The Problem and Controversy of "Generations"
"Migration Experience" as an Analytical Framework

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The article sets out some central dilemmas in which migration researchers often find themselves, knowingly or unknowingly. First, it tackles the problem of the so-called new and old migration, and conceptual problems stemming out of such a differentiation. The next important stalemate is embodied in quantitative evaluation of national migrations. The latter is critically reliant on access to and the quality of statistical and other data sources. In this sense, the author presents the conceptual background of data formation for the assessment of immigrants' integration. The prism of "generation" is scrutinized through the cases of Germany, Austria, and Slovenia, and is found as analytically insufficient. In turn, the author proposes a methodological approach which lessens discrimination of individuals and families in order to distinguish persons rather in relation to the existence of the so-called migration experience than to predisposing the so-called migration background.

Keywords: generations of migrants, migration experience, refugee crisis, pseudo-voluntary migration, migration background

Introduction

In the last half century or so, migration processes in Europe, for their most part, faced a significant overturn: from mostly interstate and the so-called north-south guest-work migration of post-war Europe in the 1960s, to the expansion of the EU, pronounced migration mobility from east to west of Europe, and to globalization of migration, all the way to the recent refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa. Henceforth, the two competing principles of inclusion of migrants into the new environment, i.e. *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, experienced a certain merger or exchange of their meaning, while categorically differentiated principles became gradually integrated within the legal framework of a given country. The famous yet unsolved French-German dispute on the applicability of both concepts arising from the 19th century culminated after the collapse of the Socialist bloc. Countries with numerous diasporas like Germany and Russia but which are, however, not confined to them, faced a problem of the "national self" reformulation.

The problem of extensive migration and pronounced ethnic differentiation of the nominally same ethnicities had, at least in the German case (e.g. Prauser and Rees 2004), been overcome by the introduction of the concept of "migration background". According to this methodological concept (which is detailed later in the text), certain populations were "positively discriminated" in order to achieve systematic integration.[1] But what was initially a good intention, it turned into an *essentialism of generations*,[2] which found domestication first in Germany, then in Austria, and soon in Slovenia, but elsewhere as well. With this contribution, we set out to resolve some central dilemmas of that new approach and its application in the aforementioned countries. We argue that this "model" needs alteration, and that the solution is actually at hand. But before distilling this issue, we will first pause at the problem of the so-called new and old migration, which gave rise to the conceptual problems stemming out of such a categorical differentiation. The next analytical stalemate is embodied in the quantitative evaluation of migration. The latter is critically reliant on access to and the quality of statistical and other data sources, and foremost on statistical definitions. The latter play a decisive role in understanding the data with which we describe or explain migration or demographic changes at large. Here, it must be stressed that the prevalent contemporary methodological approaches are not suited to encompass a plethora of possible migration settings and outcomes in a changed international environment, as they have remained rather rigid (Rogelja 2017: 17). Bringing forth the agony of people undertaking marches and voyages through dangerous routes, be it on land or on sea,[3] a need for new, more holistic concepts is apparent. For example, another categorical differentiation between the so-called forced and the so-called economic migrant or migration caught the EU and other countries on thin ice. The controversy could partly be overcome by the application of the "pseudo-voluntary migration" framework which introduces a "middleman" between the "forced" and the "voluntary" (Josipovič 2013).[4] In the broader context of recent refugee flows from the Middle East, we must not, howe-

[1] According to the German migration and integration policy orientation after 2000, special attention (i.e. positive discrimination) was given to immigrants, regardless of their ethnic belonging or affiliation, in order to integrate them more successfully into German society (Seifert 2012). The policy was further reshaped after the mass migration of refugees in 2016 (Josipovič 2017).

[2] Coined after Fred Dervin and Regis Machart (2015).

[3] Here, we mean the consequences of wars and tyrannies across continents, especially in the Middle East (wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen), when people were/are forced out from their war-torn regions.

