CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION TRENDS AND FLOWS ON THE TERRITORY OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE

Edited by

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MOBILITY, POST-MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

Introduction
Contemporary Migration Trends and Flows on the Territory of Southeast Europe

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This edited volume is the result of the conference "Contemporary Migration Trends and Flows on the Territory of Southeast Europe", held in November 2016 and organized by the Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb and the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies in Zagreb. The conference gathered participants from different European countries, reaching Zagreb from Sofia, Ljubljana, Marseille, Belgrade, Malmö, Ankara, and other cities. Migration scholars with backgrounds in ethnology and cultural anthropology, sociology, geography, history, political science, demography, legal studies etc., offered various perspectives on migration processes in Europe today. One of the aims of the conference was to bring together experts who deal with migration, mobility, asylum, refugee, citizenship, and integration issues in the region, from different countries and with diverse research experience, in order to share, exchange, comment, discuss and, above all, familiarise themselves with each other's works and ideas, and to connect and establish networks for future collaboration.

Diverse and multifaceted migration patterns and trends, including emigration, transit, immigration, and circulation of persons constituted the key topics we discussed at the conference and which are analysed in this volume. Several presentations focused on the increased arrival and transit of refugees and other forced migrants through the Balkan corridor in 2015/2016.

Through presentations and discussions, conference participants elaborated on the (im)mutability of migration push and pull factors, on multi-causes of migration, diverse migrant networks, as well as on the roles of the political, economic and legislative context of migration. Some of the lines of the analysis were: (re)examination of migration typologies (e.g. economic, family, permanent, legal, irregular, voluntary, forced, virtual migration, return migration, brain drain, transmigrants, expatriates...); views on the duration of migration processes (circular, temporary, seasonal, long-term, permanent); changes in the socio-demographic structure of migrants (e.g. the feminisation of migration, youth migrants); changes in the discourse and narratives related to migration (e.g. the politicisation, securitisation and criminalisation of migration), etc. Moreover, some of the papers tackled the impact of migration processes on source, transit and destination areas. Several papers focused on the issue of integration of (im)migrants, on integration policies and on different constraints migrants encounter. The conference offered an opportunity for

comparisons of experiences from different countries: it shed light on some of the similarities between countries, as well as on some of the national specificities.

As a follow-up to the conference, this edited volume tackles different topics concerning old/new conceptual, methodological and theoretical dilemmas in migration studies. The knowledge and experience of scholars from various disciplines is shared within the pages of this volume: papers written by ethnologists and cultural anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, and others are brought together in order to gain a better understanding of the social, economic, political, cultural and other processes connected with migration in modern European societies. While some of the papers focus on migration processes, others dwell on post-migration phenomena and migrants' livelihoods in their places of immigration. Nineteen authors participated in writing thirteen papers, divided in four interrelated sections.

The first section, titled "Statistics, Patterns and Policies", deals with some of the terms and methodological tools used in migration policies, migration-related data and statistics. The paper titled "Improving the Comparability of International Migration Statistics: The Case of South-East Europe", written by Sanja Cukut Krilić, Duška Knežević Hočevar and Simona Zavratnik, discusses gaps in the categorisation and classification of migrants. The authors argue for a careful approach to the systematic recording of migration, one that would balance between the ethical issues connected with people's registration on one hand and the need for data which would serve as a basis for policies and actions on the other. In the paper "The Problem and Controversy of 'Generations': 'Migration Experience' as an Analytical Framework" Damir Josipovič focuses on the issue of "generation", which is found to be analytically insufficient and having a stigmatizing and discrimination effect. Instead, the author advocates the use of a "migration experience" framework. In her paper "Use of Migration Terms in Public Discourse: Example of Serbia in the Last Hundred Years" Miroslava Lukić Krstanović analyses the normative production of terms and categories, which are strongly embedded in historical processes of migration and state policies connected to them. The author also sheds light on the scientific institutionalisation of migration issues and on the construction of scientific paradigms.

The four papers in the section titled "Narratives and Experiences" deal with different realities and life-narratives of persons with migration experiences or migration aspirations. In her paper "A Transnational Triangle: Representations of the EU and Serbia in the Narratives of Bosnian Serbs Living in Graz", Marija Brujić writes about ambivalent and liminal positions in regards to the ethnic and cultural identities of Bosnian Serbs in Austria. She analyses their cultural representations of the EU and of the EU integration of Serbia as a transnational way of belonging in Serbia. Ivaylo Markov's paper "Narratives about Migratory Experiences and Homeland among the Albanians from the Republic of Macedonia" examines narra-

tives among Albanian labour migrants from the Republic of Macedonia, their attitudes toward their place of origin and connections to it, and their perceptions and senses of home and belonging. In the paper titled "'Should I Stay or Should I Go?': Migration Patterns of Macedonia's Young People" Mina Hristova discusses the issue of Macedonian youth obtaining Bulgarian passports. The author shows how a passport could be seen as an identity symbol, but also as a pragmatic tool for achieving a chance for a better life. In her paper "Cross-Border Marriages between Residents of South Kosovo and Western Europe: Discourses, Aspirations and Realities", Carolin Leutloff-Grandits writes about cross-border marriage migration. The author analyses discourses and legal measures against marriage migration, women's and men's aspirations to marry abroad, gender roles and family relations, as well as conflicts, possibilities and benefits that cross-border marriage might bring.

The third section, "Refugees and Asylum: Regimes, Borders and Responses", focuses on the transit movements of refugees and forced migrants through the Balkan corridor and over the Balkan route, and on the bureaucratic impediments to access, reception and integration prospects for the refugee population. The paper titled "In the Shadow of the Transit Spectacle", written by Marijana Hameršak and Iva Pleše, deals with the detention and transit camps in the Croatian part of the Balkan corridor, and with the border control system. Along with the roles of the camps in the social production of migrants' statuses, and the underlying security and humanitarian practices, the authors also recognise forms of resistance to and subversion of migration control regimes. In their paper "Migrants/Refugees in Slovene Healthcare: Many Open Questions and Some Possible Answers", Uršula Lipovec Čebron and Sara Pistotnik analyse the legal and administrative barriers migrants encounter while attempting to access the healthcare system in Slovenia. The authors also discuss some of the proposals that were made to overcome those obstacles. In her paper "'Managing' the Polyphony: The Discourse of Fraud and Epistocracy in the Context of Migration", Marta Stojić Mitrović writes about the struggles of different social and political groups to establish authority over narrations related to contemporary migration processes toward the European Union. She deals with questions of credibility and disqualification of certain voices as a manifestation of systemic violence towards disempowered groups.

The final section is titled "Mobility, Post-Migration and Integration". It gathers papers dealing with diverse topics related to mobility and post-migration phenomena such as integration, as well as with migrants' agency and the role of religiosity. The paper written by Jasna Čapo, "Economic Activities and Agency of 'Love-Driven' International Migrants in the City of Zagreb", deals with well educated, highly skilled immigrants in the Croatian capital, who have been driven to the city by love/partnership. The analyses focuses on the systemic constraints on migrants' agency and entrepreneurship. In the paper titled "Local Religiosity in the Context

of Migration: The Cases of the Greek Catholics from Žumberak in Croatia and the Orthodox Christian Serbs in Eastern Serbia", Petko Hristov and Violeta Periklieva present two cases of transnational and translocal processes. The authors focus on local religiosity in the context of labour mobility, and the roles it may play in the construction of migrants' identity and in relations to the places/areas of their origin. In their paper "Interaction as a Key Connective Tissue of Refugee Integration in Croatian Society", Rahela Jurković and Marijeta Rajković Iveta focus on experiences of integration of persons who received international protection in the Republic of Croatia. They emphasise the importance of the interactive dimension of integration, i.e. the significance of social relationships that these persons establish with the members of the receiving country and local community.

Some of the papers tackle the (post)transitional legacy and continuity of the migration, population, citizenship, asylum and/or integration policies of the states in this region. Others focus more on the historical and contemporary aspects of migration, which is understood as the consequence of economic decline, family reuniting motives or a necessity framed or de-construed as "the crisis". Aspects of post-migration phenomena reveal the complexity of integration in an era of the growing heterogeneity of immigrants. By discussing family and gender construction within national and transnational families and social spaces, some authors dwell on family, expat and other migrant networks, transborder activities, lifestyles and everyday experiences. Thus, these texts shed light on the motivations, conditions and outcomes of migration acts, depicting and emphasising migrants' agency: their motivation, perception of personal well-being, decisions, feelings, plans and actions.

Our hope is that the articles published in this volume will contribute to the better understanding of recent migration movements within and in-between Southeast Europe territories, and towards other European as well as other transcontinental areas. The collection has brought together authors who deal with macro, mezzo and micro perspectives on migration and analyse contemporary pre-migration, migration and post-migration processes. We believe that a comparative perspective – detecting similarities between countries and also indicating their specificities – can help us achieve a better understanding of migration trends and patterns. Moreover, discussing and transgressing theoretical, epistemological and methodological boundaries within migration, refugee and transnationalism studies can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of migration processes.

The discussions we engaged in during and after the conference demonstrated the great complexity of contemporary migration trends, modes and directions. Every day, we witness how migration processes impact and are influenced by the broader context: demographic trends, socio-economic inequalities, developmental perspectives, etc. At the same time, political, public, media and expert discourses on migration-related topics tell us much about socio-political positions and power

relations among different international and local stakeholders. After the events in 2015/2016, many of migrants out of necessity are still stuck on the borders along the Balkan route, and in need of assistance, protection and a chance for long term stay and integration.

We hope this edited volume will contribute to the better understanding of the social, cultural, economic, political and other challenges and potentials which migrations bring to modern European societies. Hopefully, it will also encourage further academic dialogues and debates. We wish to express our deep gratitude to all of the participants in the conference, as well as to our co-workers and colleagues who helped in organizing the conference and in making the publication of this volume possible.

Marijeta Rajković Iveta, Petra Kelemen and Drago Župarić-Iljić

Improving the Comparability of International Migration Statistics
The Case of South-East Europe

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Despite growing attempts to standardise and harmonise migration-related data collection in recent decades, fully comparable migration data across countries are still scarce. The differences in the concepts used in national statistics on migration are related to the history of specific countries and their historical migration patterns that shape migration policies, as well as to the availability and collection of migration-related data. Drawing on results of the international project "Managing Migration and Its Effects in South-East Europe – Transnational Actions Towards Evidence Based Strategies" (SEEMIG), this essay discusses these issues at the level of South-East Europe (SEE).

Keywords: migration, statistics, migration data, comparability, South-East Europe

Introduction

It seems that the statement "We are all migrants, the question is only how many generations back our migrant ancestry goes" describes well the dynamic of migration through historical narratives of both "traditional" and "modern" societies. International migrations in contemporary societies are embedded into the context of a globalised society, and the effects of globalisation can be seen as changes in the structure, dynamics and scope of migration movements (Castels and Miller 2009; Goldin, Cameron and Balajaran 2012; King 2010). Migration trends are also

a key point of reference for researchers, stakeholders and different publics that not only provide them with basic insight into the state of affairs in the area of migration at a given moment, but also, at least to a certain extent, enable them to forecast the future dynamic of possible changes in these trends.

It is at this point that the question of data as the foundation for observation of migration trends, as well as their future developments, becomes of fundamental importance. Although not all migration trends can be subsumed under the term of migration statistics – it would be difficult, if not impossible, to statistically capture the trend of politicization of migration – such statistics are indispensable in analysing, for example, the trends of feminisation and diversification of migration, and thus represent a fundamental element of more coherent migration theories.

The current tradition of researching comparative statistics in the field of migration is framed both in academic research,[1] combining either a theoretical or a mixed theoretical-empirical approach, as well as through more applied-oriented analyses of expert institutions at the international level. Among the most visible agencies that provide a rich pool of secondary data about international migration are Eurostat – the Statistical Office of the European Commission, the most comprehensive source of data on international migration in the EU member states; continuous SOPEMI (French acronym for the Continuous Reporting System on Migration) reports on recent trends in international migration by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development); Council of Europe data on demographic trends, data on asylum by the European Commission's Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security, and the data collected by the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration as two central actors of global migration management.

Therefore, a discussion on the comparability and the necessity of providing comprehensive migration statistics is in line with the academic ambition of improving and better understanding migratory movements through statistical realities, as well as through migration policies, aiming at recording and controlling people's movements of different types across international boundaries.

Acknowledging the necessity of obtaining more comparative data on movements of people across the borders of nation-states, this essay reflects upon selected dimensions of international migration statistics. Bearing in mind that an individual migrant cannot be reduced merely to a "statistical element" in different national and transnational contexts, such as in the processes of crossing national borders and/or entering databases of national employment services, the authors hold that reliable statistical data represent the key to creating migration-related policies and measures. Moreover, policies based on systematic monitoring, observation and evaluation of

[1] See for example: Kupiszewska and Nowok 2005; Raymer and Willekens 2008.

migration trends can be seen as an effort against populist manipulations of fictitious or non-existent data and moral panics and dystopias that are grounded in a notorious belief that "a high number of migrants is threatening 'us'".

For this reason, recent developments in establishing common statistical recording systems of migration are discussed in this text, particularly the issue of comparability of data in various European contexts, not only in the EU, but also on the territory of South-East Europe, which has been largely overlooked in previous research endeavours. Drawing on the results of the project SEEMIG,[2] the text addresses the cross-national synthesis of migration-related data based on eight country reports from Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.[3] We presume that the differences in the comparability of migration-related data occur not only due to differing systems of recording migration, but also as a result of historical practices that are evident in different categories of migrants. We demonstrate that the comparability of statistical data is an ambition that, though not yet achieved, is firmly grounded in the efforts of researchers that not only summarise such data but also critically reflect upon them.

To keep records on migration: theory, trends, empirical evidence

It seems that a coherent social theory on international migration is missed by those researchers who insist on "capability of prediction" of population movements as an inevitable element of doing science itself. According to Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001: 85), these experts believe that most disciplines of social science (e.g. economics, geography, sociology, demography) seek to explain the causes of observed patterns of international migration, but their theoretical perspectives still cannot predict, for instance, the movements of refugees, nor can they forecast social implications of simultaneously evidenced low rates of fertility and high rates of immigration in a given society (Teitelbaum 2005: 210).

Various actors of "demographic engineering" also take interest in such predictions, particularly the population politics policy makers. The size of a population, its age structure, distribution and growth levels are only some of the "strategic fields"

[2] SEEMIG – "Managing Migration and Its Effects in South-East Europe – Transnational Actions Towards Evidence Based Strategies" was a project funded by the European Union's South-East Europe Programme. The project aimed to better understand and address longer term migratory, human capital and demographic processes of South-East Europe, as well as their effects on labour markets, national and regional economies (project code: SEEMIG – SEE/C/0006/4.1/X; duration 2012–2014; http://www.seemig.eu/).

[3] Although we are aware of the importance of the symbolic boundaries and the socio-political connotations behind the term South-East Europe, for the purpose of this text, we perceive this territory in terms of the South-East Europe programme area defined at the EU level that encompasses all of the eight above mentioned countries as well (view also footnote no. 2).

which are controlled and managed by national governments since "[t]here are two and only two avenues for entry into membership in a population that constitutes a nation: through immigration or through birth" (Demeny 2005: 331).

In the last three decades, particularly in the European context, migration is increasingly being discussed in the view of social repercussions of low fertility and population ageing, which are among the main demographic trends that are altering the population composition in most "developed" countries.[4] Furthermore, already in 2005, the European Commission tried to establish the EU national governments' attitudes towards such demographic trends with an open questionnaire in the *Green Paper*.[5] Some questions addressed the immigration scenario as a potential response to negative social consequences of low fertility; however, it was stressed that such a scenario would not be an easy solution. Numerous questions would still remain open, as for instance: to what extent could immigration mitigate certain negative effects of demographic ageing; what policies should be developed for better integrating these migrants, in particular young people; and finally, how could Community instruments, the structural funds and the employment strategy, contribute (Green Paper 2005: 6). In the last decade, the European institutions have afforded significant attention to the economic and social repercussions of such demographic trends. As firmly stated in the European Commission's report on population ageing in Europe: "Population and labour force ageing in particular, accompanied by a shrinking of the work force, raise concerns about future economic growth"

[4] The demographic perspective constitutes one of prominent perspectives in analysing contemporary migration movements, however at least two other perspectives should be briefly mentioned, as they have common overlapping effects. The first perspective is based on establishing economic criteria for migration inflow, whereas such an economic justification in reality produces classifications of migrants into less wanted (or legitimate) or conditionally slightly more wanted if they fit the requirements – or better – shortcomings of the labour market. In particular cases, migrants can be accepted as "welcome" when representing "brain gain" for the receiving society. Economic prospects and benefits as well as risks that could arise from migration have been increasingly discussed in the academia and expert institutions since World War Two, but particularly since the economic crisis in 2008, when migrants became increasingly defined in public and policy discourses as an economic "threat" to contemporary nation-states. The second perspective is built around the critics of those researchers that link migration with the question of security and even terrorism, with a fundamental focus on establishing hard, well-protected external borders of nation-states. Modern nation-states of the "liberal" West have fenced themselves with walls, be they physical, electronic or bureaucratic and Europe as a union has erected electronic "e-borders" (Zavratnik Zimic 2001) nearly two decades ago. The analysis of hard impermeable borders at the external edge of the European community is therefore in line with the development of sophisticated information technologies that made border management and consequently control over mobility of the population mainly a matter of surveillance cameras, biometrics and databases regulating entry and of determining who is "legal" and who is "illegal" (Andreas and Snyder 2000; Pajnik and Zavratnik Zimic 2003).

[5] The full original title reads: *Green Paper. Confronting Demographic Change. A New Solidarity Between the Generations*.

(European Commission 2014). In a similar vein, the recent report produced within the auspices of the European Union Committee of the Regions (2016) lists population ageing as the core long-term structural demographic change in Europe.

The European Union, as the unit of observation of migration movements, has motivated both the academic and administrative efforts for systematic and comparative investigation and monitoring the issue. Therefore, it is not surprising that the European Commission has supported recent research projects on the harmonisation of databases on migration trends in the EU and beyond, aimed at creating suitable measures for the integration migrants into societies on the basis of more accessible, reliable and comparative evidence. The 2007 European Parliament Regulation on Community Statistics on Migration and International Protection (Regulation 2007) does provide clear definitions of immigration and emigration and also lists the migration indicators that must be transferred to Eurostat. The new regulation preserved the concept of usual residence and the duration limit of one year included in the UN recommendations adopted in 1998, which defined an international migrant as a person who changed the country of their usual residence, while distinguishing between long-terms and short-term migrants on the basis of duration of their stay (UN 1998). However, because of diversification of migration types and increasing complexity of migration at both the regional and international level in recent decades, the regulation's definition of an international migrant has remained vague.

The first actions for collecting internationally comparative data on migration were tackled by researchers of a pilot project entitled "Comparing National Data Sources in the Field of Migration and Integration" (COMPSTAT) in the 5th Framework Programme between 2001 and 2002. In order to establish a meta-database of statistical datasets available as individual data on the social and economic integration of migrants and their descendants in ten European countries,[6] the project partners reviewed various kinds of micro-datasets and statistics produced regularly by public authorities (ICMPD 2017). The project showed the uneven distribution of topics on migration in the examined datasets and, as a result, the huge incomparability of data among the selected countries (Kraler and Reichel 2010: 9).

In 2004, the 6th Framework project entitled "Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration" (THESIM) was funded as a response to the EU Regulation on Community Statistics on Migration and International Protection. The project focused on five types of data (migration flows, population stocks, asylum statistics, statistics on residence permits and statistics on citizenship

[6] The project covered eight European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland), as well as two European countries that were EU candidates at the time – the Czech Republic and Poland.

acquisition) in 25 EU member states. Similarly, as in the previous pilot project, the results showed substantial differences of certain types of administrative datasets and differences in the definitions of immigrants in the selected countries (Kraler and Reichel 2010: 9).

The subsequent project under the same framework programme entitled "Promoting Comparative Quantitative Research on Migration and Integration in Europe" (PROMINSTAT) represented an effort towards a more reliable and comparative quantitative study of European migration. Between 2007 and 2009, the project partners compiled meta-information on statistical datasets on migration, integration and discrimination, this time in 29 European countries (EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland). The project results, based on national reports and a series of comparative studies on particular topics of national data collection systems, enabled in-depth analyses of the scope, quality and comparability of statistical data collection on migration in the selected countries (PROMINSTAT 2017). Reviewing concepts, categories, topics areas and variables of various datasets (registers, censuses, surveys, etc.) at the local and national level in the selected countries, the project team identified both the repertoire of existing comparable information on migrants, their integration and discrimination, and gaps that prevented the comparison of datasets within the respective country and among the countries. For example, emigration from a given country proved to be improperly recorded because it was a common practice among emigrants not to report their residence on time, or as immigrants they reported it with a delay. As a result, data on immigrants and emigrants were either under-estimated or over-estimated. Moreover, most datasets had limited information on migration background or migration history. Information on citizenship at birth or the exact length of residence in the country before the person in question emigrated from it were rarely included in official national statistics, except for the place of birth. Such data are necessary for both the analysis of integration processes and of the reasons or motives for migration (Kraler and Reichel 2010: 70).

Finally, providing reliable and comparable data on migratory, labour market and demographic processes in South-East Europe was the main concern of the target-oriented project "Managing Migration and Its Effects in South-East Europe – Transnational Actions Towards Evidence Based Strategies" (SEEMIG) from 2012 to 2014. In addition, to better understand long-term migratory processes related to demographic dynamics and their effects on labour markets, national and regional economies, the project sought to empower public administrations to develop and implement policies and strategies by using enhanced datasets and empirical evidence (SEEMIG 2017). Compared to previous projects, the SEEMIG project focused on South-East Europe for "historical" reasons. Countries of the SEE region were, in the 19th and the early 20th century, integrated into global colonial capital-

ism in a similar manner (Melegh 2012: 420), which was necessary background information in defining types and timing of migratory movements in the area. However, analysing net migration developments in the observed time period from 1950 to 2010, the SEE region proved to be a very heterogeneous one in which four types of migratory patterns were identified. Some countries of the region that were emigrant in the 1950s and the 1960 gradually became immigrant countries (type 1), some remained emigrant (type 2) or became emigrant countries throughout the observed time period (type 3), while the fourth type included countries that oscillated between emigrant and immigrant status (Melegh 2012: 425).[7]

These types of migratory patterns were further analysed by changes in the economic and employment structure in each country, mostly in terms of the changing shares of agriculture, industry and service sector in the GDP within the time period observed, and additionally, in comparison with the world average income, all for the purpose of placing the country in question into a global hierarchy, as well. These migratory types were also reflected from the view of radical political transformations in the last 60 years (e.g. guest worker programmes initiated by Germany and Austria in the 1950s and the 1960s, or the collapse of socialist regimes all over Europe in the 1990s) to bring a socio-temporal perspective into the explanatory model of migratory developments in the region, so often limited or neglected by macro statistical analysis of migration. Yet combining the long-term macro statistics (net migration, per capita GDP) with proxy variables of economic and political changes in each country observed to improve explanation of migratory developments in a temporal perspective did require reliable and harmonised data on the issues (Melegh 2012).

Comparability of migration statistics: selected examples from European countries

Bearing in mind that migration movements were not confined to the areas within a single country, but rather formed networks at the regional level (South-East Europe), the SEEMIG project sought to provide available comparable data on migration movements as the basis for national and trans-national developmental strategies. The project, unlike previous European projects on migration statistics that addressed mainly EU member states and/or Western European countries, focused on the area of South-East Europe, where countries started to face increas-

[7] Type 1 group includes Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Greece; type 2 is comprised of some Balkan countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and FYR Macedonia; type 3 relates to the countries that were once the South-West edge of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia); and type 4 covers Croatia and Serbia.

ing challenges related to migration statistics especially in the late 1980s and 1990s (Gárdos and Gödri 2014).

This part of the essay addresses the cross-national synthesis of data based on eight country reports from Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia, which are elaborated in a comparative report entitled: *Analysis of Existing Migratory Data Production Systems and Major Data Sources in Eight South-East European Countries* (Gárdos and Gödri 2014). The aim is not to provide a comprehensive overview of main data sources on migration, but rather to identify those features of data that hamper their comparability. In this regard, a general overview of the socio-political context in selected countries that might influence the way in which data on migration are collected is taken into account, partly drawing on secondary data sources (e.g. research articles, reports).

Considering the use of administrative data, such as the population register, the register of foreigners, the register of asylum seekers and the social security database, the report finds that the usability and comparability of such data is most effective if data sources are linked. This linkage is generally easier established in countries where the PIN (Personal Identification Number) is used in administrative records and where the official connection between the statistical offices and other data owners is legally regulated and coordinated (Gárdos and Gödri 2014). However, the populations included in population registers are not always the same as those that are included in the statistical definitions of who constitutes a migrant. For instance, in Romania, "immigrants are defined as foreign citizens, who come to Romania with the agreement of Romanian authorities to settle in the country. Emigrants are defined as Romanian citizens who choose their residence abroad in agreement with Romanian authorities. Consequently, the target populations of registers cannot cover the migrants as defined in statistical requirements as there is no information on immigrant Romanian citizens and out-migrant foreign citizens" (ibid.: 14).[8]

Depending on legislation, coverage of the foreign population is slightly different. For example, in Hungary, unlike in most countries where the population register covers all people resident in a country for more than three months, only foreigners considered as permanent residents are included in the population register (ibid.:

[8] In a related manner, Fassmann provides the examples of Romanians of Hungarian origin entering Hungary, Moldovans of Romanian origin entering Romania, ethnic Greeks from the area of the former Soviet Union entering Greece and Bulgarians of Turkish descent entering Turkey, which are also not counted as regular immigrants in these countries. This can be attributed to the fact that these states are based on an ethnic concept of the nation that includes all ethnics, irrespective of where they live. Consequently, these border crossings are not categorised as instances of immigration of foreign nationals but as return migration of people who have always formed part of the nation (Fassmann 2009: 33–34).

18). The examples of Germany and Austria as typical guest worker regime countries in the second half of the twentieth century reflect the existing socio-political context at the time. Neither countries of origin nor destination regarded those workers as permanent emigrants or immigrants, nor did they count them as such in statistics. These workers were consistently described as the temporary resident population in the Austrian census, and from 1965 onwards, they were recorded in separate administrative statistics on "registered guest workers" rather than in the usual population registers (Fassmann 2009).

Another identified problem is related to under-estimated data on emigration in all observed countries. The reason mostly lies in a lack of incentives for self-deregistration of persons moving abroad, especially when temporary emigration is in question (Gárdos and Gödri 2014). As to the register of foreigners, foreigners with the right to free movement in the EU (EEA and Swiss citizens) and residence in a Member State are generally included in a different database of the foreigners' register than citizens themselves. However, due to the fact that they are not obliged to enrol in the register of foreigners and/or that they frequently do not report their stay to the authorities, their coverage in registers is estimated as most likely under-reported (ibid.: 20).

In relation to the statistical register-based data sources, the report found that collecting and clarifying emigration data was quite problematic and that emigration was generally under-represented. Immigration related data was generally found to be lower in relevance and range in countries where immigration was perceived as a marginal issue (Gárdos and Gödri 2014).

Among the SEEMIG project partners, the European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS) was generally identified as the most useful international survey in relation to migration-related data, while the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the OECD's Programme on International Student Assessment (PISA) were found to be less useful. Nevertheless, according to the interpretation of the Italian report "the hidden nature of certain groups of the immigrant population, language barriers, the particular spatial distribution of migrants, which is often not in correspondence with the sampling methodology, and potentially high non-response rate due to irregular work or irregular status" (ibid.: 34) generally add to the fact that immigrants are under-represented in the LFS. As to data on emigration, it was found that the LFS could be applicable to identify only short-term labour emigration to some extent. However, the definitions of the "household" and "household member" when asking respondents, for example, about household members working abroad, differ among countries, making such data quite unreliable (Gárdos and Gödri 2014).

Regarding the population covered in censuses, the EU Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 on Population and Housing Censuses defines the population covered by

censuses as the "national, regional and local population at its usual residence at the reference date", whereby usual residence shall mean the "place where a person normally spends the daily period of rest, regardless of temporary absences for purposes of recreation, holidays, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage" (Regulation 2008).

Those who have lived in their place of usual residence for a continuous period of at least 12 months before the reference date and those who arrived in their place of usual residence during the 12 months before the reference date with the intention of staying there for at least one year shall be considered as usual residents of a particular geographical area (ibid.). In this way, censuses also include migrants, but there exists a difference among the SEEMIG countries in the duration limits for foreign citizens living in a country. For instance, in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, a period of 12 months is required. In Slovenia, only persons who have a registered permanent or temporary residence are included, regardless of their intended period of stay (Gárdos and Gödri 2014). Furthermore, it is clear that the definition of the population cannot account for the diverse and complex transnational realities that are characteristic of many forms of contemporary mobility and migration movements.

Considering nationals living abroad, the practices of the SEEMIG countries are generally uniform; temporarily staying abroad for a period shorter than 12 months is treated as belonging to the resident population (except in Austria, where the three months criterion is considered). However, in Serbia, persons who have been living abroad for more than a year but re-enter Serbia at least once a week (e.g. commuters) are also considered members of the resident population (ibid.: 49).

That information in censuses reflects the prevailing concerns of stakeholders is clearly evident in the case of Romania. For those living abroad, the census included a special questionnaire on basic demographic characteristics, destination country, time of their departure, reason for departure and field of work and frequency of remittances in the case of employment abroad (ibid.: 52). A more detailed inclusion of such issues can be attributed to large-scale emigration from Romania in the past couple of decades. Not only in Romania, but also in Serbia, which is also faced with high levels of emigration, the question about the reason for migration was included with regard to both those staying abroad and those arriving in the country (ibid.). Italy, where there has been a major increase in the number of foreign citizens since the 2001 census, has included the country of birth of parents, which is generally not included in censuses, to identify the group of "second-generation" migrants (ibid.: 53).

Migration statistics in the wider socio-political context

What constitutes migration and how it is measured is anything but a matter of consensus. As evident from selected cases, the data are not comparable; either across national borders or over time (see also Fassmann 2009). The reasons for this can be attributed to socio-political events in various nation states and to the historical development of the notion of the nation-state.

Population movements, as Teitelbaum (2005: 200) reminds us, were controlled to a much lesser extent before the creation of sovereign nation-states in the second half of the nineteenth century, when a more systematic engagement with migration issues both in Europe and in the United States began (Kreager 1997). At that time, a much greater need to gather statistical information about the national population as a whole also appeared. Population specialists strived towards the "ideal" of counting, classifying and categorising members of such national populations that were viewed as clearly bounded and separated by the borders of newly formed nation-states (Kreager 1997; Kertzer and Arel 2002; Knežević Hočevar 2011). European nation-states thus expanded control over their national populations by counting and recording births, deaths, property and property transfers, income and population movements (Chatterjee and Riley 2001: 816). Political elites perceived such a gathering of national statistics as a tool for modernising the state (Kertzer and Arel 2002), and statistics were seen as a diagnostic tool for monitoring the social and economic welfare of the national body (Krause 2001). It is therefore not a coincidence that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the first discussions on how to collect internationally comparable migration statistics also emerged among statisticians (Fassmann 2009: 24).[9]

In this vein, statistics can be viewed as a tool of "representing the complexity of the world in categories and figures attached to such categories" (Fassmann et al. 2009: 18; see also Kertzer and Arel 2002). Histories of statistics demonstrate that "statistics as a knowledge system and set of practices has evolved in interaction with political contingencies" (Rudinow Sætnan et al. 2011: 3). Who is counted as legitimate resident of a certain nation-state, and what does residence mean, are not simply technical bureaucratic questions but are among the most complex political issues (Goldschneider 2002: 71). For example, who is included in the category of foreign persons in a particular country, depends on whether the dominant citizenship policy is *jus soli* (citizenship by birth) or *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by blood) (Grieco 2002). While the concepts of foreign born and foreigner may appear similar, they actually categorise people in different ways, depending on the prevailing concept of citizenship in a particular country (ibid.). The vast

[9] The first discussion on this issue was held at the 1891 Vienna meeting of the International Statistical Institute (Fassmann 2009: 24).

differences in nationality laws have direct consequences for the low comparability of data on citizenship and on "foreigners" across different countries (Reeger and Sievers 2009: 299).

It is quite widely acknowledged among both researchers and policy makers that statistics enable the aggregation of individual units into a larger whole and differentiate them. This can facilitate the generation of generalizable knowledge about the structure and characteristics of a population and can provide an entry of policy intervention (Kraler et al. 2015). Nevertheless, it could be argued that statistical categories do not represent social reality but construct it in a way that might influence public perceptions of selected social groups. Kertzer and Arel (2002) writing about the use of identity categories in censuses argue that such categories create particular visions of social reality by assigning all people to a single category and by conceptualising them as sharing a common collective identity with a certain number of others. They go on to argue that "rather than view social links as complex and social groupings situational, the view promoted by the census is one in which populations are divided into neat categories" (ibid.: 6).

The term migrant can thus be considered a strong form of categorization particularly for those who do not consider such a label as relevant and appropriate to their everyday lives (Gárdos and Gödri 2014), as qualitative research across different migration contexts has pervasively demonstrated. The terms second- and third-generation migrant could be particularly problematic in this respect. Life stories of individual migrants point to the gaps in statistical categorisations of migration that fail to capture the diverse and changing motives of the collocutors. An empirical distinction between different types of migration is therefore impossible to sustain. Migrants are often labelled too narrowly as either "labour" or "marriage" migrants or as voluntary on the one hand, and forced migrants on the other hand. Clearly, such narrow statistical typologies do not encapsulate the diversified nature of contemporary migration processes. A wide range of motives, often quite distinct from the statistically ascribed category, can lie behind the process of migration. Typologies, as Brettell (2000: 102) argues, present us with a static and homogenised picture of a process that is dynamic throughout the course of an individual's life. Crosby (2006: 3) holds that "because of the way we label, define, and categorise people who move, we obscure and make invisible their actual lived experience". In this respect, Kraler, Reichel and Entzinger (2015: 55) argue that the "production and use of social statistics differentiated by 'migration background', be it on the basis of demographic, sociological or ethnic criteria, not only makes these groups visible, but also manifests their very existence and creates a reinforced perception of group differences".

Concluding considerations

The general finding that achieving comparability of migration statistics is a rather complex and challenging task is evidenced not only in academic endeavours, but also through the operationalization of such statistics in concrete practices of establishing comparable systems of recording population movements. The efforts of researchers to contribute to more reliable and internationally comparable statistical data on migration can be, in particular, traced to the last couple of decades. Such attempts are also backed by various initiatives within international organisations and institutions (European Commission, OECD, United Nations, International Organisation for Migration, International Labour Organisation – ILO, and some other agencies). The diffuse nature of data and their non-comparability due to different systems of recording them – which can be the result of different definitions produced in different socio-political contexts of nation-states – is the key feature of migration related data that nation-states record. In different national contexts, statistics do not always speak the same language.

The examples from selected countries of South-East Europe point to the ambivalences and challenges of achieving better comparability of migration movements, which is a highly prioritised area of public policies. Migration movements can be located at the intersection of at least three key public policies (migration, demographic and economic) through which the state defines its citizens, tax payers and foreigners and ensures a continuity of the national body.

In this respect, the results of the SEEMIG project confirm the need for a reliable repository of migration statistics that can also be of support to more coherent migration theories. The forecast of long-term trends as well as short-term changes in the nature of migration movements is generally based on datasets as an analytical foundation of predictions; exceptions are periods of crisis, such as migration due to radical environmental changes or sudden forced migration in armed conflicts. The lack of statistics or unwillingness to include them in the analysis leads to "imaginary migration statistics" and, in turn, to populist approaches to migration.

The need to complement existing public registers with data "from the field" is also evident. Such is the case in micro environments next to former borders of EU member states where either a high number of daily migrants (e.g. between Poland and Germany, and Slovenia and Austria, to state just two examples) and/or transnational migration (e.g. circular migration from Romania to Italy) can be observed. These cases are only partially covered by existent migration statistics, which was observed also in the SEEMIG project. Qualitatively designed research is not meant to substitute the centralised records of public institutions, but instead to strengthen their value and spread knowledge of migration and mobility practices outside the established instruments for recording them, such as, for instance, the census and

central registers. These endeavours can deepen our knowledge of motives for migration.

The use of migration statistics is, due to different definitions of main migration-related concepts and mutually incomparable databases between nation-states, often inaccurate and sometimes even problematic. This points to methodological nationalism at the axes of migration-demography-nation that is not a notion related only to romantic visions of the nation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but is embedded also in globalised migration movements into which formerly less mobile societies of socialist provenience are increasingly involved. Migration statistics are also a key component of demographic predictions, however increasing population through increased fertility of the "native population" rather than through increased immigration is the preferred solution of most European nation-states.

The need for systematic recording of migration is not in line with individual motives of migrants and the idea of the freedom of movement as one of the main pillars of the EU. In its core, the statistical gathering of migration-related data is quite ambivalent and, although highly needed at the level of public policies, can present an intrusion into the principle of freedom of movement. Population-related data restore the traceability of the individual, and abundant experiences in various migratory contexts show that migrants perceive such control over their lives as intrusive and restrictive to their freedom of movement.

Such is the example of the practices and policies used to counteract the lack of deregistration of nationals, evident in the underrepresentation of emigration in statistical data. For practical and financial reasons and in the absence of strict administrative rules, migrants may have particular reasons not to (want to) register their (e)migration (Poulain 2008). Detecting persons, to whom official mails could not be delivered, checking whose benefits are received in another country, checking persons receiving pensions in another country, etc., are all state-enacted actions that are quite problematic from an ethical and human rights point of view. It seems that finding a balance between these ethical issues and the need for further data on the basis of which policies and actions could be developed, must be sought in individual national contexts and also at the wider supra-national level.

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The Problem and Controversy of "Generations"
"Migration Experience" as an Analytical Framework

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The article sets out some central dilemmas in which migration researchers often find themselves, knowingly or unknowingly. First, it tackles the problem of the so-called new and old migration, and conceptual problems stemming out of such a differentiation. The next important stalemate is embodied in quantitative evaluation of national migrations. The latter is critically reliant on access to and the quality of statistical and other data sources. In this sense, the author presents the conceptual background of data formation for the assessment of immigrants' integration. The prism of "generation" is scrutinized through the cases of Germany, Austria, and Slovenia, and is found as analytically insufficient. In turn, the author proposes a methodological approach which lessens discrimination of individuals and families in order to distinguish persons rather in relation to the existence of the so-called migration experience than to predisposing the so-called migration background.

Keywords: generations of migrants, migration experience, refugee crisis, pseudo-voluntary migration, migration background

Introduction

In the last half century or so, migration processes in Europe, for their most part, faced a significant overturn: from mostly interstate and the so-called north-south guest-work migration of post-war Europe in the 1960s, to the expansion of the EU, pronounced migration mobility from east to west of Europe, and to globalization of migration, all the way to the recent refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa. Henceforth, the two competing principles of inclusion of migrants into the new environment, i.e. *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, experienced a certain merger or exchange of their meaning, while categorically differentiated principles became gradually integrated within the legal framework of a given country. The famous yet unsolved French-German dispute on the applicability of both concepts arising from the 19th century culminated after the collapse of the Socialist bloc. Countries with numerous diasporas like Germany and Russia but which are, however, not confined to them, faced a problem of the "national self" reformulation.

The problem of extensive migration and pronounced ethnic differentiation of the nominally same ethnicities had, at least in the German case (e.g. Prauser and Rees 2004), been overcome by the introduction of the concept of "migration background". According to this methodological concept (which is detailed later in the text), certain populations were "positively discriminated" in order to achieve systematic integration.[1] But what was initially a good intention, it turned into an *essentialism of generations*,[2] which found domestication first in Germany, then in Austria, and soon in Slovenia, but elsewhere as well. With this contribution, we set out to resolve some central dilemmas of that new approach and its application in the aforementioned countries. We argue that this "model" needs alteration, and that the solution is actually at hand. But before distilling this issue, we will first pause at the problem of the so-called new and old migration, which gave rise to the conceptual problems stemming out of such a categorical differentiation. The next analytical stalemate is embodied in the quantitative evaluation of migration. The latter is critically reliant on access to and the quality of statistical and other data sources, and foremost on statistical definitions. The latter play a decisive role in understanding the data with which we describe or explain migration or demographic changes at large. Here, it must be stressed that the prevalent contemporary methodological approaches are not suited to encompass a plethora of possible migration settings and outcomes in a changed international environment, as they have remained rather rigid (Rogelja 2017: 17). Bringing forth the agony of people undertaking marches and voyages through dangerous routes, be it on land or on sea,[3] a need for new, more holistic concepts is apparent. For example, another categorical differentiation between the so-called forced and the so-called economic migrant or migration caught the EU and other countries on thin ice. The controversy could partly be overcome by the application of the "pseudo-voluntary migration" framework which introduces a "middleman" between the "forced" and the "voluntary" (Josipovič 2013).[4] In the broader context of recent refugee flows from the Middle East, we must not, howe-

[1] According to the German migration and integration policy orientation after 2000, special attention (i.e. positive discrimination) was given to immigrants, regardless of their ethnic belonging or affiliation, in order to integrate them more successfully into German society (Seifert 2012). The policy was further reshaped after the mass migration of refugees in 2016 (Josipovič 2017).

[2] Coined after Fred Dervin and Regis Machart (2015).

[3] Here, we mean the consequences of wars and tyrannies across continents, especially in the Middle East (wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen), when people were/are forced out from their war-torn regions.

[4] Pseudo-voluntary migration, *stricto sensu*, designates those migrations which occurred in localities or regions as a consequence of systematically changed local political, ethnic or cultural landscape, and were thus consciously or unconsciously driving individuals or groups away from certain environments. To distinguish it from the Cartesian duality of forced and/or voluntary migration (after Klinar 1985), the pseudo-voluntary migration's milieu lies somewhere in-between them, or partially overlaps one or both of them (for a thorough explanation see Josipovič 2013).

ver, exclude the role of official, semi-official, and unofficial migration industries as hidden concepts of proliferating as much as for profiting from and facilitating wars, conflicts and migration flows, as it was seen and confirmed in the Syrian example (see e.g. Josipovič 2017). In 2015 alone, the yearly turnover from facilitating migration amounted to some five billion Euros, predominantly in cash (source: Europol 2016 Report). Additionally, as much as 90% of migrants coming to the EU are facilitated mostly by members of a criminal network (ibid.). Nevertheless, these days many observers of the last "refugee crisis", as it was referred to, hardly envisage any of the repetition scenarios, as rattled and hummed barely a year ago. Though 2015 and 2016 are hardly forgotten, the so-called Balkan migration route is overtly more or less idle. Owing to the German-Turkish agreement from 2016, it seems that "rivers of people" moving to the West have ceased to exist. However, many sovereign countries *en route* between the promised Germany and disparaging Syria and Turkey took extraordinary harsh measures to prevent future forced migration. Countries like Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary initiated a domino effect of physical closings of entire portions of boundaries towards their neighbours, notwithstanding their eventual EU membership (like Romania, Croatia, or Bulgaria, and even Greece). The aforementioned countries served as gatekeepers to the "developed", "core" Europe, the Europe of the "highest speed" as the EU Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker uttered. But, the more the Balkan route became ephemeral, the more it started to become clear that recent events had given room to many barely tangible processes, except that of the closure of Schengen. This "anomaly", as stated by Mojca Širok, the Slovenian TV correspondent from Rome, served mostly to bridge an otherwise more important Mediterranean route – a true lucrative jewel for the migration industry (Josipovič 2017). In addition to the restrictions of border control and the asylum policies of the EU member-states, the events of past three years also led to the re-questioning of the position toward migrants in general, chiefly the issue of acknowledging rights to the "new migrants" versus the "old migration".

The problem of "old" and "new" migration and the "free-willingness" of migration

The collapse of the Soviet bloc and all former socialist federal countries (The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) brought forth a range of new "younger and smaller" states which clearly wanted to have the whole range of properties (like the state apparatus, national narratives and the like) as are usually pertaining to "bigger" or "older" countries. Slovenia is a clear example of this. In line with Hobsbawm's and Anderson's observations, this inevitably led towards the mystification, glorification, and mythologization of its own historic emigrations and diaspora as a foremost feature. A long tradition of emigrating is pertinent to the majority of subdued or colonized lands at least since the industrial revolution (Hobsbawm

1983; cf. Anderson 1991). On top of this, most of them exhibit the role of historic victim and loser of territory (Gavrilović 2016). The same holds for Slovenia: in the late 1980s, a series of publications and public exhibitions emerged which nourished ancient geographies of the forgotten greatness[5] with little or no regard to the contemporary views of the national question, the recognition of national minorities within or outside (diaspora) the country. This seeming un-connectedness has its logical counterpart between the new and the old. It is therefore critical to point out to the theoretical distinction between the old and the new ("migrant") minority, which is found abundantly on forums, in laic debates, and in the daily news. Though theoretically incorrect, as rich literature portrays (Šumi 2003; Knežević Hočevar 2011; cf. Josipovič 2014a), it needs to be dealt with in more detail. The question of new vs. old minorities in Slovenia bears an important paradox. It implies that "new minority" came by migration, while the "old minority" never migrated. Hence, they own the ancestral right to the "colonization primacy". It means that their rights are inherent and collective and are derived from the ancestral occupation of a given land, despite the fact that their ancestors immigrated as well – and in most cases banished their predecessors. This *contradictio in adiecto*, which arises from the question "who was there before they came", means that it is nevertheless not necessary to protect certain groups of population legally. On the contrary, the pertinent legal provisions should have been established under the equitable criteria. What does then "new", "migrant" minorities mean? Nothing particular, if we do not introduce their counterpart in the "old" minorities. The definition of new migrants is seldom agreed upon. Negative connotations are much more common in many languages (e.g. Slovenian: "pritepenci", "prišleki", "tujci"; Serbian: "došoši"; German: "Ausländer", "Preusse", "Ossis"; English: "foreigners", "newcomers"; French: "immigrés", etc.). Well, even towards "traditional" minorities, who have been present on the territory of what today is Slovenia for ages (Roma, Jews, Hungarians, Italians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, etc.), there are discursive animosities of the exponents in the "entitled population of power". Let us take a glance at the "model" of officially recognized minorities in Slovenia.[6] To restrict their number and rights in relation to potentially increased new legal protection entitlements (i.e. new groups requesting legal protection), the Slovenian parliament passed the principle of "autochthony" but failed to legally justify it, as observed by the Constitutional Court (Šumi and Josipovič 2008). The case exposed the ambivalent stance towards the country's "own" immigration and emigration, as well as the national diaspora's

[5] The most popular at that time was the so-called "Venetic" theory, which drew connection of the contemporary Slovenes to the ancient Venetes. The most renowned proponents of that theory were Jožko Šavli and Ivan Tomažič.

[6] The arrangements of legal minority protection in Slovenia were deemed a model (after Komac 2014).

struggle to enter the "cultural acquaintance with its motherland" (Žitnik Serafin 2008: 238–240). However, Slovenia does not stand alone here. On the territory of former Yugoslavia, the countries without a particular geopolitical tradition adopted practices of an apparently genuine version or interpretation of the past and the role of diasporas. The analysis of school textbooks, especially those covering history, in the area of former Yugoslavia frequently shows diametrical portraying with remerging patriarchalisation (cf. Agičić 1998; Tomljenović 2014; Šumi 2015). Such an invention of tradition is not unusual since it bears the sole *raison d'être* of the national state. Or, as Eric Hobsbawm (1983: 1) puts it:

> "'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past."

The problem evolves into the ways of "domesticating" the concepts on emigration and diaspora which nourish grounds for conflicts. Even these days, we may widely catch prejudices and stereotypes on less educated and thus less cultivated immigrants stealing jobs from fellow Slovenians who, though well educated, are forced to emigrate. How wrong and perilous such views are is visible from the brochure published by the Sloga platform in 2016 – in the heat of the so-called refugee crisis. Its findings, solidly backed up by the official statistical data, clearly overrule half-baked claims. Among the false claims is notorious prejudice that immigrants take jobs away from the domestic population. *Au contraire*, immigrants occupy less paid and mostly precarious labour previously vacant of domestic workers (SLOGA 2016). As regards education, immigrants coming to Slovenia in the last years possess slightly lower average officially attained education compared to those who emigrate from Slovenia. However, a decade or so ago, immigrants were above the national average for years (Josipovič 2006: 173). Considering these claims, it is important to define the lens through which we observe changes in the structure of overall migration. Immigrants as a group may be compared to emigrants on one hand, or to the national average on the other hand. Nowadays, immigration is closely related to the notion of employment. But to consider migration as a mere emanation of employment is counterproductive. It is obviously hard to imagine a single person not wishing to work (though such exist), or to be employed or creative in one of many respects we might connect with work or employment. Therefore, labelling one an "economic migrant" is of little or no analytical use. People might want to live and work in one place, and this particular, as well as universal, want or need does not cease neither with nor without migration (Josipovič 2013). Even when considering restrictive immigration practices/policies of states aimed at providing labour force for deficient jobs, these workers are not necessarily "economic

migrants". Most of times, the "situation" in which an individual happens to find himself/herself, sets up conditions for migration (war, work recruitment, seeking something "new", environment change etc.). Neither does employment *per se* make a migrant an economic one – since EU countries generally tend to employ refugees, forcedly resettled or expelled, and thus treat them as "forced" in contrast to "economic" migrants. But with the "forced" only the refugees are subsumed, and with the "economic" only the voluntary migrants.[7] Additionally, emigration for "better salary" or for "improvement of the living standard" is not necessarily of economic character or economic gain since the initial aims, goals, wishes, and aspirations of migrants hardly come true. It is henceforth more fruitful to distinguish between "voluntary, pseudo-voluntary, and the forced migration" (Josipovič 2013, see the footnote above) in order to grasp the sometimes contradicting facets of motivations in the decision making process for migration in different environments and settings. Such an enhanced perspective is of crucial importance in studying migration as well as diaspora since it reveals the next important issue – the reliable data and its interpretations.

The problem of data gathering in migration research

When evaluating the extent of emigration or the size of diaspora in a given state, researchers generally lack suitable data. This problem is more apparent in contemporary migration and the rise of so-called "Balkan migrant route" in which children (accompanied or unaccompanied) fleeing wars and destruction represented huge proportions, though they were systematically statistically underrepresented and lacking accurate data coverage (from misreporting of age to accompaniment of "uncles", missing children etc.; Gabaj 2013). Topped by the uneven development of national statistics across the globe, other methodological problems arise: the definition of destination areas, distinct regionalizations, incomparable data sets as regards time, state, age and gender of emigrating persons and their family members. Arising from these obstacles, it is easy to comprehend the need for precise deindividualized personal data, which is an arduous undertaking to involve a common platform for data collection across countries.

Another approach is tackling the questions pertinent to diasporas through the activities of "cultural societies" of minority members, be they emigrant or traditional, long term ethnic minorities (cf. Kržišnik Bukić 1995; Žitnik Serafin 2014). It is becoming clear that, apart from raw statistical and demographical data, the so-called

[7] Eurostat, for example, distinguishes family reunification from the economic migration, which does not contribute to the further understanding of migration since it is again seen as a supplement to the initial "economic" and thus "voluntary" migration (cf. Albertinelli et al. 2011: 14, 32).

"soft tissue data" are obtainable only through fieldwork. New studies reveal that the diasporic situation is forged within a space between cultural societies, an individual's motivation to participate, and other societal and political actors (Josipovič 2014b). Alongside political actors, there are more and more protruding economic actors, which also shape the societal transition. The demographics of these ethnic societies is a specific aspect of such a transition: on one hand, a classical function of "retaining ethnic specificity", and evermore firmly expressed needs and aspirations of actors' recognition and economic exchange on the other hand, by which the ambitions of "home-countries" interplays with inner needs of other actors (Lukšič Hacin and Udovič 2014).

Here, the question of statistical perceptions, definitions, and coverage of emigrants or diaspora members emerges. Beside the sturdy definition of the migrant, we lack summarized data on various circumstantial categories (age, gender, time of migration, duration of movement between A and B locations, length of living in a new environment, obstacles, inclusion within the neighbourhood, well-being, etc.) as well as demographic data (marital status, age at marriage, number of marriages, duration of marriage, number and age of children, their place of birth, age at migration, etc.) (e.g. Malačič 2000: 19). One way or the other, the question of birthplace is radically important since it distinguishes between children born in the new geographical environment (the so-called destination country),[8] or in the former parent's (one or both) geographical environment (the so-called place of origin). Both types of data are important, though it is not always possible to distinguish between the two. For example, statistical offices sometimes equate the migrant status of parents and their children moved together with their parents or under custody separately, with those children who were actually not in a possession of migration experience since they were born in the country of immigration. The UN Convention on Rights of the Child (UNCRC 1990) makes a cogent claim in the first paragraph of the Article 2:

> "States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status."

So, the Article 2 introduces legal difference between the child and his/her parent(s). It means that it is not possible to judge or prejudice a child according to any status of its parents. This issue obviously challenges the notorious polemics on

[8] The new environment is often falsely named the "host society", which is a mere biologism since it assumes an alien relationship between the predator and prey, while the roles are economically rather opposite (Harris 1995).

the "generations" of migrants, where some countries (like Germany and Austria) already rectified their standpoints and technically and statistically limited the number of the analysed "generations" to two, as it will be elaborated below (sources: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016; Statistik Austria 2016).

The tyranny of "generations", "generations of migrants", and "migration background"

European countries have various historical experiences with migrations. Owing to their specific settings, each of them paved its own way of treating and managing migration. As shown earlier, migration is closely intertwined with ethnicity, so it is not surprising that the principles of the citizenship access differed across countries. The two main legal settings of nationality emerged: the liberal French Revolution's inspired principle of *ius soli* on the one hand and the German principle of *ius sanguinis* on the other. The first maintains the so-called right to land by birth regardless of ethnicity, which was brilliantly explained by Ernest Joseph Renan. On the case of the Alsace and Lorraine provinces, he showed that despite different languages (or dialects) the population there is in "relation" with France on the basis of "everyday plebiscite", which is inclusive in and of itself, and cannot be denied to future generations (Renan 1887: 306–308).

The second principle basically follows Ratzel's predicate of *Kulturboden*, incorporated into the so-called *Blut und Boden* theory, where the ethnic affiliation played a key role for the inclusion of German (*Volksdeutscher*) diaspora after WWII into Germany, as opposed to the geographical principle, i.e. place of birth regardless of ethnicity (cf. Le Bras 1999). With the new circumstances (socio-economic transition of former socialist countries, expansion of the EU, demographic changes including the population aging, and the recent refugee waves from Africa and the Middle East), Europe was radically changed. The ruling principles of nationality also changed accordingly. In Germany, for instance, not only the principle of *ius sanguinis* changed, but also the view of the generations of migrants. But the "language", this good-old "broker" between the meant and the said, also represents a huge challenge. What lies at the very core of the problem is not just the unsuitable analytical use of demographic term "generation", which apropos means the totality of people born in a given calendar year (e.g. Wertheimer Baletić 1999), but also the semantic interrelation of *migrant* and *generation*. How, for instance, to speak of a "migrant of the second or third generation", who never had a migration experience? The situation when a child is ascribed to, for example, the third generation of migrants if, say, one of its grandparents migrated long time ago and never even got to know him/her, is even more absurd. Such labelling is therefore highly controversial. However, it is not only when we speak of migrant populations or their

descendants that the application of "generations" is problematic. When there are distinguishable social-geographically segregated communities, or in other ways distinct populations, it is justifiable to examine e.g. the degree of discrimination of community members' descendants regardless of their migration status (e.g. Romani settlements etc.). Henceforth, an adaptation of observing migration is needed. The ways in which these were changed are presented through the cases of Germany, Austria, and Slovenia.

a) The case of Germany

In 2005, Germany updated its statistical concept of following migration based on amendments of the Citizenship Act.[9] Instead of the notion of "generations", it introduced the system of "migration background in a narrower sense". The latter is not ideal since it presupposes the differentiation between persons "without background" (i.e. "clean" persons, ethnical *tabulae rasae*) and those "with background" (i.e. "unclean" persons). A certain background always alludes to some kind of "luggage", actually a rather heavy psychological burden, if we are to accept such discrimination, since it is crystal clear that there is no single person without a "migration background". Our grandparents would tell us many tales about people moving here and there, how there were wars and armies, and how someone had to move (migrate) to another house (of a spouse or a third person) even within the same village, though the latter would not be considered as migration in statistical terms, but as intra-mobility. Thinking more of it, these stories should be ascribed to experiences, memoires, or "memoria" as proposed by Jurič Pahor (2007), rather than to a certain "background". When speaking of backgrounds, ignorance is always present to some degree, thus carrying a darker, more obscure connotation, which permanently qualifies people as incorrect. Contrasting that, as reveals the view caught in the "national", "clean" persons are automatically defined as those belonging to the "dominant culture" with an exclusive prerogative to appropriate the exploitation and governing resources in a framework of a given "national state". This is everything but the methodological nationalism, which does not see the state formation as an historical inheritance of specific geographies of power, but as a natural, social, and political form of modern world (cf. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). When inverting such a view, one can easily find out that emigrants and diaspora members (naturally, only those of correct ethnicity) are *ad infinitum*

[9] The German nationality law (source: StAG, see the 3rd paragraph of Article 4) has, since 1 January 2000, in addition to the principle of descent, also distinguished acquisition according to the birthplace principle (*ius soli*). According to this amendment, children whose both parents are non-German citizens automatically acquire German citizenship upon birth in Germany under certain conditions. The German national statistics applied this amendment into its migration methodology. The same Act defines Germans as persons with German citizenship.

counted as the lost children begged from the motherland to return, as visible in the Slovenian case.[10]

The syntagm "migration background" if not appropriate, is extremely telling. The German statistical methodology distinguishes migration background in a narrower or wider sense. The so-called "migration background in a narrower sense" limits its use to the third "generation" at most, but only in a case when all three "generations" are not in a possession of the German citizenship. It means that the "first generation" is represented by persons without German citizenship, who actually migrated to Germany, and whose children ("the second generation") or grandchildren ("the third generation") are also without German citizenship. The German statistical office covers persons normally until the generation of the direct descendants of migrants with "migration experience" (i.e. two "generations" or "progenies"), for the majority of actually immigrated gain the German citizenship or are "naturalized" (source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016). The main reason for these assessments is the degree of integration into German society. For Germany, such assessments are very important especially when dealing with people from remote areas and countries (where bigger cultural differences are present), or in regions and localities with a higher local density of migrants, which may result in greater social disparities compared to other areas of Germany, since the German model of "welfare-state" aims at reducing social inequalities (Knuth 2016).[11] Therefore, the presented methodology seems suitable for application in the context of the newest migration or the so-called refugee crisis.

As mentioned earlier, the notion of "migration background" is ill-suited since it alludes to something obscure, latent, or dim. Thus, with the last micro-census of 2011, the German system progressively began to head towards the definition of "migration experience" (i.e. migration background in a narrower sense), instead of emphasizing the "migration background" *per se*. As a result, the German statistical office demographically differentiates between Germans (i.e. persons with the German citizenship) and the Foreigners (i.e. persons of foreign citizenship residing in Germany). Only thereafter, it distinguishes between persons with or without migration experience (see Table 1).

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[10] According to the Slovenian nationality law, the ethnic descendants of Slovenes or emigrants of Slovene origin "up to the fourth generation in a straight line" (orig. "do četrtega kolena v ravni vrsti") may acquire Slovenian citizenship upon discretion of the competent agency (source: CRSA, see the Article 12 of the Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia Act).

[11] Many reasons and circumstances support the decision for societal consensus on immigration in Germany, foremost a low fertility population regime (1.4 child per woman in childbearing age) with high shares of older population (65+), and low shares of younger (14–) and active (15–64) population. A well-integrated immigrant population was seen as a "saviour of the German economic miracle", otherwise the prominently export-oriented economy would fail to accumulate sufficient surplus, and the pension system would collapse (Knuth 2016).

Table 1: "Migration experience" of population of Germany
(source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016)

	Population, 2014 (in millions)	Without migration background (%)	With migration background (%)				
			Total	Germans		Foreigners	
				with	without	with	without
				migration experience			
0–4	3,419	65.4	34.6	2	81.7	5.3	11
5–9	3,466	64.7	35.3	3.3	78.3	9.7	8.7
10–14	3,690	68.6	31.4	4.7	74.8	9.8	10.8
15–19	4,008	72.3	27.7	9.5	56.3	14	20.3
20–24	4,493	76.1	23.9	20.3	31.9	30.6	17.1
25–34	10,062	74.9	25.1	34.2	8.5	47.5	9.8
35–44	10,284	74.1	25.9	36.2	4.8	50.7	8.4
45–54	13,243	83.5	16.5	45.6	1.6	50.1	2.7
55–64	10,880	84.7	15.3	52.6	1	45.2	1.1
65–74	8,717	88.9	11.1	46	1	51.4	1.7
75–84	6,554	92.3	7.7	64.4	-	33.7	1.4
85–94	1,995	93.8	6.2	78.9	-	18.7	-
95+	0,086	94.2	-	-	-	-	-
Total	80,897	79.7	20.3	30.6	25.4	35.8	8.2

Table 1 shows that some 20% persons have a "migration background", among whom more than half were Germans either *with* (31%) or *without* (25%) migration experience. Looking at the data through the perspective of age, the youngest cohort consists of 35% of the "backgrounders", among whom 84% were Germans and almost all of them (98%) *without* any immediate "migration experience". Precisely due to unnecessary "stamping" of population, and consequently burdening them with a feeling of unwantedness, Germany introduced a significant change affecting the legal constitution of migration from 2000 on. This change moved Germany away from the traditional, primordial conception of the "*gens*/stem based Germanness" (*Abstammungsprinzip*). The traditional *ius sanguinis* principle was supplemented by the *ius soli* principle, according to which a person may be awarded German citizenship if his/her parents are foreigners residing in Germany and wish so (source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016). In such a case, an under-age person may retain the citizenship of one or both parents, under the condition that

the same person, between the age 18–23, makes it clear whether she or he wishes to preserve a German citizenship and dispose of other citizenships (ibid.). Currently, only persons who are willing to preserve the parents' foreign citizenship are counted into the "second generation" of migrants.

b) The case of Austria

The German model was almost thoroughly followed by Austria which, in contrast to Germany, developed a two-generational principle by which only persons born to parents who, regardless of citizenship (!), both have "immediate migration experience" of migrating to Austria, are counted into the "second generation" of migrants (source: Mikrocensus 2015). In this way, the Austrian statistics completely left out persons with one parent who migrated to Austria from abroad as not being worthy of special statistical attention. Thus, the number of non-immigrant population of concern was reduced to 0,479 million or 5.5% of all Austrian residents (Table 2).

Table 2: Population of Austria according to citizenship, place of birth, period of residing in the country, and migration background (source: Mikrocensus 2015)

	Total	Born abroad	Born in Austria
Foreign citizens	1,267,674	1,085,847	181,827
… residing 10 or more years in Austria	498,709	…	…
… residing 5 to 10 years in Austria	222,402	…	…
… less than 5 years in Austria	546,563	…	…
Migration background	1,812,934		
… "first" generation (*de facto* immigrant)		1,334,257	-
… "second" generation (non-immigrant)		-	478,677
No migration background	6,678,096		
Austrian citizens	7,432,797	508,876	6,923,921
Total (Foreign citizens + Austrian citizens)	8,700,471	1,594,723	7,105,748

The Austrian legislation subsumes integration of migrants as a legal inclusion into the Austrian citizenship. In Vienna alone, the number of naturalized persons in the period 2004–2014 amounted to 60,447 people (source: SAMA 23). From 2010, the actual experience of migration is set forward as of paramount importance in distinguishing between the question of personal, actually experienced migration and, on the other hand, questions of citizenship and naturalization (ibid.).

c) The case of Slovenia

It is of utmost importance to stress that, in the German and Austrian cases, possession of citizenship is but one of criterions of integration. This principle was only partly followed in Slovenia, one of the former Yugoslav post-socialist countries. In 2008, Slovenia introduced a new definition of population, harmonized with the EU demographic rules, which revealed an increasing number of persons without Slovenian citizenship – as much as 135,000 by December 2016 (source: MIRS 2017). While the number of foreign citizens has been increasing in the post-economic crisis period, their number was already high in 2011 (83,000; see Table 3). Nevertheless, only a fraction received Slovenian citizenship since the conditions for granting it are quite rigorous (source: CRSA).

Table 3: Population of Slovenia without Slovenian citizenship 2011–2016 (source: SURS 2017)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Persons without Slovenian citizenship	82,746	85,555	91,385	96,608	101,532	107,766
From the former Yugoslav area*	72,595	74,388	78,868	74,153	77,555	82,337
... out of which Croatia*	7,738	7,966	8,317	…	…	…
From the EU member states*	5,363	6,078	6,925	16,317	17,165	17,597
... out of which Croatia*	…	…	…	8,707	8,805	8,900
Former Yugoslav area including Croatia	72,595	74,388	78,868	82,860	86,360	91,237
EU member states (excluding Croatia)	5,363	6,078	6,925	7,610	8,360	8,697
From other countries	4,788	5,089	5,592	6,138	6,812	7,832
	share (%)					
Former Yugoslavia	87.7	86.9	86.3	76.8	76.4	76.4
Former Yugoslavia including Croatia	87.7	86.9	86.3	85.8	85.1	84.7
EU member states	6.5	7.1	7.6	16.9	16.9	16.3
EU member states (excluding Croatia)	6.5	7.1	7.6	7.9	8.2	8.1
Other countries	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.4	6.7	7.3

* On 1 July 2013, Croatia became an EU member state.

The data in Table 3 clearly shows that the former Yugoslav area is the primary recruitment basin for migration to Slovenia. This share amounted to 85% in 2016 (including Croatia, an EU member state, with some 9,000 citizens). On the other hand, apart from some 200,000 "naturalizations" (175,000 only in 1991–1992 period), Slovenia has a very strict system of population incorporation through migration, therefore the majority of migrants reside in Slovenia for decades before gaining citizenship. Such protectionism is not bene favour to declining citizen population in Slovenia, since some 25,000 Slovenian citizens recently migrated to Austria and Germany. Some 20% of those who emigrated to Germany came there after the onset of the 2008 economic crisis (source: Deutsche Statistische Bundesamt 2016).

Conclusion

The main feature of the presented change in the setting of statistical coverage of migrations is the pioneering recognition of those subpopulations who went through the immediate migration experience. The German statistical office thus managed to distinguish between the migrants *per se* and the descendants of migrants. This huge methodological change was for the time being followed only by Austria. Unfortunately, Slovenia has not followed this innovative approach of distinguishing between people with or without migration experience. Thus, the possibilities for further analyses are limited. As we saw from both the German and Austrian examples, the introduction of "migration experience" has the potential for overcoming and neutralizing the negative stance on migrants and the politics of fear, while it could at the same time facilitate more active integration policy. Further statistical differentiation between immediate partakers of migration with "immediate migration experience" and the persons with "migration experience in the family", be it one, or both parents, assures sufficient categorization with less intrusion into the personal sphere and well-being of an individual. As proposed, the concept of migration experience could be a way towards understanding migrants as the ones personally enriched, instead of earmarking them as in the case of "migration background". The latter is problematic and stigmatizes an individual not only for life, but through the whole chain of their descendants until the generation X, regardless of the actual share of migratory ancestor's lineage. Such discrimination is established in a given critical moment when national statistics are in possession of ancestral statistical data, and it is well worth abandoning it as soon as possible.

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Use of Migration Terms in Public Discourse
Example of Serbia in the Last Hundred Years

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Migration-related terms were created, multiplied, supplemented, and amended, establishing specific realities of reading, interpretation, and use. In terms of terminology and typology, the migration-related nomenclature has changed through history under the influence of global and specific social, economic, and political events. This paper analyses the shaping and representation of migration-related terms in public discourse of the state, media and academic policies during the last hundred years on the example of Republic of Serbia. The analysis is based on contextual observation of formal and symbolic constructs, which have been changing their linguistic and semantic positioning. This involves the most frequently denoted and denoting terms which were and which are used in Serbia, partly compared with those in Croatia.

Keywords: migration terms, public discourse, former Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia

Conceptual frame

The ever-changing and multiplied migration phenomena are constructed into certain terminological and typological systems and orders, in accordance with (inter)national, academic and media policies, and the administrative management. The shaping and use of technical terms establishes a specific communication with a large number of participants – those who produce, supervise, implement, apply, analyse, inform, and those who identify with those terms. This is how the field of explicative power is created. As subjects of scientific observation, instruments of political use and control, interpretative phenomena and news/events, migrations represent derived realities and formal rationalities. The terminological processing and use of migrations is therefore dependant on language, criteria, interests, situations, systems of values, social and cultural identifications. A field is created in which the normative and affective, the empirical and theoretical, the public and private are confronted. Clearly, the naming and distribution of phenomena into notions, types and categories inaugurates appropriate distinctions, distances and relations, i.e., an entire range of relationships and roles (migrants, *non*-migrants, us – them). The terms that denote migration are also sensory images, symbolic projections and attributes

that create special correlations between the senders and the recipients of messages. Dictionary entries, press headlines, TV images, visa applications, statistics, and protocols are subject to particular norms suggested by those in authority. Migration-related terms were created, multiplied, supplemented, and amended, establishing specific realities of reading, interpretation, and use. Terminological stratification and positioning have largely complicated migrations and made them complex, further complicating and escalating the issue of human mobility. Diversification and changes in the migration processes shape the notional nomenclature, which is internationalised and centralised, but also localised in sets of autonomous political instruments. The conceptual model which I generated can serve as a guideline for further analysis, bearing in mind the diachronic and synchronic dimension.[1] The vertical column contains the bearers and authorities on shaping terminologies in public discourse: political and administrative institutions, science and media. The horizontal column has three categories: norms as legal regulators, paradigms as exemplary forms, and symbols as association codes. In this manner, migration phenomena can be traced both through historical prism, and through current processes.

Migration-related terms in process of production

	Norm	Paradigm	Symbol
Political and administrative institutions	managing migration flows: state and national terminology, international conventions	state and national utilitarian; internationally networked	public discourse: power of authority, hierarchy, supremacy and subordination, securitisation and protection
Scientific discourse	academic and scientific institutionalisation – discipline, education, institutes, projects, subjects	theories (methodological nationalism, transnational theory, etc.) and academic authorities (especially in ethnology and anthropology), interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, comparativity	symbolisation of identity structures, contextual factor in interpretation
Media	electronic and printed media: exclusivity and events – news comments	media nationalism, media internationalism	glorification, satanising, victimisation, discrimination, dehumanisation

[1] This conceptual frame is based on research material: archival materials, state and social protocols, statistics, press, public rhetoric, scientific literature and interviews.