[4] Pseudo-voluntary migration, *stricto sensu*, designates those migrations which occurred in localities or regions as a consequence of systematically changed local political, ethnic or cultural landscape, and were thus consciously or unconsciously driving individuals or groups away from certain environments. To distinguish it from the Cartesian duality of forced and/or voluntary migration (after Klinar 1985), the pseudo-voluntary migration's milieu lies somewhere in-between them, or partially overlaps one or both of them (for a thorough explanation see Josipovič 2013).

ver, exclude the role of official, semi-official, and unofficial migration industries as hidden concepts of proliferating as much as for profiting from and facilitating wars, conflicts and migration flows, as it was seen and confirmed in the Syrian example (see e.g. Josipovič 2017). In 2015 alone, the yearly turnover from facilitating migration amounted to some five billion Euros, predominantly in cash (source: Europol 2016 Report). Additionally, as much as 90% of migrants coming to the EU are facilitated mostly by members of a criminal network (ibid.). Nevertheless, these days many observers of the last "refugee crisis", as it was referred to, hardly envisage any of the repetition scenarios, as rattled and hummed barely a year ago. Though 2015 and 2016 are hardly forgotten, the so-called Balkan migration route is overtly more or less idle. Owing to the German-Turkish agreement from 2016, it seems that "rivers of people" moving to the West have ceased to exist. However, many sovereign countries *en route* between the promised Germany and disparaging Syria and Turkey took extraordinary harsh measures to prevent future forced migration. Countries like Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary initiated a domino effect of physical closings of entire portions of boundaries towards their neighbours, notwithstanding their eventual EU membership (like Romania, Croatia, or Bulgaria, and even Greece). The aforementioned countries served as gatekeepers to the "developed", "core" Europe, the Europe of the "highest speed" as the EU Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker uttered. But, the more the Balkan route became ephemeral, the more it started to become clear that recent events had given room to many barely tangible processes, except that of the closure of Schengen. This "anomaly", as stated by Mojca Širok, the Slovenian TV correspondent from Rome, served mostly to bridge an otherwise more important Mediterranean route – a true lucrative jewel for the migration industry (Josipovič 2017). In addition to the restrictions of border control and the asylum policies of the EU member-states, the events of past three years also led to the re-questioning of the position toward migrants in general, chiefly the issue of acknowledging rights to the "new migrants" versus the "old migration".

The problem of "old" and "new" migration and the "free-willingness" of migration

The collapse of the Soviet bloc and all former socialist federal countries (The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) brought forth a range of new "younger and smaller" states which clearly wanted to have the whole range of properties (like the state apparatus, national narratives and the like) as are usually pertaining to "bigger" or "older" countries. Slovenia is a clear example of this. In line with Hobsbawm's and Anderson's observations, this inevitably led towards the mystification, glorification, and mythologization of its own historic emigrations and diaspora as a foremost feature. A long tradition of emigrating is pertinent to the majority of subdued or colonized lands at least since the industrial revolution (Hobsbawm

1983; cf. Anderson 1991). On top of this, most of them exhibit the role of historic victim and loser of territory (Gavrilović 2016). The same holds for Slovenia: in the late 1980s, a series of publications and public exhibitions emerged which nourished ancient geographies of the forgotten greatness[5] with little or no regard to the contemporary views of the national question, the recognition of national minorities within or outside (diaspora) the country. This seeming un-connectedness has its logical counterpart between the new and the old. It is therefore critical to point out to the theoretical distinction between the old and the new ("migrant") minority, which is found abundantly on forums, in laic debates, and in the daily news. Though theoretically incorrect, as rich literature portrays (Šumi 2003; Knežević Hočevar 2011; cf. Josipovič 2014a), it needs to be dealt with in more detail. The question of new vs. old minorities in Slovenia bears an important paradox. It implies that "new minority" came by migration, while the "old minority" never migrated. Hence, they own the ancestral right to the "colonization primacy". It means that their rights are inherent and collective and are derived from the ancestral occupation of a given land, despite the fact that their ancestors immigrated as well – and in most cases banished their predecessors. This *contradictio in adiecto*, which arises from the question "who was there before they came", means that it is nevertheless not necessary to protect certain groups of population legally. On the contrary, the pertinent legal provisions should have been established under the equitable criteria. What does then "new", "migrant" minorities mean? Nothing particular, if we do not introduce their counterpart in the "old" minorities. The definition of new migrants is seldom agreed upon. Negative connotations are much more common in many languages (e.g. Slovenian: "pritepenci", "prišleki", "tujci"; Serbian: "došoši"; German: "Ausländer", "Preusse", "Ossis"; English: "foreigners", "newcomers"; French: "immigrés", etc.). Well, even towards "traditional" minorities, who have been present on the territory of what today is Slovenia for ages (Roma, Jews, Hungarians, Italians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, etc.), there are discursive animosities of the exponents in the "entitled population of power". Let us take a glance at the "model" of officially recognized minorities in Slovenia.[6] To restrict their number and rights in relation to potentially increased new legal protection entitlements (i.e. new groups requesting legal protection), the Slovenian parliament passed the principle of "autochthony" but failed to legally justify it, as observed by the Constitutional Court (Šumi and Josipovič 2008). The case exposed the ambivalent stance towards the country's "own" immigration and emigration, as well as the national diaspora's

[5] The most popular at that time was the so-called "Venetic" theory, which drew connection of the contemporary Slovenes to the ancient Venetes. The most renowned proponents of that theory were Jožko Šavli and Ivan Tomažič.

[6] The arrangements of legal minority protection in Slovenia were deemed a model (after Komac 2014).

struggle to enter the "cultural acquaintance with its motherland" (Žitnik Serafin 2008: 238–240). However, Slovenia does not stand alone here. On the territory of former Yugoslavia, the countries without a particular geopolitical tradition adopted practices of an apparently genuine version or interpretation of the past and the role of diasporas. The analysis of school textbooks, especially those covering history, in the area of former Yugoslavia frequently shows diametrical portraying with remerging patriarchalisation (cf. Agičić 1998; Tomljenović 2014; Šumi 2015). Such an invention of tradition is not unusual since it bears the sole *raison d'être* of the national state. Or, as Eric Hobsbawm (1983: 1) puts it:

> "'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past."

The problem evolves into the ways of "domesticating" the concepts on emigration and diaspora which nourish grounds for conflicts. Even these days, we may widely catch prejudices and stereotypes on less educated and thus less cultivated immigrants stealing jobs from fellow Slovenians who, though well educated, are forced to emigrate. How wrong and perilous such views are is visible from the brochure published by the Sloga platform in 2016 – in the heat of the so-called refugee crisis. Its findings, solidly backed up by the official statistical data, clearly overrule half-baked claims. Among the false claims is notorious prejudice that immigrants take jobs away from the domestic population. *Au contraire*, immigrants occupy less paid and mostly precarious labour previously vacant of domestic workers (SLOGA 2016). As regards education, immigrants coming to Slovenia in the last years possess slightly lower average officially attained education compared to those who emigrate from Slovenia. However, a decade or so ago, immigrants were above the national average for years (Josipovič 2006: 173). Considering these claims, it is important to define the lens through which we observe changes in the structure of overall migration. Immigrants as a group may be compared to emigrants on one hand, or to the national average on the other hand. Nowadays, immigration is closely related to the notion of employment. But to consider migration as a mere emanation of employment is counterproductive. It is obviously hard to imagine a single person not wishing to work (though such exist), or to be employed or creative in one of many respects we might connect with work or employment. Therefore, labelling one an "economic migrant" is of little or no analytical use. People might want to live and work in one place, and this particular, as well as universal, want or need does not cease neither with nor without migration (Josipovič 2013). Even when considering restrictive immigration practices/policies of states aimed at providing labour force for deficient jobs, these workers are not necessarily "economic