In this paper,[2] migration-related terminology is analysed through the shaping of terms in a historical context, from the institutionalisation of migration policies in the former Yugoslavia[3] to the present day, with a special focus on terminological transformations in the Republic of Serbia.[4] My objective is to demonstrate the way in which terms were constructed under the influence of social, economic, and political circumstances, the way in which terms were stereotyped in public discourse and everyday communication, establishing certain protocols, interests, systems of values, and stereotypes in creating conceptions on migrants. The sources used – administrative protocols, archive materials, media (especially press), scientific literature, not only represent factual tools for analysis, but also a text of its own kind which stratifies meanings. Although historically marked, the principal migration processes (such as: internal migrations, deruralisation, political emigration), the stress will be placed on external migrations and their terminological markers, which have seen the largest terminological transformations in public discourse over the past seventy years. This necessitates a comparison of similarities and differences in lexical, semantic, and functional shaping on the level of state policies and public discourse, especially in the example of Serbia, and then in comparison with Croatia,[5] which derives from the period of cohabitation in the former states of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929) and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1963)[6], all the way to the breakup of the mutual state in the 1990s (Republic of Croatia – Independence 1991), and finally to the establishment of separate state entity (Republic of Serbia 2006).[7]

Normative production of terms and categories

The word/term *migration* is of Latin origin (*migratio -onis, migrans, migrare*). These words have acquired international use and spread across the Anglo-Saxon and

2 This paper is the result of the work on the project "Multiethnicity, Multiculturalism, Migration – Contemporary Processes" (17702) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

3 The construction of migration-related terms can be traced even earlier, from the period before World War II (the Kingdom or Yugoslavia) when the state institutions for monitoring internal and external migrations were consolidated.

4 My research of migration, especially of emigration processes has been ongoing since 1984. Based on the field work and documentation activities, I was able to monitor the transformations of migration-related terminologies in the domain of administration, science, and media.

5 Croatia and Serbia were the principal institutional bearers of migration policies from the beginning of 20th century to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Therefore, this paper will mark the principal institutions which represent the starting points of the terminological roads.

6 Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (1945).

7 State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003–2006).

Francophone language realms over to other languages. The term *mobility* (UNDP 2010: 8) is superordinate to the term *migration* today, taking into account the different forms of migrations and the different forms of mobility such as, for example, daily migrations – commuters, tourism, virtual – internet mobility, and other. This is why not only spatial mobility, but also social mobility is taken into account. On the other hand, a number of phenomena have obtained notional definitions and specific categorisations – colonisation, emigration, immigration, evacuation, exile, asylum, repatriation, expatriation, irregular migrations, readmission, brain drain, as well as the key terms that accompany these processes (integration, acculturation, accommodation). Since the establishment of the United Nations[8] and international organisations for migrations, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), European Migration Network (EMN), and others, the set of terminological instruments has been permanently redefined and refined. International glossaries of terms set guidelines for the purpose of harmonisation and comparison; this especially refers to EU members within the scope of their multi-sector activities.

In the Serbian and Croatian languages, the word migration (*migracija*) has been used for a long time; however, much older words: *selidba*, *seljenje* and *seobe* (moving, moving place, moves) also appear as complementary terms. The history of the Balkans and South-East Europe is built on movements of people, and it is only logical that these terms have long been in use. With the institutionalisation and internationalisation of the state policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the 1920s, the problem of emigration – until then haphazardly and only partially regulated, became a matter of state policy and regulations. The foundations of emigration policy were laid with the establishment of particular state bodies in the ministries, which drafted and then adopted provisions, decrees, and laws on emigrants.[9] The term *returnees* also came into use in the administrative discourse of those years, in the sense of regulation and influx of foreign currency into state coffers.[10] At the same time, with intensified international and diplomatic communication the word *immigration* was transferred into the local official language. Among

[8] The key markers for defining the standards and protection of migrants have been determined in universal documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); ILO (International Labour Organisation) Convention No. 97 Migration for Employment Convention (1980); the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2003), etc.

[9] In the 1920s, the emigration affairs were conducted by the Emigration Commissioner's Office in Zagreb, and the services of emigration supervisors and envoys were also introduced (Archives of Yugoslavia, Ministry of the Interior, 14, 37, Archive Unit 104, document signature 140-201, d. 141). The term *emigration* appears in the title of *Draft of the Emigration Decree* of 1921.

[10] *Report on Returnees and Refugees and Methods of their Admission*, MUP, State Security Department, Archives of Yugoslavia, F 37/116.

other, the following sentence was recorded in the emigrant news of 1923: "With regard to emigration to Canada, the need for increased immigration is generally emphasised" (Archives of Yugoslavia, document 120, MUP 34/104).

The migration-related terminology is associated with migration currents, which are a result of social and political circumstances. After World War II, socialist Yugoslavia saw a particular increase in internal migrations – from villages to cities and from less developed to more developed agricultural areas (the Agrarian Reform of 1945–1946 contributed to such trends, as well as relocations from the Mt Dinara region to Vojvodina – Serbia, from Lika to Slavonia – Croatia; also known as the *Colonisation*; Bjeljac and Radovanović 2016: 502–503). The terms which denote the processes – urbanisation, industrialisation, and deagrarianisation occur most often in the literature of that time. Workers – migrants became a key category of the demographic policy. Daily, seasonal, and permanent migrations towards city areas, lifestyle changes, as well as the attitudes towards the newcomers, created population entities that shared the same norms and values: the return of repatriates to their native areas, relocation of military personnel and other professionals throughout the former Yugoslavia, education and arrival of young people to cities. The rural – urban migration trend continued in the 1970s with more prominent regional migrations, which either represented a *circular flow* of people's migrations or permanent relocations. In the 1981 population census, workers and students were asked for the first time about the frequency of returning to their places of permanent residence and about the duration of work outside their places of permanent residence (Oliveira-Roca 1984: 5).

Economic emigration processes in the second half of 20th century were usually initiated by pauperisation, stagnation of economic reforms, unemployment, "superconcentration" of people in urban areas, and depopulation of rural areas, while the reasons for political emigration processes were marked with refusals to recognise the existing political regime and the imposing of repressive measures by the state. These standard reasons, denoted as push-pull factors, determined the emigration to other states (Bobić and Babović 2013: 214–215). Since migrations are always supervised by the state, the official politics and authorities strived to determine appropriate constructs for their regulation. This is how terms were constructed and redefined to be used as signifier and signified. Since the end of the 1960s, the following terms were used in political, academic, and public media discourse: *iseljeništvo* (emigration), external migrations, political emigration, *radnici (lica) na privremenom radu u inostranstvu* (workers (persons) temporarily working abroad), and as of the 1980s: *odliv mozgova* (brain drain).

In Serbian and in Croatian, the terms *iseljeništvo* (emigration) and *iseljenici* (emigrants) are terms that have been in use for a long time (Lukić Krstanović and Pavlović 2016: 9). However, regardless of their persistence, these phenomena/terms

have produced different and variable linguistic and terminological codes within the frame of communicational and situational configurations.[11]

Emigration/*Emigrants* are defined as flows and stocks of long-term or permanent residence out of the domicile country, usually for economic reasons. According to some definitions, the Latin expression *animus non revertendi* (with no intention to return) can be ascribed to the notion of the emigrant (Čizmić and Mikačić 1974: 1).[12] In contrast with the term *iseljenici* (emigrants), which continued to be used domestically in its original form, in the socialist period, the construct *emigranti* (emigrees) denoted persons who moved out of the country for political reasons (in some cases, the term *emigrant* (émigré) was determined by the adjective *political*; *Pravna enciklopedija* 1979: 298, 437). Such a polarisation created an opportunity for the further heightening of differences. Unlike *emigrants* (*iseljenici*) who were legitimately accepted by the state as Yugoslav compatriots and loyal nationals of the "Homeland county", *political émigrés* (*politički emigranti*) had a negative connotation in the administrative vocabulary – those with a hostile attitude towards the then socialist regime. In some encyclopaedic entries and studies from that time, political émigrés became a category unto itself, separate from the other categories (economic migrants, Yugoslav emigrants, persons temporarily working abroad).[13] As of 1945 and up to the breakup of SFRY, the terms *political emigration* and *enemy emigration* (see Spasić 1982: 192) were used in political and state discourse and in official language register, categories which denoted all the emigrants who were or who were labelled as enemies of the Yugoslavia.

Until the 1960s, Yugoslavia had a restrictive policy toward moving out of the country. The change of the course of Yugoslav state policy, which occurred after the break-up with the Eastern Bloc and the opening toward the West, created a new climate around the issue of emigration. At the same time, the Western countries experienced an increased workforce demand, which additionally intensified the spatial mobility. The Amnesty Law and a set of measures regarding the possibility of employment abroad were passed in those years. The regulations were formalized in 1964, as part of the Law on Yugoslav Citizenship. Year after year, the number

[11] Here, I primarily refer to the political events (Wars for Yugoslav Succession) on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, i.e. the breakup of the state and the establishment of separate states within which different migration processes were unfolding and different migration policies were crated as of the beginning of the 1990s. These states are: Republic of Serbia, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Republic of Macedonia. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence, which was not recognised by Serbia and some other countries.

[12] Čizmić and Mikačić (1974: 1) indicate four types of emigrants: conqueror, colonist, entrepreneur, and industrial worker.

[13] See: *Sociološki leksikon* 1982: 365.

of those going abroad increased. At the end of the 1960s, another technical term entered the administrative and political vocabulary: *workers (persons) temporarily working abroad*. The newly-coined expression in the Serbian and Croatian languages was obviously a modified version of a term taken from the German language: *Gastarbeiter* – in English literally: *guest-worker* (Giordano 2010: 12). This category is based on two referent units: work and temporariness. The insistence on this phrase derives from the political interests of the state of emigration – in this case the former Yugoslavia, and the states of immigration. The term *workers* pertained to non-qualified and qualified workers, while the term *temporary* was used as a guarantee that the workers would return to their domicile country after a certain while. For the country of immigration, the term *guest* was a guarantee that the workers-migrants would not become permanent citizens, securing in this manner the stability and tolerance of the rest of population towards the newcomers (Vuksanović 1996: 296). Although the 1970s saw relative stagnation in the demand for foreign labour, due to the "oil crisis" (1972–1978), modernisation of technology and automation, people continued to leave Yugoslavia.[14] The term "persons temporarily working abroad" first appeared in the Yugoslav census of 1971 (Bobić and Babović 2013: 215). In the following, 1981 census, the category of workers-emigrants was extended to include their household members. As of the 1991 census, the word "temporarily" was removed and the term "persons working/residing abroad" was introduced.[15] In Serbia, the persons studying abroad have also been added to this category as of 2011 (Stanković 2014: 11). With regard to administrative regulations, the status of workers-emigrants was regulated by special international and national regulations. The export of skilled workers from Yugoslavia was supervised by state bodies and methods of administration called workers' self-management (self-managing interest communities for employment). A specific form of employment entailed sending workers employed by Yugoslav companies abroad, based on investment contracts and contracts of business and technical cooperation, in accordance with the bilateral agreements of 1988 (Pavlica 2005: 130). On the other hand, there were institutions/authorities which regulated the contractual status of emigrants in the domain of state emigration and immigration policies, while on the other hand, personal decisions on whether to stay or to return created flexible positioning into a "permanent temporality" (Čapo Žmegač 2005: 255–273), bearing in mind the

[14] Emigration is a set of very complex individual and social circumstances, relying on micro- and macro- immigration/emigration policies on the labour market. Another important factor in the 1970s was making personal decisions to stay abroad temporarily for the purpose of fulfilling the motives for improvement of quality of life and living standards.

[15] It has to be emphasised that this was the last census conducted in the then SFRY. It turned out already then, that the republican statistics institutes stopped collaborating with each other, and that demographic and statistical data became the responsibility of the newly-established administrative state entities, including also identification and terminology markers.

several generations that had already been living abroad.[16] Hence, it is not surprising that, after a certain while, the expression denoting the *temporary character of working abroad* found itself in a blind alley. The past decades have proved that this migrant category has exceeded the "temporary stay" and entered the phase of (long-)lasting, taking into account that this indicated period has come to include their offspring, as well. The terminological fluidity arises from the cumulative process of naming those who are arriving and those who already live there, blending-in or merging with the category of "guests" in diaspora (Krstić 2011: 307). According to some authors, the attribute "temporary" was a euphemism of the contemporary communist nomenclature the aim of which was to conceal the organised and massive "export" of workforce (Stanković 2014: 10). Regardless of the state emigration or immigration policy, the term of "temporariness" represented a limiting variable that served the purposes of political control. The Law on Conditions for the Temporary Assignment of Employees to Work Abroad and Their Protection (*Official Gazette of RS* [Republic of Serbia] no. 91/15) demonstrates that the tendency toward the terminological use of "temporariness" has continued, this time in the form of control over the residence abroad by the time limitation set by the employer.[17]

Another technical term that has been in use since the 1980s is *brain drain*.[18] This term could be determined as a subcategory of emigrants, i.e. migration of highly-qualified people. The use of the term, especially in professional publications, coincides with the period when professionals (predominantly engineers and doctors) left the former Yugoslavia for the countries of Western Europe, USA, and Canada. Originating from the academic vocabulary, this term very soon assumed global use and entered the administrative and political rhetoric. The development of means of communication, internationalisation of production, trade, and financial flows resulted in increased mobility and the circulation of professionals within the developed world (Mesić 2002: 15). These were highly educated professionals who predominantly migrated from bigger cities. This term has also been increasingly used for students and postgraduates abroad. Brain drain is the term used in the countries of emigration to denote the depletion of human capital, while brain gain is interpreted as a benefit and contribution of human capital. Therefore, brain drain and brain gain correspond to the rotational formula of loss and profit (Lukić Krstanović and Pavlović 2016: 220).

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[16] The terms *detaširani* (detached) and *izaslani* (dispatched) workers refers to a worker that "remains employed in his company, but is sent on work at the facilities of this company located abroad" (Heršak 1998: 34–35).

[17] The term *labour migrant* is used more often nowadays in official documents. See: International Organization for Migration, *Key Migration Terms*, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms (last access 25 January 2017).

[18] With the introduction of the term *globalisation*, the term *brain gain* has become increasingly frequent, too; it refers to the circulation and "migration of talent" (Mesić 2002: 16).

In the example of Serbia, the use of the word diaspora appeared in the political context with the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia and the national constitution of Serbia. Having come into terminological use in Serbia in the 1990s, the term diaspora is indicative of the nationalization of emigration and has taken over the role of the term *iseljeništvo* (*emigration*).[19] However, unlike the term *emigration*, the term diaspora has an internationally recognised status, which automatically makes it a valid category. How did the exploitation of this term begin? Everything revolved around emigration policy and nation-building.[20] The degree of institutionalisation of the term *diaspora* in the example of Serbia demonstrates that it is a new/old construct. The Ministry for Serbs outside Serbia was established in 1992; in 2004, the Ministry of Diaspora was created and it was later renamed to the Ministry of Religions and Diaspora. Until the present day, the institutionalisation of the category of diaspora has been restructured from Ministry to Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. In 2009, the Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region was passed. This Law pertains to the citizens of the Republic of Serbia who live abroad, and Serbian nationals – expatriates from the territory of the Republic of Serbia and from the region, as well as their offspring. The term "Serbs in the region" denotes Serbian nationals who live in the Republic of Slovenia, Republic of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Republic of Albania, and Republic of Hungary (Art. 2). Most of the protocols use the term "Serbian diaspora". The institutionalisation of diaspora is thus directed towards creating a constituting unit and national entity of the expatriate community. The presented terminological policies are made evident through administrative instruments which are used primarily in formulating the national diaspora as an essence. The process of "diasporisation" today is a matter of political records, strategy of governmentality (establishment of ministries and boards for the diaspora), and the activity of diaspora bodies – such as assemblies and congresses, so as to create a unifying image of the nation in diaspora.

In addition to its institutional affirmation, the term/notion of *diaspora* is a suitable instrument for symbolic identification. I have constructed the following formulations of diaspora which indicate particular meanings and messages at the symbolical level: 1. Homogenisation of emigrants into an entity; 2. Harmonisation – interconnecting; 3. Collective memories and collective experiences; 4. Common narratives; 5. Feeling of empathy and solidarity; 6. Uniqueness and differentiation

[19] While the term *iseljeništvo* (emigration) is used increasingly less in the public discourse of Serbia, in Croatia the terms *iseljeništvo* and *dijaspora* are associated with different types of mobility. The term *iseljeništvo* in Croatia rather denotes transcontinental emigration, while diaspora refers to those who live in the dispersive area of European countries (Grbić Jakopović 2014: 16).

[20] Vertovec (1997: 277–299) accentuates three meanings of diaspora: diaspora as social form; diaspora as type of consciousness; and diaspora as mode of cultural production. Once these three meanings are brought together under a national umbrella, diaspora becomes a political concept.

from "others". It is only enough to have a look at the internet communication (official internet sites of state institutions and state network) as various forms of propaganda, cultural events in which diaspora is promoted in its unity of life and past.[21] In this manner, emigrants are observed and presented in the form of a matrix and national essence. It is not difficult to conclude that such a matrix could be easily manipulated to project an ideal standard model of diaspora with an established history, economy and culture. The more stable a construct the diaspora is, the stronger is its power to further solidify into a monolithic matter and *fictitious Us*. According to those terminology managers, the citizens of Serbia and those who originate from Serbia but belong to other ethnicities, do not always fit into the formula of diaspora. Therefore, a terminological question is posed – how do the members of diaspora call and see themselves; or even further – how do the members of the second and the third generations of emigrants see themselves? The diaspora is based on "allopatricity" (Mežnarić 2003: 335) and stratifications, which is difficult to classify as a produced or artificial entity from the point of view of the members of diaspora.

The migration terminology is multiplying increasingly, since human mobility is also becoming more complex. The migration-related terms are especially problematized through the following categories: refugees, asylees, irregular migrants and migrants. Over time, the dilemmas regarding the use of these terms have grown into issues of inconsistency between the general universal declarations on protection of human rights, movement of people and changes in their status, in accordance with the current geostrategic and national policies. Marta Stojić Mitrović points out to the shifting of policies in migration categorisations. In the SFRY period, the "asylee" and "refugee" were clearly divided categories. The "asylee" category belonged to the domain of state strategy of responsibility and propaganda towards "foreigners", while "refugees" were more in the domain of international humanitarian responsibility (Stojić Mitrović 2014: 1117).[22] Up until the year of 1996, the experience in Serbia with the refugees from the former Yugoslavia and from other countries demonstrated that political interest was becoming increasingly primary in determining the status of refugees (Pavlica 2005: 145). Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, the "refugee" status in Serbia has acquired the label of expelled and dislocated

[21] Concurrently with official programmes, social networks and internet sites which create specific virtual communities and communications – *Nova srpska dijaspora* (New Serbian Diaspora) internet magazine, of Serbian Diaspora Café and many other contacts via Facebook, Twitter and similar networks, are thriving.

[22] Certain events that initiated regulation of the asylum issue can be highlighted, such as when Hungarian citizens sought asylum in Yugoslavia after the Soviet intervention of 1956/57. Most of the arrivals from socialist countries to Yugoslavia were under the jurisdiction of police and were treated as confidential data. As of 1974, the right to asylum was regulated by the Constitution, Article 202, which was based on the International Convention.

persons based on national criteria which all fitted well into the turbulent political and warmongering rhetoric and which became the subject of the Hague trials. The repeated activation of the asylee and refugee issue comes as a consequence of the international migration events of 2010.[23] This time, terminology becomes the key player in political strategies. International and national supervisors of categorisation have assumed the key role now. UNHCR presented an important standpoint that there was a difference between migrants and refugees while nowadays all migration categories are being converted to migrants. While the international protocols on protection are valid for refugees, migrants exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of the countries of immigration. Distorting these two terms only shifts the attention from the specific forms of legal protection that the refugees need (see Edwards 2016).

Analytical studies and reports state that the migration terminology in the Republic of Serbia has not been sufficiently harmonised with the current terminological trends.[24] Until now, a few laws – such as the Law on Foreigners, the Law on Asylum, and the Law on State Border Protection, have tackled the issue in their introductory sections, by defining the meaning of certain terms important for the domain of migration management (*Osnovi upravljanja migracijama u Republici Srbiji* 2012: 15–17).

Terms in the sphere of scientific paradigms and media symbols

Technical terms shape paradigms, denoting systems and rules, which are established and stable designations and denominators. However, terminological paradigms in different contextualisations and interpretations become fertile ground for the production of symbolic constructs in zones of perception. Politics and science have institutionalised migration-related terms, and the media have shifted them to the field of symbolism. The overlapping of paradigmatic and symbolical contexts has occurred in a number of situations.

In the second half of the twentieth century, emigration processes were activated thematically and institutionally, both as part of international scientific trends and as instruments of current policies and ideologies. As Mežnarić pointed out, "con-

[23] These are events related to the massive arrival of refugees from Asia (especially Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) and from African countries to the countries of the European Union. The reasons for emigration are war events and poverty.

[24] The Migration Profile, published on a regular basis by the Government of the Republic of Serbia since 2010, contains the following migration categories: foreign citizens (temporary stay and permanent residence), asylum seekers, illegal migrants, victims of human trafficking, returnees based on readmission agreement, refugees and displaced persons (SEEMIG projekat 2013: 3).

ceptually, personnel-wise and cognitively", the humanities have not dealt with the phenomenon of external migrations, which were then taken over and dealt with by economics, social geography and demography (1985: 78). Discursive gaps also came as a logical consequence of migration flows. Social sciences and humanities have commenced their scientific journey within the agendas of institutes and research projects: in Serbia, Institute of Social Sciences (the projects conducted by Živan Tanić and the studies of Milena Primorac), Institute of International Politics (Vladimir Grečić). In accordance with the adopted proposal of Slobodan Zečević and Dušan Drljača, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts commenced a long-term project of the Institute of Ethnography entitled "Ethnological Study of Emigrants and Ethnic Minorities from Serbia", in 1981. In Croatia, continuous research of external migrations can be traced back to 1965, within the Agency for Migration and Nationalities and to 1967, within the Institute of Geography of the Zagreb University. The Centre for Migration Study was established in 1984, and it was renamed to the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies in 1987. This was the first institution that entirely consolidated the research of migrations and ethnic groups and minorities. Upon the initiative of Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SAZU) and the history department of the Slovenian Emigration Institute, the *Študijski center za zgodovino slovenskega izseljenstva* (Study Centre of Slovenian Emigration History) was founded in Slovenia in 1963. In 1982, the Centre was renamed to the *Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo ZRC SAZU* (ZRC SAZU Institute of Slovenian Emigration). Concurrently with the scientific research activities, as of 1951, social and political institutions named *Matice iseljenika* (Emigrant Centres) were established in all the republics of Yugoslavia with the task of establishing contacts with the newly-formed Yugoslav clubs in the countries of immigration. They worked on "positively directed" cultural cooperation which was harmonised with the politics of the socialist Yugoslavia. Obviously, such a form of social engagement carried strong political residues of the promotion and selection of emigrants who were positively oriented towards socialist Yugoslavia, in contrast to emigrants and organisations that were stigmatised as negative anti-communist "elements". As opposed to the diffused and insufficiently transparent academic research, the Emigrant Centres enjoyed strong support of the authorities, since the work that they carried out was in the interest of the state politics. The alliance between science and politics can also be followed in the undertakings that put the problem of emigration processes into the focus of interest in the 1980s. An academic gathering on the study of emigration (Conference Proceedings: *Iseljeništvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije* [Emigration of Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Yugoslavia], from 1978) assembled a number of experts and authorities at the end of the 1970s. The Conference Proceedings became the main platform for the ensuing projects, programmes, and initiatives under the auspices of the Yugoslav paradigm, yet at the same time, with an explicit orientation towards the national academic course of

research of the country's *own* national emigrants (Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian emigrants).[25]

What is noticeable in the launching of these activities? Firstly, that the migration problems were scientifically institutionalised, i.e. theoretically and methodologically promoted, and then that they set off on their research paths and established their scientific paradigms. Scientific activities, and accordingly the set of terminological instruments have traced the path in two directions: one was the direction of methodological nationalism[26] (studying emigrants, refugees, and later diaspora) while the other direction consisted of problematising the phenomenon of ethnicity and monitoring ethnic identity in a symbolic context. Whereas sociologists were predominantly focused on socio-economic problems and neo-classical migration theories, ethnologists and anthropologists in Serbia and Croatia were engaged in studying ethnicity, ethnos, and identity over the 1970s and the 1980s, which created a platform for research activities in emigration processes (Lukić Krstanović 2014: 24–25; Grbić Jakopović 2014: 53).[27] When migrations became a part of ethnicity studies, especially in anthropological research, ethnic identities and migration processes were problematized. The other direction was focused on socio-cultural studies in the context of following the dynamics and processes of population movement, especially of economic migrations. Economic migrants, in the form of *Gastarbeiters* were contextually clarified from the perspective of sociological and ethnological research. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the international word – *Gastarbeiter*, assumes a pejorative meaning in the local vernacular, with emphasis on the status symbols and identity patterns of those who worked abroad, as a form of "symbolic flaunting" (Bratić and Malešević 1982; Antonijević 2013). Finally, the migration-related scientific terminology of recent years has been articulated in accordance with the global problems, such as stigmatisation of foreigners, dehumanisation of irregular migrants and deeply altered identity contexts in border zones of identifications. The terms/notions of asylees, refugees, irregular migrants, and transmigrants are becoming regular scientific and methodological practices, which are not competing for the positions of paradigm and form any more, but for a flexible monitoring and clarification of the problem. Therefrom science poses the question of whether terminological classifications for migrations are necessary at all, taking into account the fact that they are produced and changed globally every day, as suits the current situation and supervisors.

[25] At the same time, the studying of emigration was intensified in Croatia, concurrently with papers in sociology which dealt with internal migrations. For example, Ivan Čizmić and Vesna Mikačić (1974) analysed the phenomenon of emigration (definitions and typologies) with a special focus on the emigration from Croatia. For an analysis of Serbian emigration see Jončić 1982: 357–364.

[26] See Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003: 576–610; Kovačević Bielicki 2016: 527.

[27] For example, the papers of Dušan Bandić, Olga Supek, Dunja Rihtman Auguštin, Jadranka Grbić Jakopović, Jasna Čapo Žmegač, Miroslava Lukić Krstanović, Mirjana Pavlović, and others.

The media (press, television, internet) are important and powerful instruments for the shaping and transmitting of information on migrations/migrants, i.e. they are the verifiers and propagators of terminological differentiation. And while the migration terminology was moulded within the frame of state and international rules, imperative norms, and scientific paradigms, the media managed to establish a much wider and arbitrary field of terminological negotiability in the domain of associations. The past decades have demonstrated that the media have left their mark on the production of representations of emigration and, in a way, left their imprint in attributive terminology. Media also have a narrative mission which models migration-related terms from information to sensation.[28] In the 1950s and the 1960s, little was written on migration processes, and even less on emigration, and there was no continuity in the monitoring and interpretation of migration movements. As of the 1970s, the greater presence of migration-related topics has been observed in the media. It was only logical, taking into account that migrations were written about from two standpoints: long-term emigration, and the workers temporarily working abroad – popularly called *Gastarbeiters*. As regards the transoceanic emigration, media topics were concentrated around famous emigrants, positive events among emigrants, especially favouring loyalty towards Yugoslavia, incidents and "dangerous events" as anti-Yugoslav provocations. Taking primarily into account articles published in the press, the headlines and content of those articles created stereotypes based on symbolic constructions: "Our People Worldwide", "Our Famous Inventor in America", "Patriot from the Pacific Coast", "Our Dollar Millionaire", "One of Our Kind", "Our Man from the West", "Honest Patriot".[29] Based on these standard headlines, we can identify symbolic parameters, which are used to express the following types of perception: remoteness and distance (*over the ocean*, *foreign country*), belonging and identity (possessive pronoun *our/s* becomes a super-mark of collectivity, native region, state and nation), distinctions and opposites (contained in descriptive adjectives *good* and *dangerous*), power and glorification (being well-known, famous, successful). The manufacturers of these and similar attributes were not only the media but also the official politics, by means of large quantities of information and propaganda materials, the mission of which

[28] As part of my research of press articles on emigration, I have especially analysed the symbolic context of various media narratives. The conglomeration of messages – news – narratives can be traced in a historical context which points to a certain continuity or discontinuity of knowledge about emigrants. Based on a selective review of the press, certain characteristics are noticed from news to narratives, irrespective of whether the newspapers from the beginning or from the end of the twentieth century are concerned (Lukić Krstanović and Pavlović 2016: 317).

[29] I have collected the press documentation in: Archives of the *Politika* (daily and periodic issues in the period between 1970 and 1990 – *Politika*, *Večernje novosti*, *Ilustrovana politika*, *Vjesnik* and other); Archives of Yugoslavia (funds after 1945); emigration press in the USA and Canada (personal archives).

was to prompt moral judgements on emigrants. For many years, the phenomenon of *political emigrees*, their lives, affiliations, social status from a distance and under control, were shaped in the zones of "strictly confidential" and censored documents but it also became an attractive topic of media news – sensations.[30] One can easily reach the conclusion that such a label and construct became fertile ground for all kinds of imaginations, prejudices, and manipulations.

Up until the breakup of Yugoslavia, the polarisation into "friendly emigrants"[31] and "enemy émigrés" in the official rhetoric, especially that of the establishment and media, left a formal imprint of ideological/political appropriateness and loyalty of the *(e)migrants*, i.e. their terminological determining. This historical context in media discourse demonstrates to what extent the (e)migration terms are subject to constructions, especially in identification policies. A decade later, the migration terminology, especially in Serbian press, attuned itself to current political and social events. The dramatic 1990s, with the breakup of Yugoslavia, consolidation of states, with nationalist tensions and refugee plights, created new media agendas for interpretation of migrations. The terms refugees and displaced persons occupied the media space in Serbia, though predominantly as part of national conflicts and warmongering discourse which ranged from victimisation to discrimination. The European policy towards transmigrants and the Balkan route became topical problems and hot media topics/news in 2015 and 2016. As the inquiries conducted by UNHCR and CeSID showed and the media (*Vreme*) reported, it turned out that the poor level of information or the lack of information had an influence on the lack of interest in transmigrants among the population up until 2014. The cumulativeness of news and a lack of analysis leave neither enough space nor enough time for investigative journalism and adequate analyses of current migration processes. TV programmes and press where analytical texts (serials and comments) are published – such as *Vreme* and *Danas*, as well as *N1* TV, are independent media the interpretative and analytical discourse of which has a characteristic autonomy of a critical view of daily politics in the country and abroad, providing for a wider range of reception and developing attitudes. On the other hand, some newspapers – especially tabloids, compete in inflating both human suffering and discrimination.

The symbolisation of the current international migrations in the media, especially regarding the refugee crisis, establishes a tripartite symbolic code of victimisation, discrimination, and dehumanisation. Numerous headlines, articles, news, and

[30] Unpublished material (confidential material), Spasić 1982.

[31] During the era of Yugoslav socialism, the term *iseljenik* (expatriate) was used in the media. The media were writing about "our" *iseljenici*, "Yugoslav *iseljenici*", "prominent expatriates", or simply "our people in the world", with the aim of creating a positive image of those who were leaving to other countries out of economic reasons and who were sympathisers of socialist Yugoslavia or who became famous and successful abroad.

reports intent on generating sensationalism and shock value create special fields of perception which produce migration narratives. Both international and national media are competing in transforming refugees and asylees into numbers, quotas, percentages, masses, strategies, or victims, which spurs further tensions, distancing, threats or empathy. Migration terms are now becoming an instrument, not only for normativisation of migrant protection and (inter)national security, but also for causing complete commotion among the public, i.e., creating stimuli with affective value in the process of categorising people. This is how public discourse is projected from formal to symbolic communication systems, especially taking into account the clear distinctions between *us* and *them* on the level of securitisation and victimisation between the resident and the migrant participants. Further systematic analyses of migration terms in a public discourse will reveal whether usage belongs to the level of instrumentalization or level of symbolization.

Further terminological dilemmas

The objective of the treatment of migration terms was to analyse the key markers of their shaping through history in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Serbia. Taking into account the course and phases of migrations, presented in this paper, it can be observed that the terms and typologies have served daily political interests[32] and changed in accordance with the interests, rather than facilitating appropriate academic articulation and demographic monitoring of the process. Notwithstanding numerous topics, contextualisations, and problematisations of migration phenomena, scientific research mobility has not sufficiently challenged the terminological dilemmas, which often form the basis for projecting migration potential: regulations, statuses, subjective and moral identifications.[33] I have demonstrated that diversification and changes in the migration processes shape the notional nomenclature, which is internationalised and centralised, but also localised in sets of autonomous political instruments. Terminological situations in the domain of migrations have a dual function: expansive[34] and restrictive.[35] The

[32] In line with the Regulation of European Parliament and Commission No 862/2007, regular updating of migrant categories in Serbia was commenced in 2011 and is used as an instrument in the planning of migration policies (*Migracioni profil Republike Srbije za 2014. godinu* 2014: 6).

[33] Nevertheless, I would like to point out two anthropological academic gatherings which raised many issues including the issues of terminology – Round Table "Scientific Research of Migrations in Serbia, Problems and Initiatives" SASA Institute of Ethnography, 2014; and "Contemporary Migration Trends and Flows on the Territory of Southeast Europe", Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb and Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Zagreb, 2016.

[34] The Importance of migration terminology course on International Migration Law jointly organized by UNITAR, IOM, UNFPA (2012).

[35] In general, the classification of linguistic functions as expansive and restrictive was given by Louis-Jean Calvet (Kalve 1995: 87).

expansiveness of migration-related terms moved in the direction of standardisation and extended use, to the effect of diffusion and permanence. Internationalisation of words such as: migration, emigration, or immigration, certainly cover the largest part of the public. The restrictiveness of migration-related terminology pertains to the limited terminological use of words/notions which are recognisable as a part of particular linguistic and political constructs, i.e. *iseljenici* (emigrants) and *radnici na privremenom radu u inostranstvu* (workers temporarily working abroad). It is interesting to note that migration phenomena and terms intensified and amassed in certain situations. The dormancy which prevailed in Serbia until recently – except for the specialised institutions for monitoring migrations, has turned into a scorching and turbulent reality of global migrations and migration-related topics. The instability of the terminological set of instruments has been caused by the cumulativeness and asymmetry of migration-related events and processes. When migration-related processes are stable, the terminology stabilises to the level of norms and paradigms.

Throughout history, migrations were managed and they were always designated with particular markers, i.e., terms and categories of classification, so as to achieve the most transparent control possible, either by authorities, administration, science, or the media. The ambivalent terminological position was a result of the diachronic continuity of existence of long-lasting categories, and of the historic irreversibility of events that altered meanings and practices. Migration policies and migration practices were confronted, often creating distance between the experiences and the system. Migration-related terms were usually modelled and presented from the point of view of legislators, science, and media. In this sense, they had a single trajectory into which the people who were named were incorporated. The naming was done from the top (according to the principle of hierarchy) and laterally in accordance with the principle of diffusion and distribution of customary names/expressions that appeared in everyday language and in public opinion. In both cases, those who were or are called emigrants/immigrants/migrants did not (do not) participate in it. It has been shown that migration-related terms/terminology are not merely instruments of categorisation, but also identity signs. In that sense, they are part of the migration politics and migration policies (of authority and law). The synchronisation and compatibility of use and presentation of migration terminological and typological apparatus in the relations between bureaucracy, science and media is not sufficient. In Serbia, academic competency is seldom used for the purposes of explaining migration problems in the domain of media and bureaucracy.

Nowadays, there is increasingly more talk about spatial mobility, human mobility, and migrations in general, which often negate problems. Due to the stockpiling of terms and categorisations, which are obviously convenient for terminology

hegemons, the identificational classification of people has found itself in a blind alley. Migrant identities and statuses are in collision with migration policies, since they entail normative and value categories on the one hand, and social and affective relationships on the other. The stability and variability of migration-related terminologies represent delicate identification fields which are adapted to different situations and cases. The general components of migrations are known, yet it is important to consider this phenomenon from a broader aspect which includes cases, comparisons and experiences, and as Mežnarić (2003: 339) pointed out – "new intuitions". Therefore, the production and use of terms is not only a matter of controlling people as migration capital, but also a matter of protection in the domain of choices and experiences, which are supposed to offer a greater degree of security to this world. Finally, the entire terminology should focus more on the category of citizen as "an institution on the move" than that of the national affiliation of migrants. All these and similar dilemmas are indicative of terminological mobility which entails permanent updating and analysis, which may not be able to resolve the burning issues, but can persistently keep mobilising them and pointing at them.

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A Transnational Triangle
Representations of the EU and Serbia in the Narratives of Bosnian Serbs Living in Graz

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As part of my research on cultural representations of the European Union and of Serbia's EU integration process among the Serbian diaspora in Austria, I discuss the narratives of Bosnian Serbs living in Graz. Their "cultural knowledge" of Serbian foreign policy can, at the same time, be analysed in light of understanding their ambivalent "neither, nor" position. Therefore, using the concept of a "transnational way of belonging", I argue that their narratives regarding Serbia's future and of the disadvantages of EU membership for Serbia can be interpreted as transnational practices which connect them with their country of historical origin.

Keywords: cultural representations, Bosnian Serbs, "transnational way of belonging", European Union, EU integration

Introduction[1]

Serbs represent one of the largest foreign ethnic groups in Austria, due to their centuries-long settlement on the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, dating from the sixteenth century, along with later migrations to Austria, especially during the "so-called *Gastarbeiter* period" from 1955 till 1973 (Grečić and Lopušina 1994: 112–113; Payer 2004; Ivanović 2012). According to the Austrian statistical yearbook, in 2014 there were 114,000 Serbs and 93,000 Bosnians (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims) living in Austria (Baldaszti et al. 2015: 26). Bearing these facts in mind, in socio-cultural anthropology there is currently a

[1] This paper is the result of research conducted in Graz enabled by a "one-month visit" scholarship from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and work on a project entitled "The Identity Politics of the European Union: Its Adaptation and Application in the Republic of Serbia" (177017) organised by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Helmut Eberhart from Karl Franzens University – who supervised my fieldwork – for his professional help, beneficial comments and kind advice.

growing interest in Serbs living in Austria.[2] However, such anthropological research primarily focuses on Serbian guest workers. By contrast, I have conducted research with Serbs who voluntarily decided to emigrate from Serbia during the last two or three decades and settle in Austria (Brujić 2015b). In 2013, with this goal in mind, I conducted micro level qualitative research among Serbs living in Graz. Given that EU integration is currently one of the most important strategic goals of Serbian foreign policy,[3] I focused on cultural representations of the EU and of the EU integration of Serbia among Serbs living in the EU (Brujić 2018). Although my main target group were Serbs from Serbia, some Serbs, originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Republic of Srpska entity),[4] wished to participate arguing that "we are all Serbs, we are one people". Therefore, in this paper I intend to shed some light on the cultural knowledge of Bosnian Serbs living in the Serbian diaspora. More specifically, by combining elements of cognitive anthropology, the anthropology of migration and EU studies, I aim to examine cultural representations regarding the EU among Serbs from the Republic of Srpska living in Graz. How do those people who are "almost like ourselves"[5] (Eriksen 2002: 66) explain the EU integration of Serbia? The narratives of the informants on the EU and on the EU integration of Serbia are in fact narratives of themselves and of their ambivalent relationship with the Republic of Srpska, Austria and Serbia. Therefore, I argue that their interpretations are part of their transnational affiliations to their home country, country of settlement and homeland. Consequently, this research aims to generate a better understanding of the EU from the "bottom-up" perspective often taken in anthropological studies.

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2 See for example: Loch 2008; Antonijević 2013; Milosavljević and Antonijević 2015; Antonijević and Milosavljević 2016.

3 See: Serbian European Integration Office 2005.

4 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, signed by the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia (Izetbegović, Tuđman, and Milošević) (see on this issue Andjelic 2003; Velikonja 2003). According to its Constitution, which regulates the peace and stability of the established country, Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two autonomous entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska (Article 3). The majority of the Serbian population today lives in the Republic of Srpska. In addition to citizenship of each entity, citizens of both entities have citizenship and passports of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 7, a, e). All quoted informants were from the Republic of Srpska entity and they referred to the Republic of Srpska as their home country. Sometimes I refer to them as to "Bosnian Serbs" which serves as an umbrella term.

5 Serbs from the Republic of Srpska are in many instances similar to Serbs originating from Serbia in Graz. They are members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, speak the same language and attend same or similar cultural societies (see Brujić 2018: 169). On the other hand, they have either Austrian or Bosnian citizenship and originate from a country other than Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in this regard, follows its own EU integration model. From 2003 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate country for EU membership and in 2016 the country submitted its application to join the European Union (European Commission 2016).

Theoretical and methodological approaches

In order to understand how the EU is viewed by certain Serbs who decided to live in Austria, I utilised an eclectic approach, using mixed methodologies with their foundations first and foremost in migration studies, cognitive anthropology and EU studies.

Currently widely spread theories regarding migrants stem from approaches based on diaspora and transnationalism (Koser 2007: 24–27). Although the meaning of the term diaspora was originally used to refer to forcibly displaced groups, such as, for example Jews, Africans, Irish and Armenians, from the middle of the 1980s this term started to include many other groups (Cohen 1997: ix). In academic, political and public discourse, the diaspora concept includes immigrants, refugees, working migrants, ethnic minorities, overseas communities, different migrant organizations or societies which participate in and materially aid the political, social and cultural life of the home country or local home country community (Ang 2005: 82; Koser 2007: 26, 48–49). Although the Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region (2009: Article 2, Article 4) makes a difference between Serbian diaspora (Serbian immigrant communities) and Serbs in the "region" (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Montenegro, FYR of Macedonia, Albania, Romania) the goal is the same: to maintain cultural, historical, religious and ethnic ties to members of the Serbian population, protect their rights and improve their position in the countries they are living in. Nonetheless, here I would like to raise the following question – to which diaspora do Bosnian Serbs living in Austria belong? The narratives of my informants revealed that they felt attached to the Republic of Srpska, Austria and Serbia.

I found a transnational approach useful in explaining issues regarding EU integration because all informants primarily have relationships with the Republic of Srpska and Austria. In summary, "transnational migration is the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-strand social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" (Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 48). This "simultaneous embeddedness" in several societies (ibid.) is facilitated by modern technology and telecommunication, cheap international travel and the process of globalization (for more details, see Vertovec 2009: 14–15). As Vertovec (2009: 3) explains

> "When referring to sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders – businesses, non-government-organizations, and individuals sharing the same interests (by way of criteria such as religious beliefs, common cultural and geographic origins) – we can differentiate these as 'transnational' practices and groups (referring to their links functioning across nation-states). The collective attributes of such

> connections, their processes of formation and maintenance, and their wider implications are referred to broadly as 'transnationalism'."

One feature of the transnational life of migrants is bifocality, or an "ongoing sense of double belonging" (Vertovec 2004: 974–975). However, in many cases, such "here and there" belonging is often "neither here, nor there", "foreigner here and foreigner there" or "betwixt and between" the society of origin and the society in which they live (Čapo Žmegač 2007: 286; Simsek-Çaglar 1994: 90–98; Antonijević 2013). Betwixt and between which countries are Serbs originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who live in Austria? What can their experience-based knowledge of the EU tell us about Serbia and its EU orientation?

Although Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 1012) consider multi-sited research as best suited for research into transnational experiences, they agree that "the impact of transnational relations can be observed by asking individuals about the transnational aspects of their lives, and those they are connected to, in a single setting". Therefore, in order to analyse cultural representations of the EU and of Serbia's EU integration, in February 2013 I conducted semi-structured interviews using a snowball methodology for gathering informants among Serbs in Graz. I did not define filter questions,[6] believing that only Serbs from Serbia would be interested in and find themselves relevant to discuss the Serbian position. Nonetheless, a typical problem when using a snowball method is the emergence of misunderstandings regarding the nature of the research (Oliver 2006: 281–282). Even a Serbian Orthodox priest whom I interviewed, and who is also originally from the Republic of Srpska, said to me that everyone in the Republic of Srpska feels "as Serbs from Serbia, no matter what. [...] We feel that way and that is the story that should be promoted".

Thus, in this article I discuss the narratives of ten Serbs from the Republic of Srpska (nine male and one female), born between 1959 and 1979, who came to Austria in the period stretching from 1988 to 2003 either due to safety-related reasons, or for economic and/or academic reasons. Only one informant is highly qualified, while the others have primary or secondary level education. I view their narratives on the EU integration of Serbia in light of their historical, personal, cultural and religious ties to Serbia and the Republic of Srpska.

Besides taking a transnational approach, as used in the anthropology of migration and migration studies in general, I also interpret the narratives of Bosnian Serbs from the standpoint of cognitive anthropology. Cognitive anthropology explains how "knowledge [is] used in ordinary life [...] and [...] conventionalized into *culture*" (D'Andrade 2003: xiv). D'Andrade (2003: 1) furthermore describes

[6] Put simply, filter questions "sort out" relevant from irrelevant respondents for conducting research (Knäuper 1998: 70).

the goal of cognitive anthropology as attempting to understand "how people in social groups conceive of and think about the objects and events which make up their world". Thus, people use cultural, experience and knowledge based notions for understanding the world around them. As a result, in his anthropological analysis on cultural representations of the EU among highly educated Serbs living in Serbia, Žikić defines cultural representations as value- and emotion-laden "cognitive tools" for describing socio-cultural phenomena, which include factual knowledge, stereotypes, personal views etc. (Žikić 2013: 5, 11, 19, 55). Therefore, in this paper I discuss what can we learn from the narratives of Bosnian Serbs living in Graz in regard of their views on the EU and Serbia's EU integration.

Betwixt and between the Republic of Srpska, Austria and Serbia

This research draws on several previous anthropological studies of cultural representations regarding the EU among Serbs, conducted over the course of the country's EU integration process. In this vein, these cultural representations of the EU reveal – at the same time – representations of Serbia which include aspects such as an idealization of the West, the EU and the SFRY. However, these are accompanied by critiques of the EU and of the current Serbian system (Radović 2009; Žikić 2013; Brujić 2015a, 2015b). To illustrate this, qualitative research into cultural representations of the EU, Europe and the West among secondary school pupils, university students (Radović 2009) and highly educated citizens living in Serbia (Žikić 2013) show that the majority of respondents are pro-EU oriented. The positive aspects of Europe and the "West", which are in most cases equalized with the EU, include a high standard of living, economic development, legal and social justice, and a quality infrastructural and education system. These elements are recognized as lacking in Serbia, and therefore some informants hope that they will develop when Serbia becomes part of the EU. In contrast with these results, Serbs from Serbia who have settled in Slovenia or Austria (Brujić 2015a, 2015b) have an awareness of numerous negative aspects relating to life in the EU. For instance, many believe that life in Austria or Slovenia became harder after joining the EU, and many commented on the discrimination of Serbs and other "Southerners". More specifically, some informants were afraid that the EU would exploit the Serbian market and force Serbia to accept Kosovo's proclamation of independence. However, nobody I spoke to planned to return, and many had even decided to take Austrian or Slovenian citizenship, in so doing abandoning their Serbian citizenship. The informants I spoke to found that these countries were economically, legally, administrative, legislative, and socially better regulated. In this respect, they hoped that joining the EU would further improve these aspects and facilitate work and educational mobility in Serbia, as well as the ability to travel more.

Serbian respondents from the Republic of Srpska gave comparable responses and had similar impressions of the EU. None of the informants interviewed planned to go to live in Serbia, although many noticed and/or experienced similar discrimination towards Serbs and "Southerners". Indeed, Austria has frequently been criticized for its "anti-immigrant sentiments" (MIPEX 2015). Although Austria joined the European Union in 1995 and accepted the euro as a currency in 1999, due to Austria's "right-wing" politics, the country was placed under sanctions during 2000 (Falkner 2001: 11–13). The majority of informants plan to return to their hometowns when they retire. This idea or wish to return is very common among migrants, especially among guest workers, and is discussed in the literature as their concrete (but often unaccomplished) "plan to return" or "myth of return" since, as in other contexts, the majority never actually went back (Simsek-Çaglar 1994; Čapo 2012: 41, 44). To illustrate this, one informant[7] who came to Austria just before the war in 1991 said he would like to go back to his hometown in the Republic of Srpska where he owns a house. However, due to the educational and career options for his children being better in Austria and in the EU in general, he decided to postpone the return until his retirement. He holds the opinion that life in Austria was better before entering the EU, and that Serbia (and the Republic of Srpska likewise) was better off not being in the Union:

> "The changes happened overnight when the euro was introduced. It was extreme. [...] [E]verything became more expensive. It became more difficult to find a job."

Another informant who arrived with his family in 1989 for economic reasons has similar views. According to him, it was a mistake for Austria to become a part of the EU, because prices increased. Like some other respondents, he also noticed that Austria used to be strong: a legally and economically developed country, which was well organized politically before its accession to the EU. He also decided not to go back while his children, who had already "become Austrians", were rooted in Austria. On the other hand, he reported missing his home in the Republic of Srpska and thinks that "there is nothing nicer than to be in the place where one was born". Although he has had Austrian citizenship since 2001, he says "I'm a foreigner here and I have remained a foreigner". From his perspective, Serbia should not integrate with the EU:

> "But there is one thing I don't understand. Why does Serbia want to join the EU so much when Serbia is already in the EU? And who can throw it out of Europe? [laughs]. [...] Look, at the start they [Serbs] will receive financial help

[7] In accordance with ethical procedures in the social sciences (Israel and Hay 2006), all personal information which is not crucial for the analysis made in this paper is hidden.

> from the EU, saying 'we got the cash' [...] And when they enter, only then they [the EU countries] will begin to demand their money back, but not what they gave but several times more."

Some other informants would also like to return. For instance, an informant who came in 1988 would gladly return to the Republic of Srpska if the economic situation were better. On the other hand, he said that Serbia should enter the EU if accepting the independence of Kosovo was not a condition:

> "Yes [for the EU integration of Serbia], but not at the cost of Kosovo. Well, that is my cradle, my homeland. [...] No, it is better if we stay down there, where we are, even if no Serbs remain. And Kosovo not at any cost."

A Bosnian Serb who does not want to take Austrian citizenship also feels as if he is both "here and there". His family is having a better time in Austria and his children were born there, yet he longs for his home in the Republic of Srpska. He explains that "it seems as if we now have two houses. Not just two houses but two homes". He is surprised with the Serbian EU orientation:

> "I'm just wondering, whether they will, let's say, completely milk out Serbia. They will drain it for years and they will always find something [...] Now Kosovo, before Mladić, before Mladić Karadžić, tomorrow they will say 'you're not beautiful', the day after they will say 'you're not well dressed'. And we always dance to their tune. Yet we never arrive! Neither we nor our children will arrive. [...] we should start to think about our house, work as you know, as you can."

This view on exploitation was repeated in other interviews as well:

> "Serbia will not gain any considerable benefit from it, because Europe is like that, it gives its stores, sends its banks, everything so that it can slowly milk everything."

The only highly educated informant who came in 2003 for school, then remained in Austria, narrates that the EU operates

> "so that large countries like France and Germany can primarily fulfil their interests. They place their goods, they invest their capital and all they need, their banks will come here, their companies will come here [into smaller countries] and they simply squeeze out all that the country has [...] You can introduce whatever laws you like. The law exists here and there in Serbia. However, the standard [of living] is that which leads the law to be respected or not. If you have a high standard [of living] and you are hit in your wallet, the next time you will ask yourself 'shall I drive home drunk next time'. [...] I

> don't believe that Serbia will have much use of it [the EU]. Its standards will be raised temporarily, but in the long run, there's nothing there."

However, although being against the EU integration of Serbia, many informants acknowledge positive changes. The most important ones relate to laws and benefits for young people. For instance:

> "It [joining the EU] will mean a lot to young people as it will mean more job positions. There is a lack of jobs down in Serbia. Young people are, you know, unemployed, there are no jobs, nowhere to work. [In the EU] there is a bigger market. [After joining the EU] some will go to Austria, some to Germany, some will go to England. [...] for those who know another language, it will be no problem. [...] young people and school pupils will go to the West without visas [...] and find a job. [...] In the EU you can travel without borders, no traffic jams, all of that is in order. As I said, it will offer better prospects for younger people. And for those who are middle-aged and who work in firms, they won't get a bigger salary. I don't believe that the standard will increase so quickly."

The informant who came to Austria "to seek his fortune" in 1991 would like to go back to the Republic of Srpska. However, he knows that this is a futile idea. As with the earlier mentioned informants, he also wants to provide for his family the best he can. Moreover, he believes that "the conditions should be created" in the Republic of Srpska so that he can go back there. He thinks that the EU stands for the economic invasion of small countries.

> "It's a pure [economic] invasion of these poor countries by the EU. [...] It means, it takes your factories, it takes your land. [...] You are its slave [i.e. of the EU]. And when it takes your factories and land it's over. You have nothing of your own."

On the other hand, he notices that:

> "The only advantage would be their laws, I think. They have very good, nice laws. [...] But they are disciplined people; they stick to these laws and are afraid of them. [...] This means that the penalties force people to be disciplined. I'm not absolutely against Serbia's entrance. That would be insolent of me, given that I live in Austria and work and make money here, while they, down there, are suffering. [...] If we want to enter the EU, let's find a nice way, and not be blackmailed [...] they can't say that you cannot have that many dairy cows and that you can only have a thousand [...] They cannot limit how many plums, apples or pears you can have. If they limit you, then that is not justice. If they limit how much you can have why would I need that EU? Only reciprocity."

What is the general impression the informants give, based on their experience, of the EU? While only one (and the only female) informant[8] had an ambivalent attitude towards entering the EU, all others believed that Serbia would do better out of the European Union. Consequently, the informants draw differences between Austria and the EU. Not only do they state that Austria had a higher economic standard before it joined the EU, but according to the informants' opinions, it was stable enough not to be exploited by the EU as a supra-national organization. According to the informants, the EU has the political and financial means to demand and impose on Serbia what it will in order to take advantage of it. These notions run parallel with Petrović's (2009: 53) remark on "colonial" discourse concerning the Western Balkans:

> "The idea that some kind of colonial administration in the Balkans is indispensable to maintain peace and enable the development of the entire European continent was frequently echoed in journal articles, essays and pseudo-academic literature dating from the 1990s."

Petrović ties these ideas regarding economic, security and peacetime surveillance of the Balkans by EU countries to political discourse. Serbian informants in Austria, on the other hand, have a fear of perpetuating power relations, including exploitation and control over the Serbian market (see also Brujić 2015b: 39), which are similar to policies used in colonies.[9] In addition, this "never-ending" migrant position that the informants occupy, is simultaneously the source of their cultural proficiency in understanding Austria, Serbia, the EU and the process of Serbia joining "Europe". They are "almost Austrians", "almost Serbs" and "almost Europeans". As Chambers (1994: 6) explains this "habit of living between worlds":

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[8] She came to Austria in 1992 with her boyfriend (today husband) and has had Austrian citizenship since 2002. The reflections upon the EU integration of Serbia of this informant are similar to the ones of other females descending from Serbia. Namely, all of them were born at the beginning of 1970s, they came initially with their partners or husbands and they have children. In this respect, their attitudes towards the EU are general, sometimes very vague and ambivalent, emotional and/or related to the future of (their) children, in other words, to the benefits of the EU for their children (see Brujić 2018: 121–128).

[9] Although Serbia and other Balkan countries are *de facto* European, a scholar who wrote about the EU integration process of Slovenia, Velikonja (2005: 26), used Bhabha's concept of "colonial mimicry", to explain this paradoxical position: "How, then, is it possible that 'we are becoming part of it now', if 'we have always been part of it'? [...] [T]he colonized natives *are almost the same, but not quite the same* as their colonizers, i.e., the members of the 'ruling', and hence, naturally, 'higher' culture. [...] The situation in which the Slovenes (and other newcomers to *Europe*) found themselves within this new Eurocentric meta discourse is one in which we are 'almost European, but not quite European'; or, in other words, 'soon to be Europeanized Non-Europeans, who still have to learn a lot about being European'".

> "To come from elsewhere, from 'there' and not 'here', and hence to be simultaneously 'inside' and 'outside' the situation at hand, is to live at the intersections of histories and memories, experiencing both their preliminary dispersal and their subsequent translation into new, more extensive, arrangements along emerging routes. [...] This drama, rarely freely chosen, is also the drama of the stranger. Cut off from the homelands of tradition, experiencing a constantly challenged identity, the stranger is perpetually required to make herself at home in an interminable discussion between a scattered historical inheritance and a heterogeneous present."

As narratives on the EU integration of Serbia illustrate, the informants are attached to the Republic of Srpska, Austria and Serbia – as an outcome of their dislocated position. Their cultural representations on the EU and EU integration of Serbia, reaffirmed by their lived experience, presumptions, speculations and personal opinions, are part of their self-understanding and self-approval of their own position (staying in Austria). Although they are only "here" in Austria and "there" in the Republic of Srpska, as ethnic Serbs they feel also that they are part of Serbian society. These multiple attachments to several countries: home country (the Republic of Srpska), country of settlement (Austria) and homeland (Serbia) reveal their ambivalent position. They are Serbs, born in the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, who are now living in the Serbian diaspora. However, due to the wars and disintegration of the country, they became the citizens of other countries. To explain this further, since they do not originate from Serbia, they are not part of "Serbian diaspora" and since they do not live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are not recognized as Serbs in the "region" as defined by Serbian Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region. Their non-existent position within the law reveals and is, at the same time, the outcome of the emergence of new national states and changes of group identities and boundaries in the Balkans. In other words, not only are they "others" in Austria, they are "others" as regards Serbian law and Serbia, which is their historical, ethnic, religious, cultural etc. source of collective and personal identity.[10] Therefore, this example affirms the notion that diasporas are heterogeneous

[10] One prominent example of maintaining ethnic, cultural, historical, and religious connection of the Republic of Srpska with Serbia, i.e. the periphery of Serbian ethnic and cultural identity with its centre, is through the change of urban toponyms after Dayton Peace Agreement. Namely, Radović focuses on symbolical identity transformations of cities in the former Yugoslavia through the reconstruction of public spaces (Mostar, Priština, Banja Luka and East Sarajevo, for example). Using the examples of re-naming the streets and erecting and reconstructing Serbian Orthodox churches and monuments in East Sarajevo and in the capital of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka, the author reveals its symbolical purpose. That is, to ethnically delineate (Serbian) space in a nation building process. As Radović observes, the streets in Banja Luka and East Sarajevo were "ethnically and ideologically cleansed" from Muslim and Croatian influences, while the majority of new toponyms, street names and monuments are connected with Serbian history, culture and its allies (Radović 2013: 143–188).

and hybrid communities that have local/domestic and transnational ties (Werbner 2005: 470). Povrzanović Frykman (2004: 85), thus, opts to use "diasporic" (experience, for instance) instead of diaspora:

> "Using the adjective *diasporic* instead of the noun diaspora (referring to social formation) hints at processes of *identity formation*. It keeps the research interest open towards a wide range of experiences of what is often presented as 'living away from home', or, from a transnational perspective, as having yet another home(land) – whether actual, remembered, or imagined – as a potential or actual frame of emotional, social or political reference."

As Simsek-Çaglar in her anthropological analysis of German Turks in Berlin explains, Turkish displacement influenced their understanding of place: "A new sense of place shaped by having more than one home has evolved, an identity placed in more than one location" (1994: 66). In this respect, these Bosnian Serbs respondents simultaneously belong and are "out-of-place" (Čapo Žmegač 2008: 333) in Austria, the Republic of Srpska and Serbia. Thus, it is possible to say that they do not live bifocal but multifocal lives. This "out-of-place-ness" enables them to justify their own settlement in Austria instead of returning to the economically poorer Republic of Srpska, to comment on the quality of life in the European Union, and to have an opinion on Serbia's EU integration.

I found Levitt's and Glick Schiller's explanation of "ways of belonging" and "ways of being" in the transnational social field useful for understanding informants' positioning. According to them (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1009), while the social field is "a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed", "transnational social fields connect actors through direct and indirect relations across borders". Within the transnational social field, "ways of being" and "ways of belonging" play an important role in shaping social and cultural interaction and the formation of a person's identity. In this respect, "ways of being" only represent a person's social practices and connections within the transnational social field and "ways of belonging", the persons' cultural or national identification with some specific group. The authors explain that "ways of being" in the social field are "actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in [...] but do not identify themselves with any label or cultural politics associated with that field" (ibid.: 1010). On the other hand, "ways of belonging", mediated through memory, nostalgia, imagination, or ideas, objects and information that spans across several societies "refers to practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group" although people do not have to have actual social relations with the identified group (ibid.: 1010–1011). I argue that ethnographic research of transnational practices of four families of Bosnian Croats who found their refuge in Sweden during 1990s

(Povrzanović Frykman 2011) is an example of a "transnational way of being" and narratives of Bosnian Serbs living in Graz an example of a "transnational way of belonging". Namely, these Bosnian Croats are connected with three countries: with Bosnia and Herzegovina from which they originate, with Sweden where they live and Croatia, as a country of their ethnic belonging, and where they have bought summerhouses on the Croatian coast. In other words, they live in Sweden, visit their family in Bosnia and Herzegovina and spend holidays in Croatia. Povrzanović Frykman (2011: 254) explains that Croatia became their "third homeland", due to their regular visits. Thus the author speaks of "the *normality* of their practices of connection, and [...] multiple locations" grounded in their personal transnational experiences. These transnational experiences "connect the places of their daily life to other places to which they are socially and emotionally attached, that happen to be located in three countries" (ibid.: 242). On the other hand, the narratives of Serbs from the Republic of Srpska on EU integration of Serbia and Kosovo are part of their historical memory, cultural knowledge and shared remembering of a homeland (see Putinja and Stref-Fenar 1997: 184, 186–187) – i.e. they are expressions of their "way of belonging" and their transnational connections to Serbia. While this "transnational way of belonging" describes how these Bosnian Serbs experience their attachments to Serbia, their understandings of the European Union reveal their dislike of the EU which is seen as exploiting small, economically weak countries, such as Serbia.

Concluding remarks

In Serbian ethnology and anthropology, the issue of cultural representations of the EU among Serbs living in Serbia or among the diaspora has already been studied. However, in this paper, the main research group considered are Serbs from the Republic of Srpska living in Graz, and their views on the EU and the integration of Serbia into the EU. Although the issues of Bosnian Serbs living among the (Serbian and Bosnian) diaspora open up many more research questions, including the issue of ethnic identity, assimilation, EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, female migration, war narratives etc., these issues constitute topics for further study. I have therefore chosen to focus this study on them as they have a permanently ambivalent status – being neither fully integrated "here" in Austria nor living "there" in the Republic of Srpska nor Serbia. Their cultural representations of the EU and of the EU integration of Serbia are not only "cognitive tools" for understanding the situation in Serbia, but serve consequently as a "transnational way of belonging" in Serbia. As they are Serbian co-ethnics originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and having either Bosnian or Austrian citizenship, they are neither part of the Serbian diaspora, nor part of the Serbian "region" in a formal sense. They are members of Bosnian diaspora and thus pro-

tected by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Constitution*, Article 7, e). In this respect, their cultural representations of the EU and of the EU integration of Serbia are products of this ambivalent relationship because none of them plan at present to go back to the Republic of Srpska nor to move to Serbia. Therefore, as they are "simultaneously 'rooted and rootless'" (Trinh T. Minh-ha 1990 quoted in Chambers 1994: 95) the stories on the EU integration of Serbia are for them at the same time stories of their own (non)-integration and a confirmation of their ethnic and cultural identity which binds them to Serbia, Austria and the Republic of Srpska.

Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 1010) explain that transnational "ways of belonging" can only be "concrete, such as wearing a Christian cross or Jewish star" rather than symbolic. On the contrary, in this paper I demonstrate that their ideas and cultural conceptions of EU integration of Serbia play a "concrete role" – to reaffirm them as Serbs and link them with Serbia, their ethnic, religious and cultural home state. In other words, their cultural representations serve to convert a space (Serbia as their historical homeland) into a concrete place: the place of their ethnic and cultural origin. They live and work in Austria and go to the Republic of Srpska for vacation, where they would like to return after they retire (although they are aware that they will probably never come back). Their narratives on Serbia and Kosovo are, thus, part of their group memory on their mythical homeland and ethnic identification. More precisely, their narratives state that homeland does not have to refer to one place but includes multiple homelands, such as mythical, historical, ethnic, ancestral etc. homelands.

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Narratives about Migratory Experiences and Homeland among the Albanians from the Republic of Macedonia

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The article focuses on two groups of migratory narratives collected by the author among the Albanian labour migrants from the Republic of Macedonia. The first group refers to temporary migration, i.e. to migrants going to work abroad, but with the idea that after a while they will return to their place of origin. The second reflects the changes in migratory trends showing the experience as well as the perceptions about those who have settled abroad and have raised their children and grandchildren there. The main aim of the article is to critically examine these different narratives and stories about migratory experiences, migrants' attitudes toward their place of origin and perceptions about where "home" is.

Keywords: Albanians, labour mobility, family migration, migratory narratives, homeland

Introduction: a brief history of the migration of Albanians from Macedonia

In the last few decades, the total number of people moving from one place to another, trying to make a living, is steadily increasing.[1] There is no doubt that human mobility and migration have played a very significant role in the contemporary world and societies of the second half of the 20th century. The absolute number of moving people is not so important, but the multifarious nature and characteristics of contemporary migration are determinative of its significance in public discourse and the way it shapes and re-shapes both sending and receiving migrant societies (King 2012: 6). In their summary of the characteristics of

[1] The reports and data about the trends in migration stock of the United Nations show that, in 2015, the number of international migrants worldwide reached 244 million, up from 175 million in 2000, 99 million in 1980 and 75 million in 1960. The share of international migrants in the world population is as follows: 2.5% in 1960, 2.2% in 1980, 2.8% in 2000 and 3.3% in 2015 (United Nations 2006: 1–2; United Nations 2016: 1–2).

contemporary migration (globalization, acceleration, differentiation, feminization and politicization) Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2003) formulate the notion of "the age of migration". In this respect, we face a considerable variety of ethnic and cultural groups taking part in migratory processes, various directions of movements and improved means of transportation, communications and access to information; political and public perceptions about migration and migrants are contradictory. It should not be neglected that temporary or pendulum movements are interlaced with the migration of people permanently moving from their places of origin.

Labour mobility away from the birth place, practicing various activities with the aim of earning means for living, has been known for centuries among the population in the broad area of the Balkans. In the region, these movements are known as *gurbet*, *kurbet*; and in the South Slavic languages the term *pečalba* is used synonymously[2] (Hristov 2015: 31). At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, *gurbet/pečalba* was a typical male occupation and usually referred to seasonal or temporary work: men left their place of origin and moved abroad making a living for their families remaining at home. They were engaged in different types of economic activities, either in the agrarian industry, such as harvesting and sheep breeding, or in the craft industry, like construction, confectionery and pottery (Palairet 1987: 25–37). Such labour mobility to closer (in the Balkan area) or more distant localities (Asia Minor, Egypt, Romania, etc.) was also known among the Albanian population inhabiting territories located today in the western part of the Republic of Macedonia (see Markov 2012). The new political borders in the Balkans after the Balkan Wars and World War I, the increasing restrictive national legislation in particular countries, combined with a complex political environment in the most Balkan countries, resulted in a drastic decrease in transborder labour mobility (Hristov 2015: 42–43). During the later interwar period and the first decade after World War II, migrant labourers from Macedonian territories redirected their routes to the north, within the borders of Yugoslavia itself,[3] and then to the east (Palairet 1987: 34–35); the Albanian *gurbetzhinjtë* (migrant labourers) were no exception (Markov 2010: 303–304).

In this article, the subject of research interest, however, is more recent Albanian migration (the last five decades) in search of livelihood and improving living conditions. The Second World War and its aftermath proved to be a turning point in the process of their labour movements, and during the subsequent post-war

[2] The word *gurbet* derives from Arabic and in the Balkan languages comes through Turkish. It means "abroad", somewhere far from one's home. *Pečalba* literary means "gain", "to gain for a living" (Константинов 1964: 14–15; Hristov 2015: 31).

[3] Before the war this was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and after that the Yugoslav federation.

decades they changed vastly in size, intensity, characteristics, and main destinations. In the second half of 1960s, Yugoslavia concluded recruitment treaties regulating the temporary employment of Yugoslav workers with various Western European countries which were still enjoying its post-war economic boom, and migrant labour was very much in demand (Ivanović 2012: 31–70; Novinšćak 2009; Fassmann and Reeger 2008: 21–28; Gross 2006: 9–10). Thus, the Yugoslav Federation became a very active participant in the guest worker programmes of post-war Europe. Macedonia was one of the Yugoslav republics which experienced a large-scale migration of mostly unskilled workers in the following decades. And many of them were, namely, Albanians who were seeking better livelihoods working abroad.[4]

Although each receiving European country pursued its own migratory policy, there were several common elements. The recruitment of workers, the working conditions, and the social insurance were regulated by the bilateral agreements mentioned above. Migrants were guest workers (or, according to the commonly accepted German term, "Gastarbeiters"). They were considered temporary labourers, who worked for a limited period of time according to residence and labour permits (which were often valid for specific jobs and areas), and afterwards they would return to their home countries. If there were still need for labour force, new workers could come. Entry of dependants was strongly restricted (Castles and Miller 2003: 69–72). Under these structural conditions, the first Albanian migrant workers coming from Macedonia were solely men, and migration was also perceived by most of them as temporary.

These movements did not differ from the *gurbet* pattern of labour mobility, known for centuries in the region, as I already mentioned above. The late 1960s were a time when labour mobility among Albanian population started to change vastly in size, intensity, characteristics and main work destinations, and working abroad became a very important source of livelihoods for many Albanian family households. The economic and social transnational practices were entirely oriented towards the villages of origin in Macedonia.

A change occurred in the structural conditions of this labour mobility in the mid-1970s. The oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent economic recession affected the host European countries so that they needed fewer foreign workers. Contrary

[4] According to census data there were 56,449 Macedonian citizens abroad in 1971 (3.4% of the total population), 100,922 (5.3%) in 1981 and 173,611 (8.3%) in 1994. Compared to these data, the percentage of Albanians (of the entire Albanian population in Macedonia) working and living abroad was bigger – 4.2% in 1971, 5.9% in 1981 and 10.7% in 1994 (Јанеска 2001: 178–180, 201–204). Unfortunately, the 2002 Census was conducted according to a different methodology and counted only those Macedonian citizens residing abroad up to one year. Therefore, these data are incomparable to the previous ones.

to expectations, however, and in spite of the restrictions put in place, migration continued. In fact, the freeze on recruitment of new guest workers stimulated the prolonged stay of those already working there. It was a precondition for their settlement. The governments in the receiving Western European countries initially opposed family reunion, but with little success. After long debates, it was accepted as a human right, but was made possible under specific conditions concerning adequate accommodation, sufficient resources, health insurance etc. (Castles and Miller 2003: 79–80). Thus, as a result of the changed macro conditions (economic, political and social) in the second half of the 1980s in Yugoslavia and especially during the 1990s (when Macedonia became an independent state), the process of "family reunion" gradually gained speed among the Albanian migrants as well, and many of them brought their families to the host countries (see also Iseni 2013: 234). The unfavourable political and economic prospects in Macedonia during this period explain why the desire to migrate abroad increased. The established culture of migration played a crucial role during the 1990s and 2000s in the manner that migration continued with high intensity, despite the limited opportunities for going abroad due to the strong visa restrictions for all former Yugoslav citizens. This time, however, the processes of family reunion and family formation caused an increase in the number of women and children abroad (Markov 2013: 250–251).[5] Living away from the home country with the family changed migrants' priorities: integration in receiving society came to the fore.

It is significant that, during the last three decades, "family migration" existed simultaneously with the migration of single men. On the basis of ethnographic fieldwork materials I collected, two main categories of migratory experience and narratives can be distinguished. The first one refers to temporary migration, i.e. to migrants going to work abroad without their wives and children, but planning to return to their place of origin. The second reflects the changes in migratory trends showing the experience as well as the perceptions about those who have settled abroad and have raised their children and grandchildren there. The main aim of the paper is to examine these different narratives and stories about migratory experience, migrants' attitudes toward the place of origin and perceptions where "home" is.