migrants". Most of times, the "situation" in which an individual happens to find himself/herself, sets up conditions for migration (war, work recruitment, seeking something "new", environment change etc.). Neither does employment *per se* make a migrant an economic one – since EU countries generally tend to employ refugees, forcedly resettled or expelled, and thus treat them as "forced" in contrast to "economic" migrants. But with the "forced" only the refugees are subsumed, and with the "economic" only the voluntary migrants.[7] Additionally, emigration for "better salary" or for "improvement of the living standard" is not necessarily of economic character or economic gain since the initial aims, goals, wishes, and aspirations of migrants hardly come true. It is henceforth more fruitful to distinguish between "voluntary, pseudo-voluntary, and the forced migration" (Josipovič 2013, see the footnote above) in order to grasp the sometimes contradicting facets of motivations in the decision making process for migration in different environments and settings. Such an enhanced perspective is of crucial importance in studying migration as well as diaspora since it reveals the next important issue – the reliable data and its interpretations.

The problem of data gathering in migration research

When evaluating the extent of emigration or the size of diaspora in a given state, researchers generally lack suitable data. This problem is more apparent in contemporary migration and the rise of so-called "Balkan migrant route" in which children (accompanied or unaccompanied) fleeing wars and destruction represented huge proportions, though they were systematically statistically underrepresented and lacking accurate data coverage (from misreporting of age to accompaniment of "uncles", missing children etc.; Gabaj 2013). Topped by the uneven development of national statistics across the globe, other methodological problems arise: the definition of destination areas, distinct regionalizations, incomparable data sets as regards time, state, age and gender of emigrating persons and their family members. Arising from these obstacles, it is easy to comprehend the need for precise deindividualized personal data, which is an arduous undertaking to involve a common platform for data collection across countries.

Another approach is tackling the questions pertinent to diasporas through the activities of "cultural societies" of minority members, be they emigrant or traditional, long term ethnic minorities (cf. Kržišnik Bukić 1995; Žitnik Serafin 2014). It is becoming clear that, apart from raw statistical and demographical data, the so-called

[7] Eurostat, for example, distinguishes family reunification from the economic migration, which does not contribute to the further understanding of migration since it is again seen as a supplement to the initial "economic" and thus "voluntary" migration (cf. Albertinelli et al. 2011: 14, 32).

"soft tissue data" are obtainable only through fieldwork. New studies reveal that the diasporic situation is forged within a space between cultural societies, an individual's motivation to participate, and other societal and political actors (Josipovič 2014b). Alongside political actors, there are more and more protruding economic actors, which also shape the societal transition. The demographics of these ethnic societies is a specific aspect of such a transition: on one hand, a classical function of "retaining ethnic specificity", and evermore firmly expressed needs and aspirations of actors' recognition and economic exchange on the other hand, by which the ambitions of "home-countries" interplays with inner needs of other actors (Lukšič Hacin and Udovič 2014).

Here, the question of statistical perceptions, definitions, and coverage of emigrants or diaspora members emerges. Beside the sturdy definition of the migrant, we lack summarized data on various circumstantial categories (age, gender, time of migration, duration of movement between A and B locations, length of living in a new environment, obstacles, inclusion within the neighbourhood, well-being, etc.) as well as demographic data (marital status, age at marriage, number of marriages, duration of marriage, number and age of children, their place of birth, age at migration, etc.) (e.g. Malačič 2000: 19). One way or the other, the question of birthplace is radically important since it distinguishes between children born in the new geographical environment (the so-called destination country),[8] or in the former parent's (one or both) geographical environment (the so-called place of origin). Both types of data are important, though it is not always possible to distinguish between the two. For example, statistical offices sometimes equate the migrant status of parents and their children moved together with their parents or under custody separately, with those children who were actually not in a possession of migration experience since they were born in the country of immigration. The UN Convention on Rights of the Child (UNCRC 1990) makes a cogent claim in the first paragraph of the Article 2:

> "States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status."