[5] According to the Macedonian census data, the number of migrant family members living with them abroad in 1971 was barely 2,016 (3.6%), but it grew to 42,958 (42.6%) in 1981 and to 87,079 (49.8%) in 1994. Among the Albanians, however, the number of family members in 1981 was less than the average – around 30%; in 1994 this percentage was already 49.9% (Јанеска 2001: 201–203).

Methodological notes

The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork[6] conducted in the western part of Macedonia, where the Albanian population is concentrated, more particularly in selected villages in the municipalities of Skopje, Tetovo, Tearce and Struga. Four field research sessions of 10–15 days each, as well as several shorter occasional field trips, were carried out in this area from 2008 to 2010. A set of 35 interviews with 43 interlocutors was conducted in both rural and urban locations. In addition, the research benefited from several informal conversations in the study locations. The respondents were migrants who, at the time of the interview, were on return visits in their places of origin or former migrants, who had worked abroad, but returned to Macedonia. Among the first group of respondents, at the moment of the interview, there were people who planned to get back to their places of origin, as well as those who saw their future work and family life possible only out of Macedonia. As to the returnees, some of them planned to work again abroad for a certain period of time. Others had the idea to go with their families next time. There were also people who declared that they would never go to work abroad again.

All my interlocutors were Muslim Albanians. Their age ranged from 18 to 75 years, most of them attended primary and secondary school, and a few had higher education. Almost all my interviewees were men. This is largely a reflection of the patriarchal context of the Albanian Muslim community in western Macedonia, within which young unmarried men like me are allowed to access only men's places. Merely three short conversations with Albanian women were conducted, but in the presence of their male companions – either husband or friend – with whom I established a close relationship of trust. Thus, this text generally presents the male point of view.

Most of the ethnographic interviews I conducted were a combination of semi-structured and biographical (life history) narratives. The life-history approach is very valuable in studying processes, social changes and everyday life, especially in cases when the archives are incomplete or missing (Thompson 1978). Life histories allow us to observe the changes in the cultural and social experience of the individuals, their points of view and daily cultural practices, and in the meanings people invest in their actions (Roberts 2002: 21). This approach takes into consideration the fact that life histories are subjective, but finds them valuable as they reveal the respondents' opinions, dispositions and attitudes (Lieblich et al. 1998). At the same time, the respondents' "versions" are juxtaposed to information from other secondary sources, statistical data and scientific interpretations.

[6] It was part of my work on a doctoral dissertation under the title "Contemporary Labour Migrations of Albanians from Macedonia". The dissertation was defended successfully at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with Ethnographic Museum (IEFSEM) in Sofia on July 18, 2011.

Narratives about temporary migration

As my interlocutors pointed out, the causes and motives for migration, are various, but a common motivation is the economic striving to earn enough to maintain basic needs of life and improve the household standard of living. Before leaving their birth villages, almost all of my respondents, temporary workers, lived in extended family households.[7] A large number of them were already married and some had children. Their wives and children stayed behind and the husbands' parents, unmarried brothers or sisters, who in most cases lived together in extended rural families, took care of them. Children's rearing is the women's responsibility, but all the decisions concerning marriage, education, visiting relatives, taking part in rituals and any activities that could affect the family prestige are prerogatives of the household's head. The migrants' wives and children are very cautious about their behaviour in order to maintain their unblemished reputation. Usually, they are put under close scrutiny by the local community and according to its common moral norms are expected to be quite humble and modest in their public actions. This behaviour is required in order to guarantee the honour of both, the man working abroad and the family in the village in Macedonia (for Kosovo, cf. Reineck 1991: 135).

> "The young bride left here does not dare to dress as young. Because her husband is absent. She must be dressed as some old woman. If she puts on new clothes, she would be laughed at, she would be told she is unfaithful, she is a prostitute. Even now those women are put under strong observation and in a very difficult position." (Man, born in 1947; worked in Serbia, currently lives as a pensioner in Zhelino near Tetovo)

Many of my interlocutors often related emotional heart-breaking stories about the modest socio-economic conditions in which they live abroad in order to save money. Seven to ten workers usually live together in a small flat and divide the rent. Many of them work overtime and even during the weekends, to double their daily wages. Migrants restrain their consumption to a minimum. They shop at discount stores, avoid pubs or restaurants, and spend money only for the barest necessaries. As suggested by Bashkim Iseni, in the case of the Kosovar Albanians in Switzerland, temporal migrants live "on the margins of the host country, leading a parallel social life to its mainstream populations" (Iseni 2013: 231). In most cases temporary migrants speak with a deep pain about the years they spent abroad. They define this period as the hardest time of their life.

[7] Such a family situation was particularly applicable for migrant workers from the first migration waves from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Such cases, however, can be observed even today.

> "Often these people come back home. When he digs a channel or a construction site falls down – sometimes the man is sent back in a coffin. Therefore, the *gurbet* is a running wound for us. Nobody wants it. However, a man is forced to leave his home and to go to *gurbet*. It is not at his will, but a compulsion." (Man, born in 1947; worked in Serbia, currently lives as a pensioner in Zhelino near Tetovo)

> "*Gurbet* is darker then the devil. And the devil is so dark that you couldn't distinguish it from the charcoal. And *gurbet* is like that – dark." (Man, born in 1968; worked in Germany [1988–1990] and Austria [1991–1998], currently lives in Skopje)

They miss their old friends they have not seen for years. This apartness begets a feeling of estrangement and oblivion:

> "Let's say when it is Bayram. The tradition here is: people go to one another and congratulate each other […] And for nine years that didn't exist for me. I couldn't come, that's how my job was. So, for nine years I did not come for Bayram. People become estranged, your old friends already have new friends, they have other life projects etc. […] When we come back here, they say: 'Here come the tourists'! We are foreigners there and tourists here. So, you are nowhere, when you are on *gurbet*, you are nowhere." (Man, born in 1968; worked in Germany [1988–1990] and Austria [1991–1998], currently lives in Skopje)

Thus, the actual points of reference of these Albanian migrants are their places of origin and especially their families living there; moreover they rely on their economic support. In all collected stories worries about the parents, wife, children and other relatives can be found:

> "You think of your parents because they rely on you. Because when you go abroad, you have a family and you have to help them. And you constantly think of it – how are they, what are they doing, is anyone sick or not [...] When you have a dream at night – you immediately call – what is happening, is anyone ill?" (Man, born in 1968; worked in Germany [1988–1990] and Austria [1991–1998], lives in Skopje)

> "As a rule all Albanians do it in this manner, even to this day – they work in order to send money here! The life abroad is not important for us. We are strongly connected to the family. It is not important for me to be happy and to have a good life abroad, if my family suffers here. So, for us it is more important that one of us be there and supports the whole family than that we are all here and do not work." (Man, born in 1963; worked in Germany [1985–1998], currently lives in Zhelino near Tetovo)

Money earned abroad is regularly sent to the relatives for covering primary vital needs – food, medicine, clothing, and housing. An important priority for many families was also the expansion of living space – they purchase land, build new family houses, improve the overall infrastructure of the place of origin (Markov 2013: 251–255). Often considerable resources are expended on community rituals such as weddings (see Pichler 2010) or circumcisions. Only a small part is invested in business undertakings, but they are mostly just small firms based on family and kinship relations.

In the early migratory stage (but in some cases even today) earned money was sent to the male head of the family household, who was in charge of controlling the finances:

> "Then [in the 1970s] there was a huge family, probably about 30 people. Uncles, cousins, brothers – all of them under the same roof […] We, my brothers and I, went abroad in order to earn money. And when we came back each of us gave our earnings to our father. The oldest man held the money. It didn't matter that I was the one earning it – he was the one taking it. He was taking care of our children – deciding whether to go to school or work. He was the chief; he kept the business accounts." (Man, born in 1944; worked in Germany and the USA, currently lives as a pensioner partly in Dologozhda near Struga and partly in the USA)

In this way the migration of one or more household members to Europe functions as income insurance. According to this pattern, when an Albanian man goes abroad to work, ideally he does not go "for himself", but to improve the living conditions of his entire family household (Reineck 1991: 143). The aim expressed by the workers abroad is to spend a certain period of time in the host country and earn enough money necessary for a new beginning for them and their families, and after this to return to their villages in Macedonia, which they perceived as home.

> "I had gone there with a goal – what I needed so that I could live here, in my native city, where I was born, where my father was born, and my grandfather. I was there with a specific goal – where should I go, why should I go, what should I do, and how much money do I need? And I didn't come back until I got it, I didn't wanna come back. I said to myself – fine, I need a good gain [...] And now, this is ours, it is private [a small hotel built with earned money]." (Man, born in 1968; worked in Germany [1988–1990] and Austria [1991–1998], currently lives in Skopje)

From a material point of view, in the opinion of men who chose to work abroad alone for a certain period of time, remittances enable wives and children left behind to live in much better conditions than their neighbours who could not rely on such resources. At the same time, this is also a less expensive option than taking the fam-

ily abroad, a process which would incur higher expenses, especially when this extra money can be saved for the future return home:

> "If you want to work and save up some money – you can't do that with your family along. There is no chance. If you live with four other men in the same lodging your expenses will be lower, since you will share the rent, so you will be earning more. This was how I lived – with two other men – one from Kosovo, the other from Albania. It was very good, because I had the opportunity to save up 20,000 euro. My brother, for example, has his family along and his monthly wage is 3,000 euro, and he is barely saving up 2,000 euro for the whole year." (Man, born in 1979; worked in Italy [2004–2007], currently lives in Skopje)

The second set of factors is sociocultural in nature: the fear of assimilation and the risk of losing the Albanian identity, language and culture along the generations. Consequently, instead of bringing them to Europe, these men make every endeavour to secure financial stability and good education for their children, who live in the native place:

> "While I was in Austria, I met some people who had been there since 1968. Until 1980 they had been alone. Then they had decided to take their family with them. I saw their grandchildren – they spoke German, even among themselves. They did not speak their mother tongue. That's why I did not want to take my children along with me. All the time you communicate only with Austrians and little by little you lose your mother tongue. So, the second or the third generation has already been assimilated." (Man, born in 1968; worked in Germany [1988–1990] and Austria [1991–1998], currently lives in Skopje)

Sometimes even men living with their wives decide to return with the whole family to Macedonia when their children reach school age:

> "I didn't plan for us to stay there. I didn't want my children to go to school there. I took them to learn Albanian, not German. Because of that I sent them back here. I saw others there – they had married to Swiss or Italian, and the child became Italian or Swiss." (Man, born in 1955; worked and lived with his family in Switzerland [1988–1999], currently they live in Tetovo)

These men who prefer to leave their wives and children in the native place comment with irritation the growing cases of family migration during the last two decades. The appearance of "them" (those working and living abroad) and "us" (who have been on *gurbet*, but have come back) is indicative:

> "In the last 15–20 years, they started bringing their children abroad. They enrolled the children in German schools and they graduated there. They

> even started buying houses abroad. Those who have already lived there are emigrants. If their children go to school or were born there, they are not there on *gurbet*. I was on *gurbet*! They don't know what the *gurbet* is! And here they come like tourists." (Man, born in 1962; worked in Switzerland [1979–1986], currently lives in Zhelino near Tetovo)

Narratives concerning the migrants' settlement abroad

For many Albanian migrant labourers, it turned out that achieving the desired objective was not that easy for various reasons (due to the above-mentioned discouraging economic and political situation in Macedonia, as well as more restrictive migration policies in Western European countries). Thus, the return was constantly delayed and many of them worked abroad for two or more decades. They were afraid that if they returned to Macedonia they would no longer be able to re-migrate to Western Europe. Often, especially since family reunion has become human right in the receiving states, Albanian male workers were accompanied by their spouses and/or children in their more prolonged stay.

On the other hand, growing up during the 1970s–1980s period in families with absent migrant fathers influenced the decision of many of my respondents to take their families with them when migrating, giving their own children what they saw as a better life in a family environment:

> "But since 1990s they started taking the families abroad. Through the years, another mentality has developed. The old father returns here after 30 years of work in Germany, Austria, but he had already lost his life. People have begun to think otherwise – so, why should I maltreat my wife and children leaving them on their own? Thereby we started taking them abroad." (Man, born in 1965 in Dologozhda; currently lives with his family in Austria)

There are also many personal motives which affect the decision on family reunion abroad, such as certain marital and inter-generational conflicts. Besides, women and children experience a very difficult social and psychological crisis during separation. There also are frequent conflicts between migrants' wives and their in-laws over the use of remittances, especially for those women living in extended families. Economic prosperity and individual independence from patriarchal and community authority play a key role. The ideal case in which a migrant from an extended family goes abroad to work and does not go "for himself" and his nuclear family, but to improve the living conditions of the entire family household, is increasingly fading. Migration enables a man to provide wellbeing for himself without having to support the larger kin network. It calls into question the traditional ideal of life devoted to the collective interests of the extended family. Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many

Albanian migrants have chosen to secure a better life for their spouse and children, often taking them abroad (Reineck 1991: 143). One of my interlocutors explained:

> "No matter whether you liked it or not – you had to obey your father, because he was the oldest man. Such was our tradition. And actually we respected each other much more. [This lasted] probably until 20 years ago. And after that you take your family abroad and you don't need to be obedient any more. The old people don't have that influence any more. The children are independent from their parents and do not pay much attention to them, as they used to. They do not give money to the oldest men as well." (Man, born in 1944; worked in Germany and the USA, currently lives as a pensioner partly in Dologozhda near Struga and partly in the USA)

The position of women abroad has also changed: although some stereotypes still persist, reflected in the remarks of some male interviewees who still thought women's place was at home to take care of housekeeping and children, women generally enjoy social freedom, not being under the control of other household members and avoiding the local village community's constant surveillance. Furthermore, there are also respondents who declared that in recent years many of their wives have started to work and to contribute financially to the nuclear family unit:

> "Earlier, until 1995–1996, women were not working, but then they began [to work]. It depends on the living standard. The costs are very high, the husband cannot make good money and the wife began working to help him. Thus they can have a better life." (Man, born in 1963; worked in Switzerland [1988–2001], currently lives in Tetovo)

The women who grew up and completed their education abroad experienced perhaps the most important change. Their position, in turn, has strongly affected the change of patriarchal attitudes towards women's role amongst people around them, including men. The words of a young man, whose Albanian wife grew up in Italy, appear to be a good evidence of these new attitudes:

> "My wife was there, her father had been working in Italy for many years and he had taken her there as a child. After we married, I also went there […] I barely speak Italian. But my wife speaks [Italian], she is fluent. What I do not know, my wife knows. She is working in a pasta factory and she found the first job position for me." (Man, born in 1990 in Tearce near Tetovo; currently lives in Italy with his family)

Living abroad with the family changes migrants' priorities which start to differ from the main motivations in the *gurbet* model: the focus turns towards earning in order to provide for the nuclear family abroad, while sending remittances to the villages of origin takes second place (cf. Akkaya and Soland 2009: 8).

> "In the recent years, our people started buying flats or even building houses in Switzerland. We have citizenship, we already live there. I still think of return after I retire, it is still in my head. But do you know where the problem is? My daughter has a Swiss passport, she is studying there and after she graduates she would have a good salary in Switzerland. And if I invest money there, how can I return? [...] In my opinion to build a big house of three-four storeys here is useless since you don't live here. If you want – build a storey or buy small flat, just for holiday." (Man, born in 1965 in Dologozhda; currently lives with his family in Switzerland)

Collected ethnographic data confirm the statement of Bashkim Iseni that there are different indicators pointing towards a shift in priorities – the strong propensity for naturalization, the acquisition of real estate abroad, the decrease in real estate investments in areas of origin, the increase of Albanian small and medium-sized enterprises owned abroad, and investment in the offspring's education in the country of residence (Iseni 2013: 234).

These migrants typically don't return after their retirement. They have raised their children abroad, and some of them even have grandchildren born in the receiving countries. According to my interlocutors, their children have broader social contacts and a diverse friendship environment, they are provided with better education and have numerous opportunities for professional development in comparison to their own. Although their visit to the country of origin, at least once a year still, appears to be a rule carrying the meaning of going back "home", at retirement age both men and women don't want to permanently go back to their places of birth in Macedonia; instead they prefer to stay in order to live closer to their children and grandchildren:

> "It is very difficult for me to return. Because my whole family is there and if I come back with my wife here, all of my children will stay there. What are we going to do here, two old people? You will stay for a month or two and you will immediately begin to think about there. It is very hard for us. We did not think about that when we went on *gurbet*. When we left, we aimed to work for one or two years, to earn some money, to build a house, just to stabilize, and to come back. But this did not happen." (Man, born in 1954 in Tearce near Tetovo; went to Switzerland in 1980 and took his family there in 1986)

Return is even less desirable for women who, as a result of living abroad, enjoy more freedom, especially with regard to constant compliance to other members of the extended household, as well as the surveillance and supervision by the local community. They fear that returning would restrict their freedom, even in older age. Similarly, the idea of returning does not appeal much to the second generation – migrants' offspring. Paradoxically, regardless of this fact, a large part of them

continues to maintain a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic Albanian identity: mixed marriages are still an exception and those who were born in Germany, Austria or Switzerland return to Macedonia to find spouses. The everlasting flow of new migrants to areas already inhabited by Albanians who are second and even third generation has a double impact. On the one hand, clubs and organizations in these countries support easier settlement and employment for the newcomers. On the other hand, new migrants carry with them elements of specific local Albanian culture – language, culinary, customs, religious rituals, behavioural habits of their birthplaces, etc.

In this way many of the migrants' descendants still remain related to their places of origin and local communities. For many of them these localities were destinations for childhood summer holidays or places to find a spouse. However, their parents' home villages and Macedonia as a whole are not seen as a place for living. The ongoing socioeconomic underdevelopment and instability is often mentioned as a cause. They fear integration and adaptation problems in case they "return", as well as the lack of opportunities they are so accustomed to abroad (for similar findings see Vathi 2011). Zurich, Munich or Vienna are the places where they were born, raised, and educated. They have their friends and established working positions there, and the real home for them is there:

> "I am a pensioner now and I come every year and I remain for five-six months, I like my native village. But my children... they come rarely. They do not like the mentality here. In the Balkans people cheat and lie more and they don't like this, they don't accept it. They have an American mentality. And they can come for a short time, for several days, but they don't want to live here." (Man, born in 1944; worked in Germany and the USA, currently lives as a pensioner partly in Dologozhda near Struga and partly in the USA)

> "They will have another mentality. There is nothing attractive for them here anymore. I see my sister's daughters – when they come here, they don't want to stay for a long time. Every day they ask: 'Mummy, when are we going home?' They don't have acquaintances here, nobody knows them. You belong where your friends are. If you send me to the end of the world, I will come back here, I was born here, here is my family, and here are my friends. But those who were born there, they are different – they have citizenship there, they are educated there, and after university, they started immediately working there […]" (Man, born in 1962; worked in Switzerland [1979–1986], currently lives in Zhelino near Tetovo)

Conclusion

Albanian migrants from Macedonia offer an interesting case study regarding the continuity and the shifts which characterise their migratory processes. Different and even opposite migratory strategies (due to residence) have evolved over time. In the 1960s and 1970s, a sizable proportion of male guest workers left their families behind in Macedonia in order to secure better living conditions for them, which meant sending remittances to their areas of origin, building homes and securing the future of their families there. The transformation of the European migratory policy in the 1980s toward immigrant integration, along with the ongoing chronic political, economic and social problems in Macedonia, was the context in which a growing number of people reoriented their migratory projects toward settling abroad. The nature of their transnational practices also changed; today they and their descendants are less connected to the places of origin and better integrated into the host countries. As a result of the diversification of the migrant experience, the understandings and perceptions of home are changing. Many Albanians, especially from the second generation, associate their home with the place abroad, where they were born and/or educated, where they work and plan to set up their families. An important point worth mentioning is that, during the last three decades, "family migration" and settlement abroad have existed simultaneously with the temporary migration of single men (*gurbet* model). Therefore, both categories of narratives are often interlacing and sometimes the differentiation is blurred, although they were separated in order to facilitate their analysis.

All of these processes and developments are clearly expressed by the Albanian migrants (temporary workers abroad and people settling with their families there). The profound study of continuities and shifts in migration patterns and trends through the people's narratives, concerning their personal life experience, is an appropriate approach which offers the researchers interesting scholarly opportunities. It contributes to a better understanding of the life choices the migrants make and the meanings they invest in their daily routines.

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"Should I Stay or Should I Go?"
Migration Patterns of Macedonia's Young People

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The paper, based on ethnographic fieldwork, deals with the question about the Bulgarian citizenship obtained by many in the Macedonian border towns – Kriva Palanka and Kratovo. Looking at the governmental framework, and the Bulgarian state authorities' rationalisation of the process, the paper provides a look at the everyday life in these towns, searching for the reasons of the Macedonians for applying for Bulgarian documents, the "grey area" in passport applications and finally the way the locals perceive their second citizenship. The main question becomes: How do people and, especially, young people rationalise possible repercussions of these processes on their identity and what turns out to be a symbolic load of the documents?

Keywords: passports, identity, border, double citizenship, Macedonia

Introduction

With this paper, I would like to draw attention to a topic which has garnered significant interest mostly outside of academia and predominantly in certain parts of the Balkans (specifically the ones in question – Bulgaria and Macedonia), and their governments and media. The question of dual citizenship and the obtaining of Bulgarian passports by the Macedonian population has become widely discussed and a "public secret" in the border region and among the wider public in the two countries.

Gradually, I became interested not in the migration patterns themselves, but in the reasons which young people realise as their main motive for leaving the country and the means facilitating their decision. In that sense, what came forward inevitably was the use of the personal documentation and the social meanings assigned to it and in turn – their influence on the identity and the Macedonian border social reality.

This text is based on ethnographic fieldwork[1] involving observations and 28 interviews, conducted mainly in the summer of 2016 in two border towns – Kriva Palanka and Kratovo.[2] The research in its wider context focused on a range of topics, concerning the past and the present of the tripoint between Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia, thus calling for respondents representing different age and social groups, having different occupation and educational status. While uncovering the diverse and multifaceted identity and political processes taking place at these frontiers, often understood as areas of "cross-pressures" (Agnew 2007), and in the case – specifically the eastern Macedonian border, a main public discourse was depicted – the one of migrations, double citizenships and "passport grey markets". The subject proved to be of interest for almost all of my respondents, despite them coming from diverse social, political, cultural and generational backgrounds. Nevertheless, the main core of actors consisted of young Macedonians aged between 18 and 30. Most of them were either unemployed, or worked in the hospitality industry in the above-mentioned towns.

For the most part the interviews were informal, since this topic seemed to put too much pressure on the interlocutors. Additionally, the young Macedonians also preferred not to be bothered or to bother themselves ("*da ne se zamarat*") with "political questions" or such which would require a lot of attention and longer conversing. The informal surrounding – cafés, bars or restaurants (*kafani*), was the preferred one for us to talk, but only in the context of having a good time ("*da uzhivame*").

With regard to positioning myself within the field, two important perceptions of the researcher should be noted. Firstly, since this is the border region between Macedonia and Bulgaria, I am the "other" from across the border – for some I am an *embodiment* of the long-standing historiography-, history- and media-created "enemy" – someone who does not recognize them as Macedonians, but rather as Macedonian-Bulgarians as the public discourse in Bulgaria dictates. For others, especially in the light of the presented material, I am also the one who is bearing a prestigious identity at the point, as we are going to see later. Secondly, and after legitimizing myself in the community, I am "theirs" – not only anthropologically, fulfilling the Slavic image (keeping in mind that Bulgarians are widely perceived as

[1] The research was made possible through a project financed by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences "Program for career development of young scientists, BAS" of commenced in 2016 (ДФНП №177).

[2] Both selected towns are located on the Macedonian side of the Macedonian-Bulgarian border region, but while Kriva Palanka is located on the international road, connecting Bulgarian capital Sofia with the city of Kumanovo in the Republic of Macedonia and Skopje, Kratovo is located approximately 63 kilometres from the border itself and on the regional road, connecting it with the town of Probishtip. While the former is directly linked to the Bulgarian side, the latter has no means of transportation in that direction including such from Kriva Palanka, and is in a way isolated from direct communication with the border.

Tatars in Macedonia by an infamous theory; Донски 2000), but also by *poteklo* (by ancestry), having a family coming from the region of Kratovo/Prilep.

Background of the migration issue in Macedonia

Current migratory processes in the region are not a new phenomenon. The tradition of temporary labour migrations, particularly among males, has existed for centuries in a number of Balkan areas and specifically in the *Shopluk* ethno-cultural region.[3] The main actors in these labour migrations are men, who earn money "abroad", returning to their families seasonally or once or twice a year (Hristov 2008: 217; Hristov 2015). The men of this region have traditionally been builders, and many of them are still today. However, the new generation has higher aspirations. In its modern version, the process gains political implications, too.

At the end of the 1960s, Yugoslavia became the only socialist country that opened its borders to the West. During this period, due to signed bilateral agreements, the biggest share of the so called *Gastarbeiters* (guest workers) labour movement was directed towards Germany and other Western countries. This policy brought fame to the Yugoslav passport, known to (not only) other Eastern European countries for granting its owners great possibilities for travelling and freedom, not only within the federation but to the number of other countries as well. So, with the changes that occurred in the 1990s, many felt trapped in their own countries facing many more limitations than they did as part of the now dissolved Yugoslav federation. The generation which could travel visa-free just a few years earlier and their families now faced a reality in which a visa was needed in order to enter 176 out of 198 countries and administrative regions in the world (Avirovic 2012: 472). Furthermore, in these first years after gaining its independence Macedonia, as one of the economically less developed former Yugoslav republics, suffered difficulties in its internal and external markets (especially during the period 1994–1995 when Greece imposed embargo) and therefore despite the reforms and the attempts to achieve political and financial stabilization, the standard of living remained unsatisfactory for the citizens even in the years to come.

This had immediate impact on migration, especially after Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007 – an increase in the regular and irregular ways of crossing the Bulgarian-Macedonian border within the context of the modern labour migrations. It also created a certain general feeling among the Macedonians – a feeling of dissatisfaction not only with the domestic situation, but with its implication on the

[3] The *Shopluk* ethno-historical region is a region which can be located in three modern countries: the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, many aspects of the region's peculiarities remain largely undefined, namely the origin of the name, the clear borders and cultural specifics (more in Hristov 2014).

status of the state in comparison with its neighbours. Bulgaria, which once used to be much less developed, closed to the West and perceived from the Yugoslav point of view with laughter and pity, became a source and one of the most approachable ways for the Macedonians to regain, at least partially, their previous freedom of movement. This was pointed out by most of my older respondents, indicating the existing nostalgia towards the times when the state, under its federative status, experienced a better and much more honourable position among its neighbours. Now, the times have changed, and their children are applying for the "stronger" (*moken*) Bulgarian passport which serves as an entry to the European Union. This has been further reinforced, not only by the current internal Macedonian crisis, but also by its international conflicts, and especially the one with Greece, resulting in the NATO block (2008) and delayed EU membership due to concerns over the democratic processes in the country.[4] The internal political instability in the past several years resulted in protests in 2015/2016 and the incapability of constituting a government in late 2016 and beginning of 2017, thus facilitating a situation in which labour mobility became the main goal and a part of the everyday discourses at the border.

According to Rumen Jonchev, cited by the Bulgarian newspaper *Sega*,[5] the now former chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on the Policies Towards Bulgarians Who Live Abroad, by September 2015 around 200 thousand Macedonians had already applied for Bulgarian citizenship and were waiting for the processing of documents and applications. According to the Macedonian State Statistical Office, the overall population of the country amounts to 2,071,278 (31/12/2015), with an average unemployment rate of 23.1% (true for April 2016).[6]

Country	**22/1/2012 – 18/1/2017**	**2007 – 21/1/2012**
Republic of Macedonia	25,447	33,530
Republic of Moldova	10,689	11,638
Ukraine	6,033	1,866
Russian Federation	2,763	1,563
Republic of Serbia	2,629	2,981

Figure 1: Nationalities and number of individuals who acquired Bulgarian citizenship in the period 2007–2017. The top five countries are shown in the table.
Source: *Doklad za deynostta na komisiyata…* 2017.

[4] The 2016 report of the European Commission on Macedonia reads: "Concerning the political criteria, the country was faced with the continuation of the most severe political crisis since 2001. Democracy and rule of law have been constantly challenged, in particular due to state capture affecting the functioning of democratic institutions and key areas of society. The country suffers from a divisive political culture and a lack of capacity for compromise" (European Commission 2016: 4).

[5] http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=768465 (last access 9 April 2017).

[6] http://www.stat.gov.mk/KlucniIndikatori_en.aspx (last access 9 April 2017).

According to the data of the Commission for Bulgarian Citizenship and Bulgarians Abroad at the Administration of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, a total number of 58,977 Macedonians were granted Bulgarian citizenship in the period between 2007 and January 2017 (Figure 1). The public and media discourse nevertheless claims much bigger numbers. The tendency of Macedonians to lead the chart in acquiring Bulgarian citizenship was kept throughout the whole period, followed by the nationals of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Serbia, the Russian Federation, etc. Between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2016, 6,196 Macedonians became Bulgarian citizens, which is 2,330 more than the number for 2015 and more than twice as much as in 2014 (*Doklad za deynostta na komisiyata…* 2016).

According to the *National Strategy in the Field of Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011–2020)* the biggest share, around 90%, of the requests for the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship are on the basis of "Bulgarian origin". Hence, in 2010, the Law on the Bulgarian Citizenship, regulating the conditions for granting, release and restoring Bulgarian citizenship, was changed in order to make the procedure shorter. This was effectively translated to the following: "Up to the date of application, a residence in the Republic of Bulgaria, naturalization, Bulgarian language knowledge, existing income or profession to supply their living in Republic of Bulgaria and exemption from previous citizenship *are not* required" (emphasis mine, *Natsionalna strategia…* 2011: 26–27). The "Motives" part, providing the argumentation for the *Suggestion for Amendment and Addendum to the Law on Bulgarians Living Abroad*, citing a research conducted by UN (2011) about the countries with the highest number of population loss until 2050, which has placed Bulgaria at the top of the chart, reads:

> "Taking this into account, we feel that no opportunity for increasing our nation, especially when an interest towards it is declared by people of Bulgarian origin or with Bulgarian consciousness, should be dismissed lightly." (*Predlozhenie za izmenenie i dopalnenie…* 2015)

The long-projected vision of the political leaders towards Macedonians as rightful Bulgarians has justified the efforts made in this direction. This idea has been further established in the *National Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria on Migration and Integration (2008–2015)*:

> "The sustainable character of the process for the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship concerns some of the greatest in number, historically formed Bulgarian communities beyond state borders. First among them are the ones in the Republic of Macedonia and Moldova, followed by Ukraine, Serbia and Albania." (*Natsionalna strategia…* 2008: 10)

The document also reflects the fact that usually those who are applying for citizenship on the basis of Bulgarian origin are aged between 20 and 40, and about 70% of all applicants come from the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Moldova. Concerning education, 55% have secondary education – about 70% are of the technical profile, and 30% declare themselves as farmers or small-scale merchants, 40% have completed higher education, and 5% have completed primary education (ibid.). Yet, they are not considered "classic immigrants", but rather "labour migrants", with off and on periods of stay in Bulgaria.

Strategies to save oneself

According to the Macedonian news agency *Meta.mk*, citing a survey conducted by the NGO InfoCentre in partnership with the Macedonian Centre for European Training, the "September 8" association and the Centre for Media Development, about 83.7% of young people in Macedonia want to leave the country and about 52.4% would like to settle in Western Europe, as opposed to 12% and 10% respectively to USA and Canada, and the Scandinavian countries.[7] The same research shows that 89.8% of young people from the North-Eastern Statistical Region (where the studied towns are located) share a general dissatisfaction with their living conditions and are planning to leave. The young people in the region are mostly aiming to get a job in Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia or Switzerland.[8]

Bulgarian citizenship proves to bring many opportunities to the border towns. From "cheaper and not-that-hard-to-graduate-from" education to scholarships, jobs, traineeships, and, most importantly, to non-restricted travelling across the European Union countries, which also opens up foreign labour markets for Macedonian citizens.

During my stay in Kriva Palanka, Bulgarians from the biggest border town of Kyustendil were occasional visitors in the city. Bulgarian citizens organize weekly or monthly "shopping visits" aimed at buying mainly basic food supplies as they are "much cheaper and of higher quality" than the ones sold on the other side of the border. Another reason for these occasional border-crossings are restaurants, due to the same motives – they offer high quality food, good service and cheap prices. These weekly "economy-boosts" are of a great importance for the shop and restaurant-owners and the elderly sellers at the *Pazar* (open market), a view shared by Goce, a representative of the Kriva Palanka municipality.

[7] http://meta.mk/en/survey-83-7-of-the-youth-want-to-leave-macedonia/ (last access 9 April 2017).

[8] For estimates, migration patterns throughout different historical periods and modern migratory experiences of the Macedonian Torbeshi (Macedonian-speaking Muslim minority group in Macedonia) see Bielenin-Lenczowska 2009.

Additionally, these contacts bring something much more important – information exchange. While on the market, the locals occasionally asked the Bulgarian guests about the life in their country and the quality of food, and were told by the Bulgarians that the market discrepancies appear due to the EU membership. Apparently, this conversation is not a one-time occasion, but many Bulgarians agree and support the opinion that joining the Union will bring economic de-stabilization and impoverishment not only in the region but in whole of Macedonia, as they feel the same happened in Bulgaria. Therefore, the EU-scepticism was justified with the "obvious negative repercussions which the membership has brought to their neighbours", who obviously find better financial reasoning behind shopping for groceries abroad. Logically, with an income that is as low (especially in comparison to the EU standards) as the one in the region, most of the people feel as if they had "their backs to the wall" and are scared of further worsening of the situation.

Another repercussion which the Bulgarian EU membership brought to this border was the market imbalance, which led to differences in the standards of living on both sides. This border, as many others, proved to be particularly financially supportive for its inhabitants during transitional periods when they faced the economic crises and almost every household suffered shortages. Therefore, small-scale trade became a part of the everyday life on this border and a strategy for the compensation of economic deficit experienced in Bulgaria and Macedonia. Being a common practice, especially during the embargo period in Macedonia when great amounts of fuel were transported across the border, the pattern of procedure was established and Kyustendil lived through some of its most economically flourishing periods in the mid-90s. The considerable price differences that appeared after the accession to the European Union, for example in the price of cigarettes, led to the establishment of relatively stable cigarette smuggling along the border. After 2007, the smuggling flows towards and from Bulgaria compensated for whatever was needed in each market. While cigarettes were transported from Kriva Palanka, clothes and electronics are even to this day transported in Macedonia and find their way to the shops, while taxes are evaded. Contextualised by the lack of jobs, and stable and sufficient income, the trans-border "trade" was justified by the locals and was a common narrative not perceived as an exclusive element of everyday life. Therefore, the border became an economic resource, contributing to the financial situation in the border towns, as it "provided" differences in prices, taxes and legal regulations which were used by the border population.

Nevertheless, a few years ago, cigarette smuggling became dangerous for most people as "the border was tightened", therefore the flow is now significantly smaller according to my respondents. One of the biggest unregulated businesses or "grey market area" in all of Eastern Macedonia, and especially in the places in focus here, is "middleman" service. These are usually unlicensed people who, for a sum

between 250 and 1500 euro,[9] legalise, put together, translate and process the needed application documents for Bulgarian-citizens-to-be. These organisations also help, if needed, with the "proof of origin" documents if the candidate does not have it. In 2014 the Governmental Agency for the Bulgarians Abroad was investigated by the Prosecutor's office of the Republic of Bulgaria on suspicion that hundreds of passports were issued without checking documents of origin. A reasonable doubt arises from the fact that some 18,000 applications[10] for Bulgarian citizenship were introduced in 2012 and only 1,600 of them were rejected. Responding to the allegations the Agency cited historical books, as sufficient proof legitimising the family roots of the people of Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo.[11] Additionally, there is a new tendency among the Albanians who wish to get a Bulgarian passport. During fieldwork in Kyustendil, in an interview with respondents from the former Municipality administration, I was told that in the last few years they started registering companies and people buying lands, houses or apartments with the premise that in a few years they would apply for "naturalisation".