So, the Article 2 introduces legal difference between the child and his/her parent(s). It means that it is not possible to judge or prejudice a child according to any status of its parents. This issue obviously challenges the notorious polemics on

[8] The new environment is often falsely named the "host society", which is a mere biologism since it assumes an alien relationship between the predator and prey, while the roles are economically rather opposite (Harris 1995).

the "generations" of migrants, where some countries (like Germany and Austria) already rectified their standpoints and technically and statistically limited the number of the analysed "generations" to two, as it will be elaborated below (sources: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016; Statistik Austria 2016).

The tyranny of "generations", "generations of migrants", and "migration background"

European countries have various historical experiences with migrations. Owing to their specific settings, each of them paved its own way of treating and managing migration. As shown earlier, migration is closely intertwined with ethnicity, so it is not surprising that the principles of the citizenship access differed across countries. The two main legal settings of nationality emerged: the liberal French Revolution's inspired principle of *ius soli* on the one hand and the German principle of *ius sanguinis* on the other. The first maintains the so-called right to land by birth regardless of ethnicity, which was brilliantly explained by Ernest Joseph Renan. On the case of the Alsace and Lorraine provinces, he showed that despite different languages (or dialects) the population there is in "relation" with France on the basis of "everyday plebiscite", which is inclusive in and of itself, and cannot be denied to future generations (Renan 1887: 306–308).

The second principle basically follows Ratzel's predicate of *Kulturboden*, incorporated into the so-called *Blut und Boden* theory, where the ethnic affiliation played a key role for the inclusion of German (*Volksdeutscher*) diaspora after WWII into Germany, as opposed to the geographical principle, i.e. place of birth regardless of ethnicity (cf. Le Bras 1999). With the new circumstances (socio-economic transition of former socialist countries, expansion of the EU, demographic changes including the population aging, and the recent refugee waves from Africa and the Middle East), Europe was radically changed. The ruling principles of nationality also changed accordingly. In Germany, for instance, not only the principle of *ius sanguinis* changed, but also the view of the generations of migrants. But the "language", this good-old "broker" between the meant and the said, also represents a huge challenge. What lies at the very core of the problem is not just the unsuitable analytical use of demographic term "generation", which apropos means the totality of people born in a given calendar year (e.g. Wertheimer Baletić 1999), but also the semantic interrelation of *migrant* and *generation*. How, for instance, to speak of a "migrant of the second or third generation", who never had a migration experience? The situation when a child is ascribed to, for example, the third generation of migrants if, say, one of its grandparents migrated long time ago and never even got to know him/her, is even more absurd. Such labelling is therefore highly controversial. However, it is not only when we speak of migrant populations or their

descendants that the application of "generations" is problematic. When there are distinguishable social-geographically segregated communities, or in other ways distinct populations, it is justifiable to examine e.g. the degree of discrimination of community members' descendants regardless of their migration status (e.g. Romani settlements etc.). Henceforth, an adaptation of observing migration is needed. The ways in which these were changed are presented through the cases of Germany, Austria, and Slovenia.