In several Facebook posts from the "agencies", shown in the picture below (Figure 2), middleman services are rushing the people to apply, due to the forthcoming Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria on 26 March 2016 as "this will change the conditions", "and [the situation] for sure will not be the same". In that sense it seems reasonable to suggest that the Bulgarian institutions, as part of a multi-level corruption scheme, are also part of the process.

Mostly through these middleman services many people from Kratovo and Kriva Palanka have gained Bulgarian documents. Some of the "new citizens" have even been registered at the same address in Kyustendil (sometimes from 10 to 12 people), or in a village nearby. Nevertheless, since the success of the process is not "guaranteed", despite the close to unaffordable prices, many are left without their "golden ticket". It is not a rare occasion for the middleman services to gather their payment and never to be seen or heard of anymore. This happened to Milica,[12] now in her late 20s, but since this business is on the shady side of the regulations, she could not go and file a complaint. She had to go back to her job as a clothes shop assistant and try to collect money again. According to Vlatko (65), some of the men working as construction workers, joined their acquaintances in one of the Western European

[9] The price range is considerable, due to the fact that some of the agencies "officially" have prices between 250 and 350 euro, which vary depending on whether applicant comes from Serbia or Albania, and also depending on what is needed for a successful procedure. According to some of my respondents, it is even possible to forge some documents "proving" Bulgarian nascence. In all "more difficult" cases, the price is additionally negotiated.

[10] http://www.dw.com/bg/професионални-българи/a-17888419 (last access 9 April 2017).

[11] http://www.mediapool.bg/darzhavna-agentsiya-proizvezhda-balgari-na-konveier-bez-dokumenti-za-proizhod-news225990.html (last access 9 April 2017).

[12] All names in the text have been changed due to the sensitive character of the chosen topic.

countries without Bulgarian documents and relied on their "boss" (if he is from the region) to "cover" them in front of the authorities.



Figure 2: Facebook pages advertising help with the preparation of Bulgarian documents through a middleman. The pages provide phone contacts, lists of documents needed and sometimes prices. Sources: https://www.facebook.com/bugarskidokumentigv/; https://www.facebook.com/BugarskiPasosi/; https://www.facebook.com/bugarskipasos1/; https://www.facebook.com/Bulgariancitizenship1/ (last access 9 April 2017).

Despite the initial expectation, according to many people it is not a question of the lack of job positions in the Municipality or in Macedonia in general. As stated by Gordana, a 25-year-old saleswoman at a bakery in Kriva Palanka, the main problem is that the jobs are not well paid:

> "See, the thing is that if you want, you can find a job to earn a living. But what a living would that be? The wage is not even enough to pay your bills, and what about living like every young person would like to. If you want to save yourself [*da se spasis*] you just have to run out of here."

During my fieldwork, a lot of the small shops, restaurants, coffee shops were searching for staff,[13] but the main problem is that financial conditions are not satisfying. Very unmotivated, most of my younger respondents commonly summed the situation up as follows: "There is nothing to do here". Logically, the cafés and bars in Kriva Palanka were full of these young people who chose to stay in their home town or were still making plans to leave the country. On the same note, most of these youngsters still in high school or in their first year after graduation didn't express any desire to study further: "I don't want to go to school any more, I just want money" was a common summary of their future plans. The same attitude was expressed towards learning foreign languages. Knowing that they will often join their fellow Macedonians or ex-Yugoslav people in the designated country of migration, they did not feel pressure to do so.

The leitmotif of "saving oneself" ("*da se spasis*") was one of the main leading points when reasoning behind the search for double citizenship among young people was involved. The vision of political and economic instability, summarized in the failed efforts of the political leaders to stabilize the country's internal affairs by the end of 2016 as well as the unwillingness of the citizens to "deal with the situation" anymore, resulted in the idea of the inability to see a future for the country or its citizens. The fact that the biggest share of employees in the municipal, local authority and culture structures are politically tied to the local VMRO[14] structures confirms that if "you want to do something here you have to 'back the right people'", as Viktor, a 55-year-old, summarises.

The political question raises fear not only of social marginalization, but also of economic marginalization. The story of a young woman particularly expresses these concerns. Knowing one another for several years, I was witness to her vital role for the community, as she was an active participant in most cultural events in the region – as a translator, organizer of public events, tourist guide, and was also invited to be a news anchor for the regional TV daughter-channel of the national *Sitel*. During anti-government protests at the end of 2015, people working in local authorities (including media) were mobilized to go to Skopje to support the government. Refusing to do so, not only because this was against her political views but because she was invited to the TV station and they "needed her", not vice versa, she refused to do so, and was fired the next day.

[13] According to the State statistical data for February 2017, the average net wage for the people in the "Food and beverage service activities" is approximately 227 euro/month (http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/2017/4.1.17.32.pdf, last access 6 April 2017).

[14] "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity" (abbreviation from Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE) – is the ruling party in Macedonia in the period between 2006 and 2016.

> "In this sense", she said, "I don't want to sound nationalistic. But I have never wanted to have a Bulgarian passport. For me it sounds much more like a betrayal, misleading your own country. But well… I had to apply. Just in case, you know. This happened in 2015 but I can imagine what can follow – I need a plan B!"

"The Bulgarian passport is like an airplane": the Bulgarian passport and its ascribed meanings

According to the interlocutors themselves and some Macedonian media, the Eastern Macedonian region is at the top of the charts in the number of people holding Bulgarian passports. It was repeatedly mentioned by almost everyone that about 80% of the locals in Kriva Palanka were already "Bulgarians" (as most of them would jokingly note[15]).

Being aware that I am not a local, the citizens of Kriva Palanka started approaching me, interested in what I was doing, and eventually the conversations started turning from jokingly pronounced marriage proposals (especially when younger ones were concerned) to suggested meetings in Sofia and/or bringing more female friends the next time I come. Usually in the context of a joke, many of them would mention they were thinking about finding a Bulgarian wife, especially if they have no documents to declare family connection to Bulgaria. For some of the interlocutors, on the serious side, this would be the fastest way to get a passport because otherwise it would take approximately two years or, in most cases, even longer.

Most of the informants drew a sharp line dividing the ethnic and the civic identity. While all declared their strong Macedonian roots, pride of history and culture, they nevertheless admitted the fact that they were now (at least according to the documents) part of two separate countries. During my first night in Kriva Palanka, some young men invited me to their table with the words:

[15] An important note should be made regarding "jokes". These remarks often made with laughter or in a humorous context seemed very much as strategy to delegitimize the Bulgarian identity, rather than to reinforce it. Some years ago it was shameful and equal to treason for the country to own a Bulgarian passport, so most people kept this information for themselves. Despite this process being widespread now, I would say it evokes similar feelings among the Bulgarian-citizenship-holders. Covering under the image of "all of us who are Bulgarians" they feel less responsible for "betraying" their country and nation. Another implication of humour and jokes, witnessed only in Kratovo, were the late night talks in a fast food place on the main square where young men would start talking about their recent travels in Bulgaria, twisting their tongues to replicate Bulgarian language and acting flamboyant, and describing their encounters with Bulgarians. Diminishing the "other" seems like another strategy to strongly separate themselves from the people on the other side of the border.

> "Come join us! We are all Bulgarians here either ways [laugh]. We all have Bulgarian passports and as a matter of fact around 80% of Macedonians also have one. So, what else are we if not Bulgarians?"

"Bulgarian" does not bear negative connotation, but is rather a signifier that a person does not feel "ashamed", since he/she openly declares to be such. Many times later, when young people gathered, they would start showing their IDs, despite always emphasizing that, for example, they had no idea where the address of their registration was. In that sense the Bulgarian identity is *mimetic* – much more a label, emptied of its "original" meaning – without a feeling of belonging to the community, understanding of shared values or willingness to be included in its "life" on the other side of the border. Two identities exist: one is ethno-national and the other *declarative* – part of the daily joking narrative, being expressed cautiously but still spoken.

When I asked a football player, on his way to being transferred to Germany after getting his Bulgarian passport,[16] whether the documents or the process of application in any way changed his feelings about himself, he answered as follows:

> "I feel in no way Bulgarian. But you have to claim you do. So, you go there [for the interview], say a ton of crap about how you love and care for the country and you get what you want. If you tell them it's an economic reason they send you to the back of the line and you wait for ages."

In this sense, possession of a Bulgarian passport is not treated as a "betrayal" of their country, but rather an escape plan to "save themselves" ("*da se spasis*") for which they make a momentary compromise. The passports are a practical step for them ensuring at least a chance for better economic well-being and no-visa regime which would otherwise limit their stay and prevent them from finding a job abroad (at least for longer than 90 days) and certainly require additional payments.[17] For young people, the fight for "a better" and "a normal" life justifies the efforts of having to go through the often expensive and quite slow process of obtaining documents for Bulgarian citizenship. This generation of Macedonian citizens appears to be much more invested in a practical approach towards their citizenship of choice than in the identity repercussions that it has. They claim that the steps taken for obtaining citizenship (namely, openly declaring their affiliation with the Bulgarian

[16] He was almost rejected due to his Macedonian citizenship several years ago, since the taxes and documentation for his support and transfer would be much higher for him as a player coming from a non-EU country.

[17] As of December 2009, the visa liberalisation was put into force and the Macedonian citizens travel visa-free to the European Union member states. This would imply that their stay must not exceed 90 days in a period of 180 days.

state, their Bulgarian consciousness, studying national history and holidays, etc. while being interviewed) do not affect their sense of belonging. The concern of being judged by their peers is dismissed for a simple reason: "Everyone here already owns one".

As Neofotistos (2009: 21) observes, in another Macedonian border town several years ago, there was surely an underlying discourse which marked the passports as artefacts of the "border reality". I have to notice that, while my interlocutors talked about passports, they used this word as a summary for citizenship and thus for both types of personal documents for Bulgarian citizenship – ID card and passport. While a passport is usually not a thing someone would carry with them, the ID cards were almost always used in a conversation as "proof". The choice of passports as an embodiment of migration processes outside the country leads to the fact that, while the ID cards are usually the inter-state documents, the passports: "have expropriated from individuals and private entities the legitimate 'means of movement'", "particularly though by no means exclusively across international boundaries" (Torpey 2000: 4). Here they are analysed apart from their "official" function as "[authorizing] movement and establishing identity discourage people from choosing identities inconsistent with those validated by the state" (ibid.: 166). With the exclusivity which they are granted in Macedonian society, Bulgarian documents are ascribed additional functions and stripped off of others in the social context, created by the actors. Thus, if the passport is a direct implication of the state power and a border within itself, being a marker of "these who are ours", then the Macedonians with double citizenship have the choice of being the "other" as a strategy of prosperity or at least of a better life.

In that sense, the passport is a "tool" or a "ticket" for a better life for these young people, since the common mentality has gathered around the simple truth: life is better everywhere else, but not in Macedonia. According to a 20-year-old citizen of Kriva Palanka: "The Bulgarian passport is like an airplane" ("*Bugarski pasos e kao avion*"). Therefore, the documents become an epitome of the hopes and dreams of a "promised land" of high wages and an easy life. Almost none of my interlocutors expressed any desire to live or work in Bulgaria. None of them seemed to even remember their home addresses at which they have been registered in the neighbouring state. Their documents were the symbol of their future life, of the simple freedom of movement and the "promised land" of Western Europe with high wages and an easy life.

The term citizenship is commonly described as a relationship between an individual and a state in which an individual owes allegiance, is subjected to taxation, etc. to that state and in turn is entitled to its protection, to equal rights and privileges. While all of my respondents did not express any affiliation with the Bulgarian state and did not plan to stay in the country, a "no strings attached" attitude becomes clear.



Figure 3: "How to catch a Macedonian: Just put a Bulgarian passport".
Source: https://www.facebook.com/kamaj.net/photos/a.519981198064990.1073741828.519908374738939/1389238054472629/?type=3&theater (last access 9 April 2017).

Conclusion

The complex reality of having double citizenship on the Macedonian-Bulgarian border is preconditioned both by the Bulgarian state attitude towards its future citizens and the hardships of the social reality in Kriva Palanka and Kratovo. The low wages and the limited job positions mainly in restaurants, cafés, bars and number of shops do not leave "many options" to young people. Contextualised by the stories of a better and prosperous life abroad, mostly in the Western European countries, many become determined to leave the country and "save themselves". The way to legitimize their stay abroad for longer periods of time, however, points at having to apply for Bulgarian citizenship as easily approachable due to the country's policy

towards Macedonians. The question of "shame" of having to declare at least equal affiliation to another country is marked by the adoption of a declarative mimetic identity, usually expressed as: "We are all Bulgarians". The "new" identity is a logical consequence of the documents which would confirm this. Making the pragmatic step of covering oneself with another citizenship is the "necessary evil" on the way of achieving a better life. The documents themselves become a symbol and a tool for this.

At the end of this text, it is important to focus attention to the wide use of these processes for political reasons in both Macedonia and Bulgaria. On the one hand, the political, media and social discourses in the former suggest the latter is "stealing" citizens in order to establish a Bulgarian minority in the state with the aim to consecutively commence its own political project there. On the other hand, the latter strategizes in order to symbolically reclaim its "historically formed Bulgarian communities beyond state borders" (*Natsionalna strategia…* 2008: 10), by which it also addresses its concerns of depopulation. Additionally, these processes direct attention towards two other important topics: *who* the migrant communities in Western Europe are, and *how* they can be addressed in a foreign context. There is also the question of redefinition of national and ethnic identity in the Balkans through these and similar identity strategies, which is still to be considered by academia.

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Cross-Border Marriages between Residents of South Kosovo and Western Europe
Discourses, Aspirations and Realities

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For the inhabitants of Kosovo, marriage migration is one of the few legal forms to enter the EU with a long-term perspective. Still, based on the perception that it fosters the immigration of cultural "Others", and that especially women may be victims of such marriages, various EU member states also restrict the immigration of family members. This study wants to shed light on the emic view of spouses upon such marriages. Relying on fieldwork in rural Kosovo as well as among migrants from Kosovo in Austria and Germany, the author takes notice of a locational and gendered perspective on imaginations as well as the realities of cross-border marriages within the family and household arrangements.

Keywords: cross-border marriages, marriage-migrants, Kosovo, Southeastern Europe, Western Europe

Introduction

What has been striking to me during my fieldwork in the south of Kosovo,[1] in the region of Opoja, was the finding that nearly half of all marriages that were registered in this municipality involved a spouse who lived abroad, and entailed the prospect of outmigration of the marriage partner living in south Kosovo. Such cross-border marriages established an important means of migration into Western (European, but also Overseas) countries, not at least because other migration options were meagre. In fact, in the region of Opoja,

[1] This article goes back to a long term social anthropological research which I started in 2011 in Kosovo on transnational family solidarity between people from the rural region in south Kosovo, called Opoja, and migrants from this region living abroad, and which was financed by a research grant of the Austrian Science Foundation (Project No D 22659-G18). My special thanks go to Karl Kaser, Blerina Leka, Tahir Latifi and Eli Krasniqi, who collaborated with me in the project. Parts of this text are based on the article Leutloff-Grandits 2015.

international labour migration to Western Europe had become an important means of livelihood already from the 1960s on. Up to the late 1980s, mainly men went abroad and left their wife and children within the paternal household in the village. When, in early 1990s, the EU states began to limit migration possibilities, while at the same time ethnic conflict escalated in Kosovo when Serbia annulled the autonomous state of Kosovo and excluded Albanians from public services, many Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo crossed EU borders as refugees and asylum seekers, among them also women and children, and sometimes they entered via family reunion programs. In 1998, this conflict developed into a full-fledged war. After the end of war in summer 1999, the situation in Kosovo did not improve as hoped for and, at the same time, the general outlook for emigration had further deteriorated (Hockenoes 2006) and was reduced to family unification.[2] In this situation, marriage migration, in which a migrant married a spouse of his or her home region – became the main means of moving abroad. In fact, many young people in Opoja, men as well as women, aspired to marry a migrant from this region living in a Western European country in order to start a life abroad.

In this article, I want to look at the different views on such cross-border marriages. For that, I rely on a sequence of six several-week-long social-anthropological fieldwork units in the region of Opoja in Kosovo from 2011 to 2013, where I did participant observation of the village life and interviewed numerous villagers as well as visiting migrants – among them young people as well as their parents – about their family life and future prospects. At the time of my fieldwork, many of them either wanted (their children) to marry abroad, were engaged with a migrant from abroad, or had already married a migrant and were waiting to move abroad, or even had already moved abroad. Due to the longer period of the research from 2011 to 2013, I could observe the coming to be of such cross-border marriages and also follow the developments within the families and the marriages of young people, not at least through multiple visits and interviews, and also by visiting migrants in Austria and Germany. With this, I could achieve a nuanced understanding of such cross-border marriages.[3]

Based on this fieldwork material, the question I wish to pose is what kind of gender roles are transported within such imaginaries, and to ask in which way gender roles are re-produced and transformed in a transnational space. In reference to

[2] In fact, although educational mobility is a way to go abroad and bears a lot of hopes for young people in Opoja, who want to use it as a means to upgrade their situation at home and to have new, cosmopolitan experiences, it is very difficult to achieve these goals due to the economic pressures under which students find themselves abroad.

[3] The fact that the inhabitants of the region of Opoja are of Muslim faith is – in my view – not an explanatory reason for cross-border marriages, which are also practiced among catholic Albanians from Kosovo.

Appadurai (2005: 33),[4] such cross-border marriages create cross-border "marriage-scapes", which are formed through social, economic and political relations across state borders, as other transnational "scapes" do (see also Lauser 2005). Based on different viewpoints and perspectives, such scapes appear to differ from each other according to gender and generation, as they are formed in everyday life through context, experience and imaginations (Constable 2005: 4). In relation to Doreen Massey's definition of "power geometry" (1994: 149), it makes sense to observe the divergent positions of people in relation to their access to power and participation in political and societal realms (Constable 2005: 14).[5]

In the following, I start with the discourses as well as legal measures on cross-border marriages within the receiving society, as they frame marriage migration. I then move to the emic perspective of young people from Opoja, in the south of Kosovo, who want to marry a spouse living in Western Europe, and describe the forms and meanings of spousal choice in the Opoja region today. In order to do so, I assume a gender sensitive and locational perspective. In a further section, I will concentrate on the coming about of cross-border marriages. Here I wish to discuss in which way their imaginations of cross-border marriages could be fulfilled and what kind of opportunities, but also challenges this entailed. This includes family and household arrangements, in which the newly married couples live, because possibilities and conflicts often manifest themselves within these domains.

Discourses of and legal measures against marriage migration within Germany and Austria

Within the receiving society, marriage migration is often regarded as an intra-ethnic phenomenon, one that the migrants who marry a spouse from their home region are pushing forward (Beck-Gernsheim 2007; Timmerman 2006; Schröttle 2007; Gutekunst 2016). This view of cross-border marriages as an intraethnic phenomenon is dominant disregarding the fact that such marriages are increasingly common between men from Western countries and women from non-Western countries (and here Russia and Asian countries are at the top of the list) (Constable 2005; Ruenkaew 2003). Moreover, cross-border marriages between migrants[6] and

[4] Appadurai (2005: 33) calls this "ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes".

[5] In the US an over-proportional number of migrants are female, which holds especially true for marriage migrants. Furthermore, the number of marriage migrants has been tripled between 1960 and 1997 and raised from 9 to 25 percent of all migrants (Constable 2005: 4).

[6] Regardless of whether they belong to the so-called first generation (meaning that they arrived abroad at school age or later) or to the second generation (meaning that they arrived at pre-school age or were born abroad).

partners from their home regions, as is the case in Opoja, are often culturalized and problematized in mainstream Western discourses (Strasser and Tosic 2014; Pellander 2015; Bonjour and Block 2016).

Based on the literature which analyses the public notions of cross-border marriages in EU states, it is widely assumed that cross-border marriages in which immigrants marry a partner from within their own ethnic group, and "even" from their so-perceived country of origin, postpones or even blocks integration of migrants into the receiving society, as the partnership with a newly-arriving migrant – based on so-perceived different cultural values – postpones the process of integration. The choice to marry someone from the home context is seen as a sign that migrants want to remain among themselves, and that they do not want to integrate into the receiving society (Beck-Gernsheim 2006; Strasser and Tosic 2014).[7] Following this logic, it is anticipated that with marriage migration, migrant communities may "rejuvenate" themselves. In Austria in the 1990s, this notion found expression in the slogan "Integration statt Neuzuzug" (integration instead of new arrivals) – assuming that marriage migration and family reunion would hinder integration (instead of fostering it) (Strasser and Tosic 2014: 131).

Another perspective on marriage migration as a cultural practice is even more problem-centred, as it anticipates that such marriages, and especially among certain migrant groups (e.g. Albanian, Turkish, Pakistani or Tamil) would follow patriarchal family arrangements, being backward and non-modern. This view is often contrasted to "Western" marriages, which are seen as based on love and as emancipated. It is furthermore anticipated that such marriages are fertile ground for "forced marriages" as well as violence within such marriages (Bonjour and Block 2016; Razack 2004). Women are, in particular, seen as pressured or even forced into, as well as exploited within such cross-border marriages, no matter if the woman is the one migrating for marriage or if she is the one who enables someone to migrate for marriage (Kelek 2006; compare also Beck-Gernsheim 2007; Schmidt 2011: 56; Timmerman 2006: 125–126; Straßburger 2001; Neubauer and Dahinden 2012; Charsley 2005).[8]

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[7] This may include that migrants abuse the institution of marriage for other purposes, e.g. to use cross-border marriages as "entry tickets" into Western European countries (see notions of "Scheinehe" – sham marriage or "Zweckehe" – marriage of convenience). A marriage between a migrant and someone from the receiving society is on the other hand seen as a sign of a successful integration (Charsley and Wray 2015; Charsley and Liverage 2015; Block 2014; Straßburger and Aybeck 2015; Beck-Gernsheim 2006: 112).

[8] It is furthermore not asked if the differentiation between migrants and members of the majority population makes sense in this regard, as also non-migrants can experience force in marriages (Riaño and Dahinden 2010: 23). This again leads to research designs in which the situation of migrant women as victims is explored, e.g. by taking organizations that deal with such victims of "forced marriages" as a starting point for research, thus blending out non-violent forms of marriages, and often also the perspective of men (an exception is Toprak 2007). The insights of these studies are then generalized and taken as absolute manifestations of such marriages.

With these notions, it is thus no wonder that legal measures are set against such marriages, making it generally more difficult to allow migration of a partner with non-EU citizenship on the basis of marriage. In various EU countries, the introduction of an age requirement for marriage migrants[9] was one important measure against so-perceived "forced marriages", anticipating that an older age would leave potential marriage partners more space for own decisions (Block and Bonjour 2013; Bonjour and Block 2016). This led to a drop in the number of marriage migrants.

Another measure demands of those migrants who want to join their partners or families in Germany and Austria (in Austria, this law is valid since 2011) to provide proof of some basic knowledge of German language before migration – thus shifting the "plea of integration" already before arrival in the immigration country and even beyond the borders of the state (at least as soon as they do not belong to a certain stratum of economically preferred migrants).[10] This measure followed the demand for integration from the side of migrants, which was articulated by the Austrian conservative government in the 1990s. In Austria, for example, migrants have been obliged to successfully complete language and integration courses in order to qualify for residency rights and, later, for citizenship rights since 1998.

Although "love" is valued as the supreme reason for marriage in Western European states, this also means that immigration states do not accept "love" as sufficient for a cross-border marriage, but force migrants who want to bring their marriage partner over or those who want to move abroad on the basis of marriage to consider the legal frames and technical matters, while at the same time suspecting cross-border marriages to be based on instrumental reasons. Such restrictions thus clearly intervene in the realm of intimacy, partnership and family planning.

These measures against anticipated "forced marriages" concentrate on the phase before the actual migration takes place, while not regarding that the perception of force does not have to necessarily occur only within the process of entering a marriage, but also may come up and change within different stages of the marriage, and that power relations and imaginations can change during such marriages. In fact, as Riaño and Dahinden (2010) have shown, it is more frequent that marriage

[9] In Germany, the minimum age of marriage across state borders was raised to eighteen in 2007 (whereas the marriageable age in Germany is sixteen), and to twenty-one in Austria (Strasser and Tosic 2014: 143) and the Netherlands (introduced in 2004) (Bonjour and Block 2016: 790).

[10] This also entailed measures for the easier arrival of higher qualified migrants and workers in certain professions in demand, which also included an easier approach for family reunion – including the omission of proof of language proficiency. This means that integration was increasingly measured on capacity for and performance within the labour market (cf. Strasser and Tosic 2014: 131–133). With the so-called "Rot-Weiss-Rot-Karte", wanted mobility is supported, while unwanted mobility is hindered.

partners experience force after they get married (compared to the experience of force or pressure to marry a certain partner against their will). Legal frames are however not necessarily supportive as soon as marriage migrants try to dissolve such a marriage as, within the first three years of marriage, residency rights are bound to the marriage partner.

Partner selection in Opoja: past and present

The notions of culturally different forms of marriage that can be found in public discourses and legal measures in Germany and Austria do not come out of the blue. In fact, also in social sciences, marriage forms have been regularly linked to different types of society within theories of modernization, thus creating a hegemonic classification of marriages. Giddens (1992: 2–3, 38–41) linked "arranged marriages" to pre-modern, kin-centred societal arrangements based on economic necessity and male privilege, and "love marriages" as well as intimate relations between spouses to highly individualized and modernized societies, which according to this logic also leads to more equality between sexes. According to Kohli and Heady (2010), such marriage models also historically find a geographical expression: while the first model is typical for northern and western Europe, the second model has been typical for southern and eastern Europe. In fact, these notions also go back to historical family studies (e.g. Hajnal 1965; Kaser 1995).

Turning now to Opoja, I found it striking that almost all middle-aged and elderly people I talked to in Opoja, but also many young people, explained to me that the forms of spousal choice changed rapidly after the end of war in 1999, and that they evaluated this with the parameters of modernity and backwardness. While in the 1990s and previously, parents had predominately selected the spouses for their children, partly even without the consultation of the young people (see also Reineck 1991), at the time of my fieldwork from 2011 to 2013, many people regarded such arranged marriages as out-dated and pre-modern. My interlocutors stressed that they were the absolute minority now, as the vast majority of young people chose their own partners, and that pre-marital romantic relations had become more common in Opoja since the end of the war, thus emphasizing individual choice, affection and partnership within a marriage.

According to my observations, the reality of spousal choice, however, included both aspects – arrangement and romances – in a "hybridized" way.[11] While in all cases I followed, the young people had the last say in the decision about their partner, family members were in different forms involved in the engagement pro-

[11] This is also the case in contemporary Turkey (see Hart 2007) as well as among migrants from Lebanon in Australia (see Hyndman-Rizk 2016).

cess.[12] What differed was how the young people got to know their partner. In "love marriages", young people had got to know each other outside the family context, e.g. in school, and had fallen in love with each other, but many young women were pressured to marry soon after their parents got to know that she was dating a young man. Based on local traditions and high unemployment, these young women then often became mothers and housewives, and the large majority of women in the villages did not take up wage work after marriage. In "arranged marriages", on the other hand, young people found their partner through proposals by relatives, but the very procedure of arranged marriages had changed, and individual opinions, desires, and the prospects of the young people were put more into the centre. A girl might choose from multiple offers according to criteria like the character and education of the person, the family background and household structure, the income of the household and the status of the family – and then testing during their mutual meeting whether the two like each other. The phase between engagement and marriage is used to build up a romantic relationship, in which spouses contacted each other on social media and regularly went out together.

Due to the different prospects and considerations concerning "arranged" and "love" marriages, the method of partner selection partly differs not only from family to family, but also within families and among siblings. The manner of choosing a spouse is often tied to the character and preferences of the young people themselves, who may be too shy and obedient for developing a romantic relationship on their own, or who are too self-conscious and flirtatious not to fall in love with a colleague at school. Maybe even more importantly, some young people opted for family counselling because they wanted to go abroad rather than stay in their home region, and thus were hoping to get to know a potential marriage candidate via family proposals. An "arranged marriage" was thus a self-conscious decision in order to achieve a better future, which was contrasted to a prospective life in their home region in Kosovo's rural south. These young people experienced the village as a realm of limited possibilities, while migration seemed to create new, better possibilities, and seemed to strengthen their own role as an actor, while at the same time also strengthening the role of the family. Such visions were however also gendered.

Women aspiring to marry abroad

Young women who wanted to marry abroad often linked this to their wish to escape poverty and their longing for material prosperity, comfort and a better future

[12] In fact, the influence of the family on partner selection is likely wider than in "average" Western European marriages, but we must not forget that this influence is there, too – as most individuals marry within their (social and cultural) group. Such choices are based on internalised social norms gained through socialisation within the family and society, but such norms get little attention.

for their own children.[13] They partly also hoped to achieve more individual freedom as well as a partner-like relationship with their prospective spouse, contrasting their hopes of a marriage abroad with their restricted economic possibilities and the patriarchal gender relations in the villages in Opoja despite the major changes that occurred after the war. Based on the consumption of daily media, social networks as well as on the visits of migrants, young people in Opoja knew that women can take over other identities outside the region, leaving traditional roles behind and enjoying more freedom.[14] They hoped to be able to take up wage work and thus to contribute to the household income, or even to continue with their education and take up a high(er) qualified job abroad.

Flora is an 18-year-old young woman from Opoja who had recently finished gymnasium. As her parents could not afford to pay university education for her and did not want her to work outside the household, she remained at home from that day on. Although she considered herself to be too young for a marriage, she said that she wanted to marry abroad, as she experienced the village like a prison that she could not leave. She thus also did not want to marry one of the young men from the neighbouring villages (and she told me that she would have had the opportunity for that if she had wanted), but instead directed her hopes at a (still anonymous) migrant.

Young women like Flora also had various concerns about cross-border marriages, which stemmed from negative experiences of others that they had learnt about. In fact, they were aware that the position of brides abroad was often difficult, and that young women from Opoja enjoyed a certain reputation of being obedient and submissive among migrants abroad – a reputation which they do not necessarily see as good. The 20-year-old Spresa, who is engaged with a man living in Opoja, said for example critically: "They take a bride because they think that she is stupid…"

Young women thus carefully looked out for a "good" young man and also checked his family background, and thus also welcomed the advice of family members who had certain information about the respective marriage candidates and their families. Flora, for example, hoped to receive a proposal with the help of a relative from abroad, as this seemed to be a more serious option for her. Only after initial contact was established, she could imagine chatting with the prospective marriage candidate via Internet in order to establish a romantic relationship and later make her decision about a possible future marriage.

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[13] That this is nothing specific for women from Opoja, but a motif found more or less universally, has been described by Appadurai (2004, 2005) and Beck-Gernsheim (2011: 62).

[14] Again this is not exclusive for women from Opoja in Kosovo. Bhalla (2014) describes that also Indian women who marry into the USA hope to leave traditional structure behind and be able to create prosperity and a better future.

When I met Dafina, who was about 30 years old, she had recently gotten engaged with a migrant who lived in Germany and who was proposed to her by a relative. She was already relatively old for getting married compared to other women in the region, and as she had only an eight-year school education, she had been at home for about 15 years already. When I asked her what she had done the years after school, she explained she had always wanted to marry a migrant in order to offer her prospective children a better future and possibilities that she had not had herself, like a better school education and the possibility to take up a profession. She wanted to learn German abroad in order to take up wage work and to contribute to the household income. She was, however, also concerned about falling prey to the wrong one, and she wanted to find a man who was family-oriented and not a dodger.

After various proposals, which her parents received and in which relatives had brokered, there was finally a proposal that met her expectations: he was a migrant from the region who was in his late 30s and who owned his own firm and had a good income. She added that he also did not have an earring or a beard, explaining to me that these were suspicious signs of a too strong individualization and westernization, or also of religious "fanaticism", as villagers often referred to their negative image of fundamentalist Islam. She also evaluated it as positive that he lived in a nuclear household as he had no relatives abroad, as she then did not have to live with his parents and had less to fear regarding their influence.

Like Dafina, young women thus rely consciously on family counselling in order to pick the right one. However, the legal measures of the German and Austrian state to prevent "forced marriages" sometimes affected them rather negatively. In Opoja, I encountered for example various young women who had to wait for the papers to join their husbands in Austria, some of them for even more than one year or several years, because they either got engaged before the age of 21 (as many had finished school at 16) or because other legal requirements had not been met. Some confessed that the situation created insecurities and burdens, as it questioned the stability of the relationship already before marriage, and because the young people in Opoja had only very limited power to influence it. Young women, who had looked to life abroad with excitement and happiness, suddenly found themselves in doubts and worries.

When the German and Austrian state introduced an obligatory proof of beginners' knowledge in German for migrating family members in 2007 and 2011 respectively (Block and Bonjour 2013: 207; Gutekunst 2016), various marriage migrants then also started attending German language courses offered by a language teachers in the region in order to pass the official German language examination held by (a partner of) the German Goethe-Institute in Prishtina.[15] While this helped them to develop basic German skills – an ability much needed abroad – and made them

[15] See www.goethe.de/lrn/prj/egn/deindex/htm (last access 27 November 2017).

proud as soon as they managed to learn and pass the test, it also put many of them under considerable pressure as they were not used to learning a foreign language, and they also experienced difficulties related to organising their participation in the course and paying for it.[16] In many cases, the language test became thus another barrier to pass for being able to marry abroad.

Thirty-year-old Dafina, for example, started to attend a private German language course in a neighbouring village after engagement. During my conversation with her, Dafina confessed that she felt under considerable pressure to pass the course, not at least because she believed that her husband and his family abroad saw her passing as a kind of precondition for marrying her. In fact, during the course, Dafina got nervous and partly also desperate about it, as she had left school more than ten years ago and learning and even reading was difficult for her. While she was learning, her eyes and head started hurting a lot, and she even developed severe tooth pain. As I had heard of such symptoms and pressures also from others, it is thus questionable whether it is helpful to start with the plea for integration already in the sending countries – as this shifts the border and puts the pressure one-sidedly on the prospective marriage migrants. Within their limited frame, however, women were not only victims, but also actors: Desa for example, who agreed to an engagement with a migrant after family counselling, dissolved the engagement after half a year when she realized that her prospective spouse was not supportive enough of her. This negatively affected her social status as well as that of her family, but it brought her also respect.

Men aspiring to marry abroad

Many young men from Opoja also wanted to marry a migrant from the region in order to migrate themselves. The reasons are first of all economic. Because of the high regional unemployment rate of 27.6% and even 52.4% among the age group of 15–24 in Kosovo in 2016, and even higher numbers in Opoja,[17] and the low earning potential in private employments, many see very little perspective for themselves in Kosovo, let alone in the region of Opoja. This applies especially to young men without any higher education, either because they were not good pupils or because

[16] As such a course is only offered in one village within Opoja that is not accessible by public transport from various other villages, most participants have difficulties to commute to the course. Furthermore, the costs for the language course need to be covered privately (and is often covered by the (family of the) prospective husband), which puts additional pressure in these marriages.

[17] See Kosovo Agency for Statistics, *Results of the Labour Force Survey in Kosovo (LFS), 2016*. Furthermore, inactive work force is quite high (61.3%), with an emphasis on females at 81.4% compared to males (41.7%), and only 29.5% of employed persons have permanent contracts in their main job, while 70.5% have a temporary contract. See for a good analysis of the labour market also Latifi 2016.

their parents did not have enough money to support their further education. They hoped to receive a well-paid job abroad and tended to ignore the negative aspects, often against better knowledge.[18] However, young men who studied also wanted to marry abroad, as they experienced that in Kosovo their job chances were restricted also in the higher professional sectors. While some were willing to take "any kind of job", others hoped to be able to continue their studies abroad, after marriage.

This was the case of the 28-year-old Agim, who came from a well-educated and ambitious, but not very prosperous family with six siblings. Agim completed his BA in Prishtina with best marks, but he said that the distribution of the few jobs that existed in Kosovo was based on clientelism and corruption, and he thus wanted to continue his education abroad in order to take up a well-paid job there. When he got to know a young woman who lived abroad through the counselling of relatives, both started a romance and agreed to the marriage soon. She then enabled him to go abroad and realize his dream of studying abroad.

Many young men, however, did not have only themselves and the fulfilment of their individual prospects in mind when aiming at a cross-border marriage, but regarded it as a family matter. They were willing to financially support their parents and siblings with their migration, as it is above all a social norm in Kosovo that sons care for their elderly parents (and siblings), while state social security is rudimentary. One young man who had married abroad the year before told me for example that he had never aspired to live abroad, but when his parents came up with the opportunity of a cross-border marriage, he agreed to it in order to secure his own future and the future of his family at home.

But other family as well as individual considerations were also of deciding importance. Young men were aware of the fact that they would be able to found a nuclear household with their wife in migration, often even with the financial support of the bride's parents, as it is against the Kosovo-Albanian tradition to move into the household of the bride's parents. At home, however, many of those young men had to share a household with their parents and partly also with their siblings in the rural context in Kosovo – until the family had managed to save enough money to build a new house (or several of them). This implies that they have to adhere to the authority of their father. As the life worlds of the young people and their parents have diverged, especially owing to the use of electronic media, some young men wanted to migrate in order to escape the father's authority in order to avoid potential conflicts.

To succinctly describe the perspective of migrants abroad who are willing to marry someone from Opoja – and of course not all marry a migrant from the

[18] Timmerman has also observed this "blending out" of negative factors for young men from Emirdag in Turkey who wanted to migrate to Flanders (2008: 590).

home region in Kosovo, many also want to marry another migrant – it can be said that those who do are conscious about the essentializing discourses about marriage migration prevailing in the majority society. Thus, they also position themselves according to these discourses. They, for example, say that they want to marry a partner from Opoja because of "cultural" reasons, and because they expect that their partners will be family-oriented. Furthermore, they often enjoy a special position in the home region in Kosovo, and have positive images about it based on the time they spent there during summer vacations.

Realities of cross-border marriage life

After migration, migrating spouses were in the beginning often highly dependent on their spouse – in legal terms, as their residency rights were bound with the marriage, and in economic terms because it took time to take up wage work, and not at least also in emotional terms, because they had to cope with a new environment and were socially rather isolated. I thus imagined that many difficulties and barriers existed within these marriages, which could reproduce but also redefine gender and partnership relations – dependent on the positioning and sex of the partners.

In fact, migrating men did not meet the same conditions as migrating women, not at least because the expectations about their economic productivity and their position within the partnership were quite different. When I asked various interlocutors if men who wanted to follow their brides abroad would fear losing power and becoming dependent on their wives, men as well as women frequently answered that I did not know men from Opoja, as they would never feel inferior to their wives and were very self-confident. Considering these answers, I realized that migrating men had little social space to define personal problems or express feelings of fear or despair, although it was unquestionable that they faced difficulties abroad.

Next to establishing a life-long partnership as a basis for a family, men were expected and expected of themselves to take up a job and earn a living for their families. After migration, these expectations were however not easy to fulfil, as many men had difficulties establishing themselves in the majority society and becoming the main breadwinners – although women often supported them in achieving this. In fact, most women who married a groom from Opoja had taken up wage work before marriage. They continued to work also after marriage, while their husbands who arrived from Opoja had to find work first, and they then often had to take a job that was paid less than the one their wife had. But women also took care to balance power relations as best as possible. Fatmire for example enabled her husband to access her bank account when he did not have his own salary. The joint account was then kept until today and both can take money from the account. This makes it less obvious that she earns more money.

Still, Fatmire has silently taken over the management and administration of the household – a practice that she did not deliberately take up, but which just developed. Due to the lack of language proficiency and orientational knowledge of her husband, Fatmire told me that she supported him in different administrative tasks, like the application for residency and for social transfer payments. Fatmire took over the official correspondence as well as banking transactions for her husband. This somehow became a rule and they kept to it even years after her husband had joined her. This however also impacted on their relationship as well as the individual self-esteem and gender roles. In fact, she complained to me that she always has to commit herself to everything, while he had adopted a passive attitude. As Fatmire earns more than her husband, they face the situation that Fatmire needs to work full time in order to finance the family, while her husband is more involved in the care for the children. When she has to run some errands she sometimes does not even ask him to take over caring duties anymore, but just leaves the children at home with him. The role in which her husband found himself may be experienced as troublesome in various aspects as it does not comply with the gendered role expectations, which are widely shared within the local community in Opoja, and partly also among migrants from Opoja and other regions in Kosovo who live abroad. Fatmire's husband does not problematize his role, but rather withdraws to the private realm and rarely goes out with his fellows from Kosovo. This however contributes to his difficult standing also within the migrant community, in which other men consider him (and others like him) as a henpecked husband, who is "ruled" by his wife who might even prohibit him from going out.

In other cases, especially when women married a migrant with higher education, the subordinate position of the husband may be more temporary, and may lead to fewer conflicts and is easier to accept. This is the case of Endrit, who married abroad not at least because he wanted to continue his studies there. His wife Shega, who came to Austria at the age of twelve and worked as a pharmaceutical assistant after finishing a professional training in a pharmacy, was happy to marry a partner with a university education and with the prospect of receiving a good job.[19] When he joined her abroad, she helped him to organize and finance his studies by working full time. After Endrit successfully finished his studies and managed to find a well-paid job, their partnership relations shifted again. He became the main breadwinner of the family and they also decided to have their first child, for which Shega remained at home for three years. However, she still helps him to fill out forms and looks over them again, as she has much more experience, not at least because she became the logistical leader of her natal family long before she met Endrit, when she had to translate for her parents and was involved in all decisions and administrative tasks. She also supported her younger sister, who recently started to study psychology.

[19] In fact, achieving this was not easy at all, as Shega had to overcome various legal and social barriers.

The position of marriage migrants and gender roles within the family also depend on family members who live close by and with whom they have regular contact. While male marriage migrants often establish a nuclear household with their wife abroad, most of the households of such cross-border marriage couples are located in close distance to the household of the bride's parents as well as those of siblings and/or other relatives of the bride. The geographical proximity of these households enables a close cooperation between them. In various cases, this is practiced daily or at least several times in a week. This means that with migration, men enter into the network of his wife's relatives, and they often also receive support from these networks, e.g. in terms of job search, finding and furnishing a flat, as well as regular hands-on support, which is rather unusual in the Opoja region.

The family network of the bride can however also be of special use for the bride herself. If she wants to take up wage work again after giving birth to children, and thus take over a breadwinner position (again), she can often count on her mother or sister to care for her child(ren) during her absence from home. Her own family networks can thus empower female spouses within their partnership, or create a space for emotional and practical support network independent from the partner (and his family), which may at times even exclude the partner. Fatmire for example lives close to her sister and the two see each other nearly daily and cooperate closely. Fatmire and her sister also take turns with childcare when the other has an important obligation for which the children are bothersome. This kind of cooperation among sisters, which has become even stronger after marriage, is unusual or even impossible in Opoja due to the geographical distance between villages, and also because of the patrilocal marriage pattern and family structures. Instead, they rather rely on their sister-in-law or their parents-in-law.

Women who migrated in order to join their spouse often wanted to enter employment and many took up wage work to a later point of time, too. But they were still far from being expected to do so by others, as they were expected to mainly care of the household and the children. This again reflects the widespread and traditional gender role model prevalent in many rural parts of Kosovo, which partially stretches to migration contexts owing to translocal or transnational family networks. However, those couples who had founded their own household particularly stressed in joint conversations with me that they had a partnership-based relationship with their spouses. Many male migrants, who had come to Germany or Austria as teens and who later married a woman from their home region, who came abroad via marriage, told me in individual conversations that they depended on their wife, who was more competent in childcare and household matters and who had the decision-making power in these realms. They also said that they discussed family matters jointly and, for example, did the weekly shopping of groceries together and visited relatives and friends jointly.

In many cases, men were even very much interested in their wife taking up wage work. With this, they underlined their "modern" approach to partnership relations, while also stressing this was a very welcome contribution to the household. In order to finance the family abroad and to fulfil the financial expectations of relatives at home, most migrant households needed two breadwinners, especially when the salaries they earned were relatively low. Thus, many women who migrated abroad in order to follow their husbands soon started to take up wage work in order to contribute to the family income, e.g. by doing cleaning jobs or working in a factory. This also led to an empowerment of women, especially as soon as they could administer their salary. This is again nothing special for marriage migrants from Opoja, or Kosovo in general, but posed a normality also for many labour migrants who fetched their spouses from the 1970s on, or who migrated together.[20]

Some young women who went abroad via marriage do not live in a nuclear household with their husband, but share a household with their husband and his parents, and partly also with unmarried sisters and brothers or even with a married brother or sister in law and possibly also their children. In such household constellations it is clear that the relationship between the bride and the mother-in-law (and partly also to other female members) has a certain importance, as the women spend a lot of time together at home and often also divide the housework between each other. However, the relations between female marriage migrants and their in-laws are of different quality.

Like men who migrated on the basis of marriage, some in-marrying women who migrated abroad receive a lot of support from their mother-in-law and other female relatives of their husband in order to get acquainted to the new life circumstances.[21] Members of her husband's family may also support the young bride in attending a language school and pursuing further education or wage work, e.g. by driving her, taking care of her children, or financing the courses.

However, the joint household situation in which the bride is living with the family of her husband can also create various burdens for the female marriage migrant. In fact, some in-marrying brides from Opoja, who lived abroad in larger family settings, told me that they faced a lot of family obligations in the household, which did not leave them much space for other things, and partly also restricted their movements and their possibilities to take up wage work and learn German. In fact, such a role model was partly supported by and expected from her mother-in-law, who had often been integrated in the household of her own parents-in-law

[20] See Morokvasic 1987 for migrants from former Yugoslavia; Schiffauer 1991 for migrants from Turkey.

[21] Similar observations are made by Straßburger (2001: 12) for female marriage migrants from Turkey in Germany.

in Opoja after marriage, where she took over a serving role for the household members, often in absence of her husband who worked abroad, while she moved abroad in order to join her husband only years later. Meeting such circumstances, such realities of cross-border marriages were in contrast to the imaginations young brides from Opoja had about their life abroad, and could become a heavy burden and a predicament.

This is the case of Blerina, who had been an excellent pupil at home in Opoja. She had married abroad in order to study medicine, but she was not allowed to attend university, or even German classes, and suffered a lot from the restrictions her mother-in-law imposed on her. After her arrival, she had to take care of the children of her sisters-in-law, who went to work regularly, and had to do the housework for the many household members as, along with her husband and parents-in-law, her brother-in-law and his family shared the same household. Being depressed, she thought about leaving the family and returning home. However, she then gave birth to a son in the meantime and leaving was no option any more, as she feared having to leave her son behind, and did not see an alternative future for herself. Being isolated and without hope, she was also not willing to involve outsiders into the conflict and possibly escalate it, but rather endured her situation. More generally, divorce meant the threat of being sent home again, as residence right was bound to the husband, and returning home meant losing honour and social status and facing the only option of marrying a widower sooner or later.

Conclusions

Different from widespread popular, but also scientific notions according to which "arranged" and "love" marriages are positioned at different poles, especially in terms of individualization, self-realization and freedom of choice, I have argued that in Opoja, these differences are blurred. In fact, today's "arranged marriages" in the Opoja region are increasingly based on the choices of the partners involved and also include a romantic phase, while "love marriages" are at the same time also family framed and the self-realization within such marriages may be limited. In cross-border marriages, the arrangement takes an even more important part in order to realize individual imaginations and future aspirations. An "arranged marriage" is thus not necessarily something that is "left over" from former times, but rather has experienced a revival in insecure economic times and of a neo-liberal, consumer oriented culture, and especially in relation to restricted migration regimes which leave nearly no other options for immigration.

However, while cross-border marriages are seen as the starting point for a better life, which is aspired by young women and men from Opoja alike, the realization of such imaginations is another side of the coin. As has been shown, gender positions

and family relations matter considerably when imagining and evaluating such marriages. As marriage migration transcends large geographical distances and country borders, it can entail new forms of empowerment or disempowerment for women as well as men that are not unambiguous.

Generally, marriages in which women migrate from Opoja abroad entail very ambivalent possibilities for the women. On the one hand, such marriages might bring material benefits, and in some cases husbands might also push their wives to learn the language, enter wage work, and pursue further education – not only because this sooner or later contributes to the shared household, but also because they want to have an "emancipated partnership". In other cases, however, the imaginations women had when moving abroad may fail to materialize and women may instead be exposed to coercions and conflicts.

Such coercion within cross-border marriages is however not prevented by the legal measures mentioned in the beginning. For migrating women, divorce is often not seen as a solution, as they fear of losing their children, their rights to stay abroad, or their honour when returning, while facing only the option of re-marriage after some time. In fact, problems related to social isolation, the lack of (access to) state support and tenuous residency rights will not be solved through the criminalization of cross-border marriages. Instead, the latter only supports inner-familiar violence (see also Strasser and Tosic 2014: 144; Neubauer and Dahinden 2012).

In the case of marriages in which male partners migrated from Opoja in order to move to their wife abroad, the relations also differed between themselves. Based on the prevailing gender stereotypes according to which migrating men were expected to take up wage work and lead the household, men had difficulties in fulfilling the role model, especially in the beginning, and became to a certain degree dependent on their wife as well as her family, while the wife gained power within partnership relations. This was one of the reasons that led to partnership conflicts and individual crises, as men felt marginalized and downgraded. This may however also open up more partnership-based relations.

More generally, such marriage mobilities across state borders can lead to the crossing of gender boundaries and the questioning and new definition of "traditional" gender roles.

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In the Shadow of the Transit Spectacle

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In the shadow of a specific form of border spectacle (De Genova 2002) and the spectacle of statistics (Stierl et al. 2016), i.e. in the shadow of the spectacle of the mass transit of refugees on their way to Western Europe in the autumn and winter of 2015/2016, the so-called profiling and detention of migrants took place. Mostly invisible to the general public, this profiling led to the forced mass movement of refugees in the opposite direction and/or their explicit detention i.e. confinement. By relying on different types of sources, ranging from public reports to our own field observations, this article deals with detentions in the Croatian part of the Balkan corridor. According to the argument offered in this article, detention can be seen as an integral part of the corridor itself and can be traced from the beginning of its establishment. Furthermore, the article presents a basic outline of what was happening in the Slavonski Brod camp after the closure of the borders on the night of March 8th to the 9th, 2016. It proposes a possible framework for understanding the imprisonment of hundreds of people in the camp from the perspectives of the specific "productiveness" of the camp and modes of resistance towards it.

Keywords: Balkan corridor, Slavonski Brod refugee camp, migrant detention, control and resistance

The so-called Balkan route, or "informal know-how" (Walters 2015a: 9) of clandestine movement shared amongst migrants to Western Europe, has been known about for a long time by experts in both national and supranational security bodies and services (cf. e.g. Frontex 2011; Frontex 2014), a variety of humanitarian and other agencies, as well as researchers in the field of migration (cf. Hassan and Biörklund 2016; Hess 2012; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010; Valenta et al. 2015). In 2015, this line of clandestine movement, which in some circles was previously well-known but almost completely invisible to the general public, transformed into a visible and mass movement across European soil, with border guards

"enforcing an orderly passage of irregular flows, issuing various registration papers" (Frontex 2016: 15), as described even in Frontex publications with the characteristic naturalizing (flow) and technocratic (irregular) discourses (cf. Hart 2011: 572). As Bernd Kasparek summarizes, at this point, the path across the Balkans "entered into the European spotlight, and indeed onto the screen of the global public" (2016: 2). The route transformed into "a highly efficient infrastructure of transit" that had been established "across the Balkans, reaching from the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki to several regional distribution centres in Germany". It was "no longer just a route, but rather a corridor, i.e., a narrow and highly organised mechanism to channel and facilitate the movement of people that only states seem capable of providing" (Kasparek 2016: 6; cf. Beznec et al. 2016: 4; Lunaček Brumen and Meh 2016). The rules of this corridor and its pathways were established by formal and informal agreements between the police forces, ministries etc. and facilitated by governmental, humanitarian and other institutions and agencies.

At that point in time it seemed that the year of 2015 would be "a historic and monumental year of migration for Europe precisely because disobedient mass mobilities have disrupted the European regime of border control" (Stierl et al. 2016: 23). Today, it is obvious that the disruption was not only short-term, but for some people also illusionary since, for example, one of the cornerstones of that regime, the Dublin Regulation,[1] was only allegedly suspended. As we know from first hand and published overviews (cf. Asylum 2017), deportations from Austria and other EU countries to Croatia already started in February 2016 and are still ongoing.

Building on the well-known concept of "border spectacle" (De Genova 2002), the visibility that the movement got in that period can be described as transit spectacle. This transit spectacle in the Croatian context consisted of countless images of crowded border crossings, nearby meadows, trains, buses and sorting centres or camps predominantly in Croatia, and sometimes in the border regions with Slovenia and Serbia, as well as the constant, literally real-time, spectacular presentation of the number of arrivals and exits. This spectacle of statistics (Stierl et al. 2016) is also echoed in summaries of the events such as the following:

> "Between September 16, 2015 and March 5, 2016, a total of 658,068 migrants […] entered the territory of Croatia. On average, there were approximately 5,500 daily arrivals, with a peak of 11,000 on September 17. […] Throughout January 2016, the average number of migrants entering Croatia varied between 500 and 2,000, with some days reaching 3,000." (Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016: 11)

[1] At: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R0604 (last access 8 March 2017).

Although extremely visible and present in Croatian news and social networks, especially in the first months, the movement of migrants in the corridor across Croatia was in fact almost invisible concerning all aspects other than those mentioned above, i.e. large numbers and mass scenes. Reflecting contemporary European immigration policies (cf. e.g. De Genova et al. 2015; Fassin 2005; New Keywords 2016), this transit spectacle emphasized the humanitarian aspect and care for the suffering of an anonymous mass of people, while on the other hand insisting on organized, effective and secure migrant crossing through Croatia (cf. e.g. Grubiša 2017; Hameršak and Pleše 2017a, 2017b; Petrović 2016, 2017; Škokić and Jambrešić Kirin 2017).[2]

Concerning the fact that the public image of migrant transit was extremely limited and founded on the ideas of efficient and secure transit with a touch of traditional hospitality culture, other aspects such as dehumanization and detention as preconditions for, as well as integral parts of, this indeed efficient transit were not discussed. They were referred to in only a few reports by some NGOs and independent activists and mostly ignored by the media and, consequently, by the general public.

In comparison to the situation, for example, in Serbia or Macedonia where migrants followed the path of the corridor (cf. Beznec et al. 2016; Kasparek 2016: 6), in Croatia and from there onwards (cf. Ladić and Vučko 2016: 21–22; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47), they were in the corridor's power, i.e. forced to follow the corridor and remain detained within it. Generally, one could not exit the corridor on one's own accord to satisfy individual needs such as to slow down and rest or to speed up one's journey, to stay the night in a hotel room instead of a tent or on a floor as it was in Dobova (Slovenia), to mention only a few of the situations we encountered in the camps in Dobova and Slavonski Brod.[3] For example, a man who asked to return to Turkey for the funeral of his close relative was not allowed to exit

[2] The insights and argumentation presented in this article are partly based on our article "Zarobljeni u kretanju. O hrvatskoj dionici balkanskog koridora" [Confined in Movement. About the Croatian Section of the Balkan Corridor] (Hameršak and Pleše 2017b).

[3] In order to denaturalise the term detention and to stress "the extent to which it has been reserved as a category for naming precisely those varieties of confinement that are intended to be emphatically distinguished from the more customarily juridical coordinates of penal imprisonment for criminal offenses" (De Genova 2016: 5), in this article we interchangeably use the terms detention, imprisonment, incarceration, confinement, etc. In this way, we want to distance ourselves from diminishing the facts that, with detention, the condition of so-called irregular migrants "culminates in summary (and sometimes indefinite) incarceration on the basis of little more than their sheer existential predicament as 'undesirable' non-citizens, usually with little or no recourse to any form of legal remedy or appeal, and frequently no semblance to any due process of law whatsoever. Migrants subjected to detention, very commonly, are literally 'guilty' of nothing other than their 'unauthorized' (illegalized) status, penalized simply for being who and what they are, and not at all for any act of wrong-doing" (ibid.: 4).

the corridor in Dobova. On the other hand, those few refugees who found themselves, for different reasons, on Croatian territory outside the corridor were unable to join the corridor. Since November 3rd and the opening of the camp in Slavonski Brod, in line with the agreement between Croatia and Serbia, the only entry point into the corridor for Croatia was the "border", the train in Šid.[4]

All this suggests the possibility of understanding the corridor from Croatia and onwards as a specific form of detention, mobile detention, which, moreover, was not founded in national or EU legislation, as explained in the case of Slovenia by Neža Kogovšek Šalamon (2016: 44–47). This detention consisted of trains, buses and walking columns of refugees guarded and directed by the police, as well as the camps becoming some form of convergence point for these different pathways of movement. Therefore, it could be said that the corridor was detention in motion with camps as stations.

The corridor as a unique form of detention, as a mobile detention, calls for further research into its mobile aspect. Amongst other things, it calls for research in the vein of *viapolitics*, a term coined by William Walters (2015a, 2015b: 10) to designate a zone of linked inquiries motivated by the shared conviction that research on migration should be more attentive to the way vehicles and their infrastructures feature in migration controversies, vehicles as mobile zones of governance and contestation in their own right and vehicles as the objects and settings of political action (Walters 2015a: 473–483). Nevertheless, we will not focus here on vehicles, roads or routes, but on the key immobile element of this mobile structure i.e. the camp as an obligatory station of the corridor. In our case, given the fact that we are dealing with the Croatian part of the corridor, this was the camp in Slavonski Brod where we had intermittent, but long term access.

As researchers and volunteers, we first came to the camp in January 2016 and we continuously returned until its closure in mid-April 2016. As we describe elsewhere (Hameršak and Pleše 2017a), ethnographic methods in the camp often boiled down to their bare contours, while our research gained many elements of investigative work. "In an environment where so much was hidden or inaccessible for various reasons, we continually had to discover the basic stratum of the world that we were studying, which the researchers in other contexts generally reach immediately, and without major difficulty" (ibid.: 123). Therefore, in the following pages we focus on the last weeks of the camp and on the confinement of people as probably the most concealed aspect of the camp. Here, we first of all present a basic outline of

[4] Cf. *Protokol između Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, Ravnateljstva policije i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije, Direkcije policije o suradnji u migracijskoj krizi i sprječavanju nezakonitih migracija*, October 30th 2015, https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//Sjednice/2015/271%20sjednica%20Vlade//271%20-%2015a.pdf (last access 8 March 2017).

what was happening in the camp after the overnight closure of the borders (March 8th to March 9th), and propose a possible framework for understanding it from the perspective of the specific "productiveness" of the camp and modes of resistance to the "rules of camp".

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As well as camps in Gevgelija (Macedonia), Preševo (Serbia), Šid (Serbia), Dobova (Slovenia) and elsewhere along the Balkan corridor (cf. Beznec et al. 2016; Kogovšek Šalamon and Bajt 2016; Lunaček Brumen and Meh 2016; Speer 2015), the Slavonski Brod camp was a so-called transit camp. However, it had an exclusively transit function for only a very short period of time. Already on November 18th, two weeks after the opening of camp, the refugees who came on the early morning train were no longer without exception directed to one of the sectors from where they were then sent to Slovenia. Instead, on the occasion of this first known example of screening or so-called profiling of refugees in the Slavonski Brod camp,[5] police directed some of them to the sector on the opposite side of the camp. According

[5] The so-called profiling consisted of selection and discrimination control measures used systematically by the police of the countries along the Balkan corridor starting on November 18th 2015, when Slovenia and Croatia extracted the first groups of refugees that did not come from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan (cf. Inicijativa Dobrodošli, "Nedopustivo je odvajanje izbjeglica na one koje su iz tzv. ratnih zona i na ostale", November 19th 2015, http://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/hr/2015/11/19/odvajanje-izbjeglica-na-one-koje-su-iz-tzv-ratnih-zona-i-na-ostale/; Moving Europe, "Restrictions and segregation on the Balkanroute: Fences, Detention and Push-Backs", January 21th 2016, http://moving-europe.org/restrictions-and-segregation-on-the-balkanroute-fences-detention-and-push-backs/#_ftnref1, last access 8 March 2017). Over the course of time, this profiling led to the mass forced movement of refugees in the opposite direction (people were returned, for example, from Austria to Slovenia, from Slovenia to Croatia, from Croatia to Serbia). People were profiled and returned ("pushed back") on the basis of formal and informal decisions of the states and between the states. Only refugees "coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan could pass along the Balkan route. People of these nationalities also had to, upon entering Slovenia, declare that they intent to go to Austria or Germany if they were to be allowed access to Slovenian territory. By using the method of asking captious questions and, in the case of some countries outsourcing the decision on access to territories to interpreters" (Banich et al. 2016b). On February 18th 2016, the national heads of police in Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia agreed "that the migration flow along the Western Balkans route has to be reduced to the greatest possible extent". The agreement introduced a unified registration form, as well as defined humanitarian grounds on which "the entry of third country nationals may be authorized" to those who "are arriving from war-torn areas and are in need of international protection (for example from Syria, Iraq)" (https://www.mup.hr/UserDocsImages/topvijesti/2016/veljaca/migranti_sastanak/joint_statement.pdf, last access 8 March 2017). The result was that Afghans were "being turned away from the Balkan border crossings. Macedonia then closed its borders to Afghan refugees trying to enter from Greece" (Bjelica and van Bijlert 2016).

to the information available,[6] 110 persons, mostly men from countries such as Lebanon, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Morocco, Somalia and Ivory Coast, were separated and directed to this sector. From this time onwards, the Slavonski Brod camp was not only the place where hundreds of thousands of people stopped for a short time in order to proceed further to the West, but also the place where people were forcibly stopped and detained for a shorter or longer period of time, some for a few hours and days and some, in the later period, for weeks or more. From that moment on, their detention took on additional and more easily recognized forms.

The above mentioned first group of people who were separated from the others in the Slavonski Brod camp, could be approached by volunteers on request. In contrast, in the following weeks and months, most of the volunteers were not allowed to approach the detainees as if the detainees had been imprisoned for wrong-doing. In fact, as it has been already noticed, due to the screening or profiling "people who would one day legally enter the countries along the Balkan corridor within the system set up by the authorities of these countries were stopped the next day, their journey interrupted, and they suddenly became illegal and subject to prosecution and detention" (Banich et al. 2016b). Similarly, volunteers were allowed to approach people when they were on their way to Slovenia in "regular transit", but as soon as they were deported from Slovenia to the Slavonski Brod camp, these very same people were labelled as those it was forbidden to approach. Moreover, their detention in the camp was systematically hidden and concealed from the public, as well as from most of the volunteers and employees in the camp. Official reports of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, as well as NGOs, media and other reports did not mention the refugees who were detained in the camp. Therefore, most of the information about imprisonments in the camp came from the outside, as for example from activists of the Moving Europe network. In January 2016, they published a short release about the "systematic violence and unlawful process carried out by Croatian police officers at the Slavonski Brod Transit Camp for Migrants and Refugees" based on insights from the people who were deported to Serbia from the Slavonski Brod camp.[7] A few weeks later, Moving Europe published a more detailed report about police dealings with so-called non-SIA (Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan) people in the Slavonski Brod camp and at the entry point to the Croatian part of the corridor at the train station in Šid, Serbia (Banich et al. 2016a). Among the published testimonies we also read: "When we arrived to Slavonski Brod the Croatian police told me: 'You are not Iraqi nor Syrian, you can't pass'" (ibid.: 10).

[6] Cf. http://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/hr/2015/11/19/odvajanje-izbjeglica-na-one-koje-su-iz-tzv-ratnih-zona-i-na-ostale/ (last access 8 March 2017).

[7] At: http://moving-europe.org/croatia-slavonski-brod-transit-camp-for-migrants-and-refugees/ (last access 8 March 2017).

People incarcerated in the Slavonski Brod camp arrived there in different ways and from different places. Groups of people or individuals came to the camp by the "regular" refugee trains from Šid or by unmarked police vans, as we had the chance to see ourselves during our stay in the camp. Twice, a train from the West arrived in the camp with a hundred or so people.[8] Information is even more scarce regarding exits from the camp. The only exception is the mass deportation of 217 refugees to Serbia in February, previously deported from Slovenia to Croatia.[9] The above mentioned report by Moving Europe refers to a different style of returning refugees to Serbia, in smaller groups and accompanied by violence. According to the testimonies published in the report, police took refugees from the camp to the border zone from where they were forced to walk towards Serbia:

> "The next day they told us that we are going to Slovenia now. We had to get into a police car. Then we had to walk 7 kilometers by foot. They told us this is Slovenia, but then it was Serbia. [...] One of my friends tried to run away, but the Croatian police cached [caught] him and beat him here [pointing at his left cheek bone] and here [pointing at his left shoulder]. And at the legs. They were violent and beating him. And when they made us get in to the car they were also using violence. Croatia is no good!" (Banich et al. 2016a: 6)

Finally, one more way to exit the camp for detainees, almost unknown to the public, consisted of the widespread practice of once again joining the refugees, who were previously "pushed back" from Slovenia, to the corridor towards the West. On several occasions in the camp we saw smaller or bigger groups of refugees brought by the police from the dislocated side of the camp to the train platform just before the train's departure.

Regarding the place where people were detained, the only thing that can be said with some certainty is that they were isolated in different parts of the camp, including sectors with containers. In one of the published testimonies we read: "They took me to a room, they kept me there from 12pm – 20pm. There were around 40 of us kept there" (Banich et al. 2016a: 10). For us on the other side of the fence, the presence of the people detained in the camp was at first made apparent by lights in some of the supposedly empty sectors of the camp. Later on, groups of people of all ages, standing in front of the tent or containers, could sometimes be seen from outside the so-called Sector 3. Since February, more and more people were impris-

[8] Cf. http://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/hr/2016/02/17/sigurni-koridor-u-eu-za-neke-koridor-povratka-u-nesigurnost-za-druge/ and http://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/hr/2016/02/28/gradani-europe-porucili-vladama-omogucite-izbjeglicama-siguran-prolaz-sada/ (last access 8 March 2017).

[9] Cf. http://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/hr/2016/02/18/europske-zemlje-moraju-solidarno-preuzeti-odgovrnost/ and HRT, *Dnevnik*, February 17th 2016, http://vijesti.hrt.hr/322636/hrvatska-vratila-217-izbjeglica-u-sid-slovenija-ima-nove-mjere (last access 8 March 2017).

oned more frequently and for more substantial periods, among them whole families with children, which was hard to hide as was the case before. Up until the time of writing, it is unknown how many people were detained in the Slavonski Brod camp.

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On March 9th after the borders were closed, there were around 300 persons who had been returned to Croatia from Slovenia in the camp. Contrary to media and other accounts (cf. Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016: 12), they did not arrive in the camp after the transit stopped, but they arrived successively in the period between the above mentioned mass deportation to Serbia in mid-February and the closure of the corridor. Ever since the last refugee train departed towards Slovenia, the camp was exclusively a place for detention in the strictest sense, i.e. a place of imprisonment. About two weeks later, two days after the *Report on Systemic Human Rights Violations by the Croatian Authorities in the Closed Parts of the Winter Reception and Transit Centre in Slavonski Brod* (Banich et al. 2016b) was published, we were allowed to enter the detention sectors for the first time, together with other volunteers and employees present in the camp.[10]

With their "entrance" in the sectors, the process of humanitarisation in the camp started to flourish, which in a way detracted from the fact that individuals of both genders, entire families, teenagers, children, toddlers, new-born, old people, disabled people, people in poor health and others had been forcibly detained. Not only that, the camp in which they were detained was located outside the city and separated from the local surroundings by a high fence and a well-developed security system. The so-called detention sectors of the camp were also separated from each other also by the fence and guarded by the police. These "camps within a camp" consisted of prefabricated plastic or metal constructions placed on gravel pitches. The huge white tent which was used as a dormitory in Sector 1, and the tiny containers which had the same function in Sector 3, were individualized only administratively, with stuck on or handwritten numbers on the "door". In the tents, there were dozens of densely lined bunk beds without mattresses, only with wooden slats. Every occupied slat was, so to speak, the only personal space in the camp. In the tiny containers, the beds filled almost the entire space. That conditions in the camp were truly rudimentary is best seen by the fact that the desire of the volunteers to

[10] During the next twenty days or so until the clamp closed, we entered these areas around ten times in total, spending about twenty hours there, which was due to the fact that the organisation we were volunteering for had limited access to them for only a few hours a day, as did most of the others, even after the detention sectors were opened for volunteers and employees of the organisations in the camp. Our ethnographic research in the camp proved to be fraught with methodological dilemmas, problems and obstacles, which we discuss in detail in Hameršak and Pleše 2017a.

bring in a few mattresses for pregnant and sick women was the subject of constant negotiation, agreements and institutional approval.

Detainees were not allowed to go out of the camp, or even of the sectors. Only exceptionally, some of them were able to get out of the camp with the permission of the police and under their escort if they had to go to the hospital as a patient or "translator" for a friend or family member. As one of our interlocutors reported in his written statement:

> "The only kind of freedom we get in this camp[:] get sick and go out. 'Freedom' comes with a price. I really look forward for one of my friend gets sick so that i can go out and for briefest moment be free."

Sometimes a few of them were allowed to go to the grocery store, accompanied by the police officers, to do shopping for themselves and others. Furthermore, they could go out of the sector in which they were being held only in exceptional cases, and also only under police escort. In some cases, their freedom of movement was restricted even within the sectors, for example, at night.

After the borders were closed, people detained in the camp had very limited chances of getting permanent exit out of the camp: seeking asylum in Croatia or voluntarily returning to their home country (excluding Syria) or some other country which would admit them (for example Greece, since those who came through Greece had a six month permit to stay on its territory). Most people opted for the first option hoping to proceed illegally to the West as soon as possible, which in many cases happened soon or immediately after their transfer from the Slavonski Brod camp to Zagreb or Kutina open centres for asylum seekers. Seeking asylum was, namely, a way to exit the camp and gain freedom of movement (cf. Banich et al. 2016b).

As far as we know, a few people left the camp in the way that their relatives came in person to the camp and asked for their release. Locked out of the legal framework, as elaborated in the already mentioned report about the camp (Banich et al. 2016b) they could be released by the very appearance of someone who represented them and their rights. As this example suggests, the Slavonski Brod camp was a place where different standards of justice and law were applied. Moreover, like camps in general, it was a place whose specific "productiveness" consisted "in the very act of decreeing the existence of individuals liable to internment, over and above individual responsibility and biographical factors" (cf. e.g. Rahola 2011: 103). For example, the Slavonski Brod camp defined and redefined identities according to its spatial order. More specifically, in each of the three sectors (so-called Sector 1, Sector 3 and Sector 4) that were in function in the period we are dealing with here, people were held in different sectors according to statuses given to them by the camp administration. In Sector 1, there were men who were identified by the camp administration as single males, regardless of whether they had relatives in the camp or nuclear families, wives

and children, outside the camp. In Sector 3, there were those who were classified as family members by the camp administration. In Sector 4, there were persons, only men, who were put in additional isolation by the camp administration for a certain period of time. With such spatial grouping, the camp became a place of the production of statuses in its own right. For some, this had radical repercussions at the level of individual biographies as already described in the report on the criminalization and detention of refugees transferred from the camp in Slavonski Brod published after the camp was closed (Inicijativa Dobrodošli 2016).