a) The case of Germany

In 2005, Germany updated its statistical concept of following migration based on amendments of the Citizenship Act.[9] Instead of the notion of "generations", it introduced the system of "migration background in a narrower sense". The latter is not ideal since it presupposes the differentiation between persons "without background" (i.e. "clean" persons, ethnical *tabulae rasae*) and those "with background" (i.e. "unclean" persons). A certain background always alludes to some kind of "luggage", actually a rather heavy psychological burden, if we are to accept such discrimination, since it is crystal clear that there is no single person without a "migration background". Our grandparents would tell us many tales about people moving here and there, how there were wars and armies, and how someone had to move (migrate) to another house (of a spouse or a third person) even within the same village, though the latter would not be considered as migration in statistical terms, but as intra-mobility. Thinking more of it, these stories should be ascribed to experiences, memoires, or "memoria" as proposed by Jurič Pahor (2007), rather than to a certain "background". When speaking of backgrounds, ignorance is always present to some degree, thus carrying a darker, more obscure connotation, which permanently qualifies people as incorrect. Contrasting that, as reveals the view caught in the "national", "clean" persons are automatically defined as those belonging to the "dominant culture" with an exclusive prerogative to appropriate the exploitation and governing resources in a framework of a given "national state". This is everything but the methodological nationalism, which does not see the state formation as an historical inheritance of specific geographies of power, but as a natural, social, and political form of modern world (cf. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). When inverting such a view, one can easily find out that emigrants and diaspora members (naturally, only those of correct ethnicity) are *ad infinitum*

[9] The German nationality law (source: StAG, see the 3rd paragraph of Article 4) has, since 1 January 2000, in addition to the principle of descent, also distinguished acquisition according to the birthplace principle (*ius soli*). According to this amendment, children whose both parents are non-German citizens automatically acquire German citizenship upon birth in Germany under certain conditions. The German national statistics applied this amendment into its migration methodology. The same Act defines Germans as persons with German citizenship.

counted as the lost children begged from the motherland to return, as visible in the Slovenian case.[10]

The syntagm "migration background" if not appropriate, is extremely telling. The German statistical methodology distinguishes migration background in a narrower or wider sense. The so-called "migration background in a narrower sense" limits its use to the third "generation" at most, but only in a case when all three "generations" are not in a possession of the German citizenship. It means that the "first generation" is represented by persons without German citizenship, who actually migrated to Germany, and whose children ("the second generation") or grandchildren ("the third generation") are also without German citizenship. The German statistical office covers persons normally until the generation of the direct descendants of migrants with "migration experience" (i.e. two "generations" or "progenies"), for the majority of actually immigrated gain the German citizenship or are "naturalized" (source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016). The main reason for these assessments is the degree of integration into German society. For Germany, such assessments are very important especially when dealing with people from remote areas and countries (where bigger cultural differences are present), or in regions and localities with a higher local density of migrants, which may result in greater social disparities compared to other areas of Germany, since the German model of "welfare-state" aims at reducing social inequalities (Knuth 2016).[11] Therefore, the presented methodology seems suitable for application in the context of the newest migration or the so-called refugee crisis.

As mentioned earlier, the notion of "migration background" is ill-suited since it alludes to something obscure, latent, or dim. Thus, with the last micro-census of 2011, the German system progressively began to head towards the definition of "migration experience" (i.e. migration background in a narrower sense), instead of emphasizing the "migration background" *per se*. As a result, the German statistical office demographically differentiates between Germans (i.e. persons with the German citizenship) and the Foreigners (i.e. persons of foreign citizenship residing in Germany). Only thereafter, it distinguishes between persons with or without migration experience (see Table 1).

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[10] According to the Slovenian nationality law, the ethnic descendants of Slovenes or emigrants of Slovene origin "up to the fourth generation in a straight line" (orig. "do četrtega kolena v ravni vrsti") may acquire Slovenian citizenship upon discretion of the competent agency (source: CRSA, see the Article 12 of the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act).

[11] Many reasons and circumstances support the decision for societal consensus on immigration in Germany, foremost a low fertility population regime (1.4 child per woman in childbearing age) with high shares of older population (65+), and low shares of younger (14–) and active (15–64) population. A well-integrated immigrant population was seen as a "saviour of the German economic miracle", otherwise the prominently export-oriented economy would fail to accumulate sufficient surplus, and the pension system would collapse (Knuth 2016).

Table 1: "Migration experience" of population of Germany
(source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016)

	Population, 2014 (in millions)	Without migration background (%)	With migration background (%)				
			Total	Germans		Foreigners	
				with	without	with	without
				migration experience			
0–4	3,419	65.4	34.6	2	81.7	5.3	11
5–9	3,466	64.7	35.3	3.3	78.3	9.7	8.7
10–14	3,690	68.6	31.4	4.7	74.8	9.8	10.8
15–19	4,008	72.3	27.7	9.5	56.3	14	20.3
20–24	4,493	76.1	23.9	20.3	31.9	30.6	17.1
25–34	10,062	74.9	25.1	34.2	8.5	47.5	9.8
35–44	10,284	74.1	25.9	36.2	4.8	50.7	8.4
45–54	13,243	83.5	16.5	45.6	1.6	50.1	2.7
55–64	10,880	84.7	15.3	52.6	1	45.2	1.1
65–74	8,717	88.9	11.1	46	1	51.4	1.7
75–84	6,554	92.3	7.7	64.4	-	33.7	1.4
85–94	1,995	93.8	6.2	78.9	-	18.7	-
95+	0,086	94.2	-	-	-	-	-
Total	80,897	79.7	20.3	30.6	25.4	35.8	8.2

Table 1 shows that some 20% persons have a "migration background", among whom more than half were Germans either *with* (31%) or *without* (25%) migration experience. Looking at the data through the perspective of age, the youngest cohort consists of 35% of the "backgrounders", among whom 84% were Germans and almost all of them (98%) *without* any immediate "migration experience". Precisely due to unnecessary "stamping" of population, and consequently burdening them with a feeling of unwantedness, Germany introduced a significant change affecting the legal constitution of migration from 2000 on. This change moved Germany away from the traditional, primordial conception of the "*gens*/stem based Germanness" (*Abstammungsprinzip*). The traditional *ius sanguinis* principle was supplemented by the *ius soli* principle, according to which a person may be awarded German citizenship if his/her parents are foreigners residing in Germany and wish so (source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016). In such a case, an under-age person may retain the citizenship of one or both parents, under the condition that

the same person, between the age 18–23, makes it clear whether she or he wishes to preserve a German citizenship and dispose of other citizenships (ibid.). Currently, only persons who are willing to preserve the parents' foreign citizenship are counted into the "second generation" of migrants.

b) The case of Austria

The German model was almost thoroughly followed by Austria which, in contrast to Germany, developed a two-generational principle by which only persons born to parents who, regardless of citizenship (!), both have "immediate migration experience" of migrating to Austria, are counted into the "second generation" of migrants (source: Mikrocensus 2015). In this way, the Austrian statistics completely left out persons with one parent who migrated to Austria from abroad as not being worthy of special statistical attention. Thus, the number of non-immigrant population of concern was reduced to 0,479 million or 5.5% of all Austrian residents (Table 2).

Table 2: Population of Austria according to citizenship, place of birth, period of residing in the country, and migration background (source: Mikrocensus 2015)

	Total	Born abroad	Born in Austria
Foreign citizens	1,267,674	1,085,847	181,827
… residing 10 or more years in Austria	498,709	…	…
… residing 5 to 10 years in Austria	222,402	…	…
… less than 5 years in Austria	546,563	…	…
Migration background	1,812,934		
… "first" generation (*de facto* immigrant)		1,334,257	-
… "second" generation (non-immigrant)		-	478,677
No migration background	6,678,096		
Austrian citizens	7,432,797	508,876	6,923,921
Total (Foreign citizens + Austrian citizens)	8,700,471	1,594,723	7,105,748

The Austrian legislation subsumes integration of migrants as a legal inclusion into the Austrian citizenship. In Vienna alone, the number of naturalized persons in the period 2004–2014 amounted to 60,447 people (source: SAMA 23). From 2010, the actual experience of migration is set forward as of paramount importance in distinguishing between the question of personal, actually experienced migration and, on the other hand, questions of citizenship and naturalization (ibid.).

c) The case of Slovenia

It is of utmost importance to stress that, in the German and Austrian cases, possession of citizenship is but one of criterions of integration. This principle was only partly followed in Slovenia, one of the former Yugoslav post-socialist countries. In 2008, Slovenia introduced a new definition of population, harmonized with the EU demographic rules, which revealed an increasing number of persons without Slovenian citizenship – as much as 135,000 by December 2016 (source: MIRS 2017). While the number of foreign citizens has been increasing in the post-economic crisis period, their number was already high in 2011 (83,000; see Table 3). Nevertheless, only a fraction received Slovenian citizenship since the conditions for granting it are quite rigorous (source: CRSA).

Table 3: Population of Slovenia without Slovenian citizenship 2011–2016 (source: SURS 2017)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Persons without Slovenian citizenship	82,746	85,555	91,385	96,608	101,532	107,766
From the former Yugoslav area*	72,595	74,388	78,868	74,153	77,555	82,337
... out of which Croatia*	7,738	7,966	8,317	…	…	…
From the EU member states*	5,363	6,078	6,925	16,317	17,165	17,597
... out of which Croatia*	…	…	…	8,707	8,805	8,900
Former Yugoslav area including Croatia	72,595	74,388	78,868	82,860	86,360	91,237
EU member states (excluding Croatia)	5,363	6,078	6,925	7,610	8,360	8,697
From other countries	4,788	5,089	5,592	6,138	6,812	7,832
	share (%)					
Former Yugoslavia	87.7	86.9	86.3	76.8	76.4	76.4
Former Yugoslavia including Croatia	87.7	86.9	86.3	85.8	85.1	84.7
EU member states	6.5	7.1	7.6	16.9	16.9	16.3
EU member states (excluding Croatia)	6.5	7.1	7.6	7.9	8.2	8.1
Other countries	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.4	6.7	7.3

* On 1 July 2013, Croatia became an EU member state.

The data in Table 3 clearly shows that the former Yugoslav area is the primary recruitment basin for migration to Slovenia. This share amounted to 85% in 2016 (including Croatia, an EU member state, with some 9,000 citizens). On the other hand, apart from some 200,000 "naturalizations" (175,000 only in 1991–1992 period), Slovenia has a very strict system of population incorporation through migration, therefore the majority of migrants reside in Slovenia for decades before gaining citizenship. Such protectionism is not bene favour to declining citizen population in Slovenia, since some 25,000 Slovenian citizens recently migrated to Austria and Germany. Some 20% of those who emigrated to Germany came there after the onset of the 2008 economic crisis (source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016).

Conclusion

The main feature of the presented change in the setting of statistical coverage of migrations is the pioneering recognition of those subpopulations who went through the immediate migration experience. The German statistical office thus managed to distinguish between the migrants *per se* and the descendants of migrants. This huge methodological change was for the time being followed only by Austria. Unfortunately, Slovenia has not followed this innovative approach of distinguishing between people with or without migration experience. Thus, the possibilities for further analyses are limited. As we saw from both the German and Austrian examples, the introduction of "migration experience" has the potential for overcoming and neutralizing the negative stance on migrants and the politics of fear, while it could at the same time facilitate more active integration policy. Further statistical differentiation between immediate partakers of migration with "immediate migration experience" and the persons with "migration experience in the family", be it one, or both parents, assures sufficient categorization with less intrusion into the personal sphere and well-being of an individual. As proposed, the concept of migration experience could be a way towards understanding migrants as the ones personally enriched, instead of earmarking them as in the case of "migration background". The latter is problematic and stigmatizes an individual not only for life, but through the whole chain of their descendants until the generation X, regardless of the actual share of migratory ancestor's lineage. Such discrimination is established in a given critical moment when national statistics are in possession of ancestral statistical data, and it is well worth abandoning it as soon as possible.

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