On April 7th 2016 when the closure of the camp was announced, around a hundred people were still in the camp. In the next few days, they were transferred to the centre for asylum seekers in Zagreb or the detention centre in Ježevo, depending on whether or not they had sought asylum, as well as because of the above mentioned statuses and identities acquired during their imprisonment in the camp. All who sought asylum were transferred to the reception and accommodation centre for asylum seekers in Zagreb, and gained freedom of movement on Croatian territory, although within the limits defined by the law and regulations related to asylum seekers. Those who did not seek asylum, but who were placed in Sector 3 and had the status of a family member in the camp, were transferred to the centre for asylum seekers in Zagreb with the argument, as stated in the decisions issued to them, that they had come from war affected areas. On the other hand, those from the Slavonski Brod camp who also did not seek asylum in Croatia, but who were placed in Sector 1 and had the status of "single men" in the camp, were sent to the detention centre in Ježevo where their imprisonment was prolonged (cf. Inicijativa Dobrodošli 2016), although they came from the same war affected countries or areas.

There are numerous and complex reasons, ranging from the very specific to the more general, some of which are already touched upon in the literature (cf. Hess 2012; Papadopoulos et al. 2008: 183–203; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010; Valenta et al. 2015), why refugees detained in the Slavonski Brod camp were delaying seeking asylum. Some of them, as it has been pointed out, refused to seek asylum even when they were faced with having their imprisonment prolonged and being transferred to the Ježevo detention centre. All these reasons connect the constant threat of "virtual prison" (Papadopoulos et al. 2008: 176), fear of being caught in the virtual data networks which increase their deportability (De Genova 2016), and the constant risk of deportation. Seeking asylum in Croatia, which involves registering in the EURODAC (a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and so-called irregular migrants) will, in line with the Dublin Regulation, further burden their possible future lives in another European country with the constant threat of deportation to Croatia. The Dublin Regulation, according to which the country in which the asylum seeker first applies for asylum is responsible for accepting or rejecting the claim "acts as a hidden hand, forcing asylum seekers to return to countries that have no desire to accommodate them, and in which they have no desire to live" (Migrant

2017). In case of leaving the country, as harsh statistics (cf. Asylum 2017) and extremely disturbing case studies (cf. Migrant 2017) show, detention and deportation are one of the future scenarios wherever they settle down.

Refusing or delaying to seek asylum in Croatia can be understood also as one of the tactics (de Certeau 1988: 34–39 et passim) to proceed further on one's way to the place, a destination that is not at the moment necessarily conceived as geographic location, but as a good place to live. This refusing or delaying can be understood in terms of waiting. In these circumstances, waiting becomes one of the crucial "survival" tactics, and it is based on know-how of the journey and route to Europe. On this journey, stops are inevitable and they are an integral part of the journey. Although camps "seem to oppose the very core of migration" (Papadopoulos et al. 2008: 191; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010: 381), from one's own and others experiences and knowledge a camp can appear as just another "tolerated station" (Papadopoulos et al. 2008: 191; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010: 381), a place where stopping is only temporary. In this context, rather than being the last stop, the camp, if you wait long enough, can be a ticket to continue the journey (cf. Tsianos and Karakayali 2010: 383). After all, imprisonments in the camps along the Balkan corridor in Slovenia, as well as in the centre in Zagreb, in the detention centre in Postojna or elsewhere were a part of the immediate experience of the refugees arriving at the Slavonski Brod camp. From that perspective, imprisonment in the Slavonski Brod camp could be understood as something one needs to endure to have a chance to proceed to West.

Waiting is an aspect of every bureaucracy, including the one related to the process of seeking asylum, humanitarian stay etc. Concerning this, waiting is not easily recognized as a form of resistance in comparison to other forms of resistance in the Slavonski Brod camp that we know about, such as protesting, sitting-in, demanding, self-harming etc. "Waiting to grab a chance", and even seemingly passive "waiting out" can be seen as a form of "imperceptible politics" of resistance which make up escape (Papadopoulos et al. 2008: 71–82 et passim), i.e. the politics which is "always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control" (ibid.: 76). In this context, waiting can be furthermore conceived as a mode of resistance to the bureaucracy and procedures immanent to the camp. Like other invisible, imperceptible daily migrant struggles (e.g. hiding identity, movement, life) by which "status quo is called into question" (Ataç et al. 2015: 7), waiting also more or less successfully, but persistently subverts the migration control regime forcing it to adjust its mechanisms to the autonomy of movement. It is in this vein that the events of the European long summer of migration of 2015 (cf. Kasparek and Speer 2015) can be interpreted, when the closed borders of Europe collapsed under the power of movement which in itself was the accumulation of decades of imperceptible daily struggles and the corridor was made in order to re-establish the control of borders.

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Migrants/Refugees in Slovene Healthcare
Many Open Questions and Some Possible Answers

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Based on the research conducted within the framework of the project "Together for Health – Skupaj za zdravje" led by National Institute of Public Health (2014–2016), the first part of the chapter presents several obstacles – legal and administrative barriers in formal access to Slovene public healthcare system as well as language and cultural barriers – that migrants/refugees face in the healthcare system in Slovenia. In the second part of our contribution, the authors discuss some approaches aimed at overcoming these obstacles that were implemented as part of the same project. Namely, a proposal for systemic changes on the level of legislation, an introduction of an intercultural mediator for women from the Albanian-speaking community in two Slovene healthcare institutions, a training course on cultural competence for healthcare workers and a self-evaluation tool for the measurement of the level of equity in the healthcare institutions. Through a critical analysis of these approaches, the authors try to show their advantages and limitations and to conclude this chapter with some considerations for future developments in this field.

Keywords: migrants/refugees, healthcare, Slovenia, obstacles, tools/strategies

Introduction

Heide Castañeda, together with Seth M. Holmes, James Quesada and other anthropologists (2015), suggests that when speaking about migration and health the questions of access to healthcare are the "most common structural factor explored in the literature" (Castañeda et al. 2015: 381). Moreover, the same authors recommend that in order "to make substantive improvements in health outcomes for migrants, migration must be understood as a key social deter-

minant of health in its own right. Migration influences all other social relationships and is a lived experience that directly affects health and well-being" (ibid.: 386).

We argue that, in Slovenia, the "deterioration" of the once almost universal public healthcare system is most visible precisely in relation to migrants' access to healthcare. Research in this field (Rajgelj 2012; Leskošek 2013, 2016; Lipovec Čebron and Pistotnik 2018) shows the gradual encroachment of health rights for a growing number of people, first for migrants/refugees and erased citizens of Slovenia and later for many other social groups (precarious workers, homeless etc.). Different studies thus confirm that the initial diminishment of rights for migrants/refugees in Slovenia was a starting point for the gradual disintegration of the universal healthcare principle, which has in the last two decades lead to the diminishment of rights for other residents. Therefore, we can state that the insufficient and inadequate access to quality healthcare for migrants/refugees in Slovenia is not an exception to the rule. Namely, for some categories of migrants, it is embedded on the systemic level and has been developing from 1991 on, since the independence of Slovenia.

But in what way are the healthcare services insufficient and/or inadequate for this population? What kind of obstacles does it face? In what way could these obstacles be addressed? In the first part of the chapter, we will put attention on some of the crucial obstacles that migrants/refugees face when they search for healthcare in Slovenia. In the second part, we will focus on some possibilities of overcoming these obstacles – namely, changes on a systemic (legal, governmental) level, the introduction of intercultural mediators and interpreters in healthcare institutions, training in cultural competency for healthcare workers and a self-evaluation tool for the measurement of the level of equity in healthcare institutions. The main findings presented in this chapter are based on the research work carried out by an interdisciplinary team (composed of health care professionals, researchers in public health and medical anthropologists) that was part of the project "Towards Better Health and Reducing Inequalities in Health – Together for Health". The project was led by the National Institute of Public Health Slovenia and financed by the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009–2014.[1]

Migrants'/refugees' obstacles in search for health

It is well known that people from so-called marginalized groups are generally at a higher risk of health problems and suffer from more health-related issues (Kraševec 1996; Marmot and Wilkinson 2006; Holtz et al. 2006; Buzeti et al. 2011; Farkaš et al. 2011; Rostila 2013), while also facing more difficulties – due to linguistic, cultural, administrative, financial and other obstacles – when visiting healthcare

[1] We thank the project leader Marija Magajne, MD, MSc, the leader of Work Package–Adults Jožica Maučec Zakotnik, MD, Simona Jazbinšek, Ivanka Huber and Jerneja Farkaš-Lainščak, MD, for all their contributions.

facilities compared to the general population (Marmot and Wilkinson 2006; Rostila 2013). In case of migrants/refugees, these barriers are even more problematic:

> "Although most migrants are healthy when they first arrive in their host country, they risk falling into poorer health compared to that of the average population because of the conditions surrounding the migration process (Smedley et al. 2003). These migrant groups are more vulnerable, due to their lower socio-economic status and the conditions of poverty they abandon are often to be re-encountered in their new host countries. This vulnerability is at times caused by traumatic migration experiences, by the feeling of exclusion in the place of arrival, and often by a lack of adequate social support due to the absence of integration and specific socio-health policies (Mladovsky 2009)." (HPH Task Force MFH 2014: 11–12)

Migrants' and refugees' health is exacerbated by the obstacles they encounter when trying to access health services: they tend to receive lower levels of healthcare compared to host country nationals due to the lack of awareness of services available, the absence of appropriate accessibility to services, and the negative attitude of staff in the delivery of health services (ibid.).

Previous research in Slovenia has confirmed that migrants/refugees often face cultural, linguistic, administrative, economic and other types of barriers within the healthcare system, resulting in lower quality healthcare services and unequal treatment (Brovč et al. 2009; Jazbinšek and Palaić 2009; Bofulin and Bešter 2010; Lipovec Čebron 2010a, 2010b; Bombač et al. 2017; Lipovec Čebron and Pistotnik 2018, etc.).

The inadequacy and poor accessibility of healthcare for migrants/refugees is also reflected in Migrant Integration Policy Index Research (MIPEX), a recently published comparative analysis of migrants' access to healthcare, which ranked Slovenia at the penultimate place among 38 other countries, alongside Croatia and Latvia and far below average even for Central Europe (MIPEX 2015). Similar are the conclusion remarks in the Country Report Slovenia (Ingleby 2017: 23):

> "[F]ew of the incentives that have encouraged many other EU/EFTA countries to adapt their health systems to the presence of migrants are present. In Slovenia, indifference to the special needs of migrants was reinforced by the assumption – not always justified – that since most of them came from former Yugoslav republics, they would experience few linguistic or cultural barriers. […] Although most legal migrants are included in the country's social health insurance system, the burden of additional complementary private insurance to cover co-payments and supplement the basket of services falls disproportionately on those on low wages – which is the situation of most migrants. Little is done to reduce the gap between health services and migrant users, either by adapting the services or signposting the way to them more clearly. As far as measures to achieve change are concerned, migrant health does not appear to be on the government's agenda, although academics and NGOs are active in this field."

International evaluations as well as scientific research therefore show a lack of effort to facilitate access to the healthcare system for migrants/refugees with different legal statuses in Slovenia. Various programs that address these limitations are mostly project-based, and as such cannot replace systemic solutions and/or offer long-term success in this field. However, they at times present a good basis for experimentation with different approaches that could bring some progress towards more inclusive healthcare for this population. One of such projects was "Towards Better Health and Reducing Inequalities in Health – Together for Health". Its general objective was to reduce lifestyle-related chronic non-communicable diseases through upgraded and promoted preventive health programs and to establish new models and approaches that would reduce inequalities in health. The part of the project we are focusing on in this chapter had two phases: the assessment of the needs of various so-called marginalised or vulnerable[2] groups among the Slovene population and the development of tools/strategies aimed at overcoming specific obstacles, which were detected in the assessment.

The findings of the assessment of needs were to some extend comparable to previous research (Brovč et al. 2009; Jazbinšek and Palaić 2009; Bofulin and Bešter 2010; Lipovec Čebron 2010a, 2010b). They were gathered through qualitative research, which was conducted between June and September 2014 in 8 Slovene cities[3] and their surrounding areas and included interviews with 121 individuals (healthcare workers, employees of public health institutions as well as different professionals from the non-governmental sector and users of healthcare services). The research was divided into three topics: first, the identification of vulnerable groups in Slovene healthcare system; second, the description of various legal, administrative and practical obstacles these groups encounter while accessing healthcare services; and third, the identification of possible solutions to overcome these obstacles.

The results of the research have revealed that migrants/refugees were perceived as the most vulnerable group in relation to health and healthcare (other groups that were mentioned were "homeless", "older people", "individuals with drug addictions", "unemployed", "people with mental health problems", "Roma" etc.).[4]

[2] When using the term vulnerable groups we should be careful since the term itself can cause further stigmatisation. Equally justified would be the usage of terms marginalised, excluded etc. In this contribution we will use these terms interchangeably.

[3] Koper, Izola, Ljubljana, Kranj, Sevnica, Novo mesto, Celje, Murska Sobota.

[4] Besides migrants/refugees that were mentioned 31 times, interlocutors identified as "vulnerable group" also "homeless" (24 answers), "older people" (21 answers), "individuals with drug addictions" (17 answers), "unemployed" (17 answers), self-employed and precarious workers (17 answers), "people with mental health problems" (15 answers), "Roma" (14 answers), individuals with handicap (6 answers).

Moreover, the qualitative research showed that among main obstacles migrants/refugees (but also many other individuals from above mentioned groups) face in Slovene healthcare system are:

1. Legal and administrative obstacles in formal access to the public healthcare system:

a) Limited or denied access to compulsory and/or complementary health insurance

The access to Slovene public healthcare system is organized through the health insurance scheme, which provides for two types of health insurance: compulsory and complementary health insurance. Compulsory health insurance,[5] that is the basis for the financing of the healthcare system in Slovenia,[6] is obligatory for Slovene citizens with permanent residence in Slovenia. The majority of Slovene citizens and migrants acquire their health insurance on the basis of employment,[7] children and spouses can be insured as family members, whereas the local communities provide financial resources for socially disadvantaged individuals (citizens and migrants with permanent residence permits).

But compulsory health insurance does not cover all costs of the treatment (full coverage of costs is ensured only for children, pupils and students, up to age 26, who regularly attend school, and in the case of certain diagnoses and conditions) therefore second, complementary health insurance[8] was introduced. This is voluntary and covers the difference between the percentage covered by the compulsory health insurance and the full price of health services. The insurance premium for complementary health insurance is to be paid by an individual (approximately 30 euros per month) and to acquire it, one has to have compulsory health insurance. If a person is lacking complementary health insurance, he/she needs to pay an additional sum out-of-pocket for the majority of medical services.

One of the most important findings of the above-mentioned qualitative research was that the Slovene health insurance scheme results in limited access to public healthcare system for people who are not insured through compulsory and/or complementary health insurance. Namely, some migrants/refugees (for example undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, unemployed persons with temporary residence permit without the legal right to compulsory health insurance) have severely

[5] Compulsory health insurance is provided by the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia, which is a public institution.

[6] In 2014 compulsory health insurance contributions provided 68,1% of the health expenditure (Albreht et al. 2016).

[7] This includes different types of self-employment. Besides, for some categories of people (prisoners, veterans etc.) the legal provisions enable health insurance on other basis but these categories are not prevalent.

[8] The insurance can be arranged at three insurance companies.

limited or denied access to compulsory health insurance so they can access health system only through necessary treatment. Moreover, the interlocutors stressed that migrants/refugees (but also other residents) with low income are in some cases unable to pay contributions for complementary health insurance and as a result avoid visits to healthcare institutions due to fear of additional out-of-pocket sums for treatment (see also Lipovec Čebron et al. 2015; Lipovec Čebron et al. 2016; Lipovec Čebron and Pistotnik 2018).

b) Restriction of the right to necessary treatment

Furthermore, the research confirmed that the right to necessary treatment – in principle accessible to all persons in need of urgent medical assistance on territory of Slovenia – is in some cases breached in practice. According to health legislation in Slovenia, urgent treatment should be free of charge and universally accessible to all people, regardless of their health insurance status.[9] It includes a very limited scope of healthcare rights[10] (reanimation, first aid, etc.), life-sustaining treatment, and prophylaxis (measures designed to preserve health and prevent the spread of the disease). Yet various interlocutors in the qualitative research emphasized that many migrants/refugees experienced being denied access in urgent medical situations. The cause of this selectivity derives also from a series of obstacles that restricts access to necessary treatment and which were repeatedly mentioned in the interviews. First, although the definition of urgent treatment seems to be unambiguous, practise shows that it depends largely on the arbitrary assessment of health workers. As a result, urgent medical assistance varies greatly (ranging from very restrictive to very liberal readings), leading to a potential violation of this right (Lipovec Čebron 2010a; Lipovec Čebron and Pistotnik 2018). Secondly, the right to urgent treatment has been additionally limited due to changed admission guidelines in the last years.[11] This is reflected in the introduction of a rather complicated administrative

[9] Article No. 7 of the Health Care and Health Insurance Act (Zakon o zdravstvenem varstvu in zdravstvenem zavarovanju, ZZVZZ) provides that the Republic of Slovenia must assure financial means directly from the state budget, that are intended for urgent treatment of the people of unknown residence, foreigners from the states that have not signed a bilateral treaty with Slovenia, as well as all foreigners and citizens of Slovenia with permanent residence abroad, who are temporarily staying or travelling through Slovenia and are unable to cover the costs of medical treatment. The Article also mentions other persons who are not included into health insurance system (compulsory health insurance) and are not insured by a foreign health insurance provider/agency.

[10] Immediate treatment after emergent medical assistance, and nursing (wound dressing), prevention of sudden and fatal deteriorations of chronic diseases or health condition that could lead to the severe damage of respective organs and/or their functions, etc. (Article No. 103, Rules on Compulsory Health Insurance – Pravila obveznega zdravstvenega zavarovanja).

[11] *Admission Instructions for Outpatients' Departments and Hospitals in Case of an Urgent Medical Treatment, and Financial Assessment of Medical Services*, Ministry of Health, July 26th 2010.

procedure for issuing a reimbursement claim for costs of the urgent treatment and as a result, the criteria to successfully conclude this procedure are often almost impossible to meet. Thirdly, the right to urgent treatment was further restricted with the provision that implies personal responsibility of the acting doctor, who is required to sign a statement that the treatment was actually necessary and that the performer of medical assistance would, in case this would prove untrue, reimburse unjustified costs of the treatment.[12] These reasons contribute to the tendency among healthcare institutions to try to charge for urgent treatment, even in cases when it should be free of charge. This has become a practice predominantly in case of migrants without health insurance and other vulnerable groups, who are unable to defend their rights and interests due to linguistic, social, economic and other impediments (Lipovec Čebron et al. 2015; Pistotnik and Lipovec Čebron 2015; Lipovec Čebron and Pistotnik 2018).

2. Linguistic and cultural barriers

Besides the officially recognized Italian, Hungarian and Roma minorities, members of many other ethnic groups reside in Slovenia but do not have a status of recognized ethnic minorities. Since the most numerous are from the former Yugoslavia, many Albanians, Croatians, Montenegrins, Serbs, members of ethnic minorities from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia live in different parts of Slovene territory (Kržišnik-Bukić 2008; Klopčič et al. 2003). Even if members of ethnic groups that come from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia and speak languages similar to Slovene (e.g. Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian) do not encounter noticeable linguistic and cultural barriers when accessing healthcare facilities, the same is not necessarily true for many other ethnic groups coming from different countries of African and Asian continent as well as Middle East and the states from the territory of ex-Soviet Union.

In the qualitative research, many healthcare workers admitted they face difficulties in communication with people who speak languages unknown to them. As a result, linguistic and cultural barriers arise hindering communication between the healthcare workers and those migrants/refugees who do not understand Slovene. All of this can lead to inadequate access to healthcare services and insufficient healthcare treatment, posing a risk to the patients' safety. Moreover, some of the healthcare workers emphasized that they received no proper training in this field during their studies or during their work in the healthcare institution. Many interlocutors also stressed the absence of professional intercultural mediators or interpreters in health-

[12] *Amendments to Admission Instructions for Outpatients' Departments and Hospitals in Case of an Urgent Medical Treatment, and Financial Assessment of Medical Services* (*Popravek navodil za sprejem pacientov…* 2010).

care institutions that would be essential for overcoming different linguistic as well as cultural misunderstandings.

Development of tools/strategies to overcome the barriers

The above stated shows that the obstacles migrants/refugees face in the Slovene healthcare system derive from different sources. As such, they create an intertwinement of structural and practical barriers, which results in limited or denied access to health treatment. Therefore, in order to overcome such barriers and enable more universal access to healthcare for migrants/refugees, the solutions should involve the development of various steps addressing different levels of the system. Based on previous experiences in other European countries (Verrept 2008; Ingleby et al. 2012; HPH Task Force MFH 2014; Bagaglia et al. 2014, etc.) a series of different tools/strategies were analysed, elaborated and – some of them – implemented as a pilot experiment within the project "Together for Health". In the continuation of the chapter we will describe four of them. It is important to stress that these tools/strategies should be regarded as the first, and by no means final, steps that would lead to more friendly and inclusive arrangements not just for migrants/refugees but also for other vulnerable groups and population as a whole:

a) Changes of the legislation

A positive aspect of the Slovene health insurance system is its attempt to include the overall majority of the population since only in that way it can maintain its core principle of solidarity (in sense of "young with old, healthy with sick, rich with poor"). But, as we tried to show in the first part of this chapter, the current arrangement is nevertheless leaving some parts of the population uninsured or with more restricted access to compulsory health insurance. This is characteristic not only for some categories of migrants, but increasingly also for other residents of Slovenia (homeless people, precarious workers etc.). In their case, the systemic (legal and administrative) obstacles to accessing the healthcare system can be overcome only with the expansion of the rights of participation in the compulsory health insurance scheme.

In order to address this issues in the framework of the project "Together for Health" an extensive document (*Proposals for Systemic Measures to Facilitate Access to Health Insurance and Health Care for Marginalized Groups*) with a series of proposed improvements of Slovene legislation was prepared. The most important measures proposed in this document were: the establishment of the interdisciplinary and interdepartmental team for the monitoring of the access to healthcare system for vulnerable groups as well as for the research and preparation of systemic measures

aimed at overcoming the barriers in the healthcare system; detection of the number of uninsured persons in Slovenia and the introduction of measures that will reduce their number and respect for the right to urgent treatment free of charge and universally accessible to all people in medical need, regardless of their health insurance status. The proposal included other measures aimed more at specific "vulnerable groups" with the focus of reducing the number of uninsured persons among the weakest segments of the population. In this context, a special measure proposed for the migrant population was to ensure equal access to compulsory health insurance for all categories of migrants and refugees (Pistotnik and Lipovec Čebron 2015).

The document was presented in a series of internal and public meetings (at the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Slovenia, Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia and at various conferences organised by National Institute of Public Health where public health authorities were present) where it received considerable attention, but there is no evidence so far that there will be any systemic improvements in this field. One of the main reasons for this could be that authorities do not follow systematically various changes occurring in the field of access to compulsory health insurance scheme, and instead maintain a persuasion about universally accessible healthcare in Slovenia. Due to lack of systemic effort to recognize that an increasing number of people are having difficulties with entering the healthcare system, many marginalized residents are invisible for different health policies; among others not all uninsured persons are included in national compulsory health insurance statistics. Moreover, none of the national or regional institutes are systematically concerned with their access to healthcare, and healthcare workers are frequently left with no clear guidelines on how to address the patients without insurance or with different scope of health rights (for example on the basis of EU health card, asylum seeker's identification card etc.). To implement at least some of the above mentioned proposals that were presented in the document and to accept the proposals of other initiatives in this field (e.g. *Integracijski paket…* 2012) would mean firstly to recognize the fact that some segments of Slovene population are left uninsured and secondly, a political will to reorganise compulsory health insurance scheme in a more inclusive manner. However, the trends in the last two decades were leaning towards the diminishing of health rights for a growing number of persons and thus show development in the opposite direction.

b) Introduction of the intercultural mediator

The term "intercultural mediator" refers to a person who works in healthcare institutions with the aim of overcoming linguistic and culture barriers and increasing responsiveness to the needs of ethnic minority users (Verrept 2008). Other terms (such as "link worker", "health advocate", "health-care interpreter" and "culture broker") are also used to define similar, but not identical, profiles within

healthcare institutions. These roles vary considerably between different countries and/or projects, ranging from pure language interpreting to culture brokering or providing health education. However, research shows that intercultural mediation and/or interpreting improves communication between users and healthcare professionals, contributes significantly to patient satisfaction and is crucial for providing more culturally sensitive healthcare (Bowen 2001; Angelelli 2008; Valero-Garcés and Matin 2008; Verrept 2008; Schapira et al. 2008; Ingleby et al. 2012; TransKom 2012; Bofulin et al. 2016, etc.). For instance, Hans Verrept (2008: 5) claims that

> "the most important of all the improvements is the fact that intercultural mediators facilitate the exchange of correct and detailed information between health staff and patients. This is a consequence not only of mediator's presence in itself, but also of the fact that patients are less inhibited about telling their stories in the presence of the intercultural mediator (and/or the absence of an informal interpreter, e.g. child or spouse)."

As was already mentioned, the interlocutors in the qualitative research we had carried out within the project "Together for Health" stressed the absence of intercultural mediation/interpreting in their healthcare institutions. Unlike in some countries of the European Union,[13] the Slovene healthcare system doesn't provide any professional intercultural mediation or interpretation. Although many professional interpreters exist, they lack the training for interpreting in a healthcare setting, they are often difficult to reach and their services are too expensive for an average patient. In order to address this important gap, a Declaration concerning the introduction of an intercultural mediation in Slovene healthcare institutions[14] was prepared and signed by eight governmental and non-governmental organizations that are active in the field of migration and health.

Besides, the findings of the qualitative research revealed also that a larger Albanian-speaking community living in the city of Celje experiences a variety of problems when accessing healthcare services, mostly due to linguistic and cultural barriers. The research specifically emphasized the obstacles that women from this community face. To address some of them, an interdisciplinary team of experts decided to pilot the implementation of intercultural mediation for Albanian-speaking women in a healthcare setting. Implementation was carried out between September and December 2015 at the Health promotion centre in the Community health centre Celje and in family medicine Health station Vojnik (also a part of Community health centre Celje).

[13] For instance, in Italy (Farini 2013, 2015; Tomassini 2012), Germany (SpraKum 2017); or Switzerland (TransKom 2012; Panagiotopoulou 2015), see also Gosenca 2017.

[14] Available at: http://www.skupajzazdravje.si/media/standard.in.orodje_web.pdf (last access 15 January 2018).

Despite a restricted time period and a limited number of participants, the results of the evaluation made during the pilot implementation[15] showed that Albanian-speaking women perceived the presence of the intercultural mediator as extremely important and expressed satisfaction with the mediator's work. Moreover, the pilot implementation of intercultural mediation confirmed that health professionals obtained much more reliable data and that patients were able to better understand health professionals as well as express themselves easier and more directly (Lipovec Čebron et al. 2017).

Good results notwithstanding, this pilot implementation raised many questions that should be taken into consideration in case such services are introduced in other healthcare institutions. Comparable to some EU countries (Gosenca 2017), the introduction of an intercultural mediator discussed here was project-based, which meant that the mediator was introduced for a short period of time, for a limited number of patients and only for preventive activities in two Slovene healthcare institutions. Thus we had only touched upon the problem of a lack of adequate mediation/interpretation services for foreign speaking patients and in no way addressed it in a satisfactory manner. Namely, similarly to practice in certain EU countries (ibid.), the experience in Celje indicates that, in order to provide adequate service in the future, there is a significant need to clearly define the tasks of an intercultural mediator as well as to organize a long-term training for intercultural mediators (in the field of medical terminology, interpreting etc.) and to enable their professionalization (certification) in Slovenia.

c) Training in cultural competency for healthcare workers

Similar to intercultural mediation, cultural competency is also a rather new concept in a Slovenian context. Cultural competence was developed in certain multiethnic countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, Great Britain, USA) in the middle of the 20th century as an approach that helps to understand and interact with persons from cultures, ethnic or social groups other than one's own. The concept was first promoted by health care professionals who recognized the importance of being

[15] Evaluation was carried out in both healthcare facilities in which intercultural mediation was implemented. Firstly, it was focused on three health education workshops, organized by the Health promotion centre Celje, where the intercultural mediator was present immediately after each workshop. Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire in Albanian evaluating the program: all questions were closed, with only a limited range of answers. Secondly, a similar questionnaire was used for the evaluation of individual preventive check-ups in family Health station Vojnik that were also carried out with a help of the mediator. Likewise the questionnaires were distributed immediately after each examination. The analysis of questionnaires was supplemented with interviews conducted with key persons involved in the implementation of intercultural mediation (intercultural mediator and healthcare workers).

able to communicate effectively with migrant workers and other migrants/refugees. However, the notion of cultural competence is not focused exclusively on migrant/refugee patients, since it includes the sensible treatment of all persons who, due to their social, economic or cultural background, encounter problems with access to healthcare institutions or within them (Betancourt et al. 2002). Research shows that culturally competent healthcare has many advantages and a significant impact on health outcomes and well-being of everyone involved in a health treatment. On one hand, it gives users more confidence and facilitates their contacts with health professionals, increases their compliance with medical advice, decreases the frequency of consequences of improper use of medicines and improves the health literacy of the population. On the other hand, health workers make fewer mistakes in determining diagnoses, provide better quality health care and, in general, carry out the work more effectively (Beach et al. 2008; Lehman et al. 2012; Bofulin et al. 2016).

As our interlocutors emphasized, during their studies (at medical faculties and faculties of health sciences) as well as during their professional careers, there was no specific training that would prepare healthcare workers for work in a culturally and ethnically diverse healthcare setting. As a response to this lack that was commonly raised in the interviews during the qualitative research, an interdisciplinary team designed and organized a 20-hour cultural competency training that took place between January and July 2015 in three Slovene healthcare centres (Vrhnika, Sevnica, Celje), and in which 51 healthcare workers participated. For the purpose of this training, a handbook titled *Cultural Competency and Healthcare. Handbook for Developing Cultural Competency for Healthcare Workers* was published.[16] The training consisted of interactive lectures and workshops on different topics (including migration and health, migrants'/refugees' access to healthcare and other obstacles that migrants/refugees face in healthcare institutions) and was carried out by an interdisciplinary team of medical anthropologists, sociologists, social workers, medical doctors and researchers in public health. It is important to stress that, in the process of the development of the training, the project team analysed educational models from different countries, but the final curriculum was organized as an independent and locally-sensitive model of training.

Although the training was evaluated[17] as useful and important for a more sensitive approach towards users from different cultural and social backgrounds, there are several limitations to it. Firstly, among different profiles of health workers participating in the training, no medical doctor attended. Secondly, since the training

[16] The handbook is available in Slovene language: http://www.nijz.si/sl/publikacije/kulturne-kompetence-in-zdravstvena-oskrba-prirocnik-za-razvijanje-kulturnih-kompetenc (last access 15 January 2018).

[17] Evaluation took place at the end of the training as a group discussion as well as through questionnaires that were distributed after each day of training.

lasted only 20 hours, many topics couldn't be presented or discussed in-depth and thirdly, the training was, for practical reasons, carried out in a classroom and thus without the possibility of developing skills in everyday practice.

In the future, it would be essential to integrate the contents of this and other similar trainings into undergraduate and postgraduate education programmes for health professionals. In this way, a necessary continuity of such education could be provided, but at the same time certain contents could be upgraded with more practical work that was lacking in pilot training. Moreover, in addition to the developed training in cultural competency for practising health professionals that covers basic topics in this field, it seems meaningful to put more attention on supplementary education on specific topics (for example connected with certain groups within the population, e.g. healthcare rights for unaccompanied minors, LGBTIQ etc. or with specific issues, e.g. perinatal care in different cultural contexts, genital mutilation and reproductive health etc.) as is the practice in some EU countries (Bagaglia et al. 2014).

d) Standard for equity in healthcare for migrants and other "vulnerable groups"

As stated in the introduction of the chapter, experiences in different EU countries show that "health organizations find themselves increasingly faced with the specific vulnerability of migrants who run a greater risk of not receiving adequate service in diagnosis, care and prevention because of their minority status, their socioeconomic position, communication difficulties and lack of familiarity with health systems" (HPH Task Force MFH 2014: 12). Therefore, it seems essential that a response to these problems is part of a larger institutional response. To further address the issue of all-embracing inequity in healthcare detected in the qualitative research, a project team translated the *Standard for Equity in Health Care for Migrants and Other "Vulnerable Groups"* and adapted it to the Slovene context[18] (Chiarenza et al. 2016). The Standard was developed by Task Force on Migrant-Friendly and Culturally Competent Healthcare (TF MFCCH) and is aimed at monitoring and measuring equity in healthcare for certain populations as well as at "providing the opportunity for staff and services to question what they do, why they do it, and whether it can be done better" (HPH Task Force MFH 2014: 7). The preliminary standards have been pilot-tested and evaluated by 45 healthcare organizations from 12 countries (including Slovenia) in 2012. A part of this Standard is a self-assessment tool for healthcare institutions with which they are encouraged to evaluate the level of equity and inclusion that they are providing in relation to migrants/refugees and other marginalized groups (ibid.). It is composed of a set of questions in the fields

[18] The Standard is available at: http://www.skupajzazdravje.si/media/standard.in.orodje_web.pdf (last access 15 January 2018).

ranging from equity in policy and management to equity in care services and promotion of health.

Although the Standard and Self-assessment tool were conceptually and linguistically adapted to the Slovene context and were promoted in public and internal meetings with the authorities, no significant interest for it was shown from healthcare institutions in Slovenia. As stated above, Slovene authorities do not (fully) acknowledge the increasing number of residents who have limited access to the healthcare system in Slovenia. Since this problem remains neglected on a national level, it is not surprising that no motivation for a self-evaluation on this topic exists by health institutions at a local level. The experience with the implementation of this tool therefore opened a following question: if the optional use of the Standard and Self-assessment tool did not give the predicted results, what outcomes could we expect if it were to be introduced as an obligatory practice?

Conclusion

We stated at the beginning of the chapter that the "deterioration" of once almost universal public healthcare system in Slovenia is most visible in the obstacles migrants/refugees encounter in their search for health. Besides the obstacles analysed here there are various others, for example health issues related to migrants/refugees social status and the level of poverty; to work conditions and exposures to different health risks; to psychological problems connected with discrimination and lack of successful integration policies etc. Different medical anthropologists and other experts (Horton 2004; Fassin 2014; Castañeda et al. 2015; Flynn et al. 2015 etc.) had extensively researched these and other structural factors that directly or indirectly cause the ill health of migrants'/refugees' population. Among the most explored is certainly the question of access to healthcare. However, far less academic attention is dedicated to the research of the tools/strategies with which these obstacles could be or are addressed and/or surmounted – little is known about the methodology used to implement them, evaluation of the process of the implementation or the results that different approaches brought. With this in mind, we tried to present in our contribution the activities of the project "Together for Health".

In conclusion, it is important to stress some final considerations. Firstly, there is a common temptation to simply "copy-paste" a model of best practice from one region to another. In many cases, this approach shows to be narrow-minded and inefficient. Our anthropological knowledge prevented us from making such a mistake and all four approaches described above were carefully prepared according to local needs and expectations. Secondly, the role of anthropologists in the interdisciplinary team seems to be indispensable not only for an understanding of a local context, which is needed for the pilot implementation of a certain approach, but

also in all other phases of the project work: from introducing qualitative methods as the basis to design and evaluate the project's outcomes to choosing a specific group and location for a pilot implementation (e.g. Albanian-speaking women in the city of Celje). Thirdly, during the last three years of work in this field, we have learned that improvements should always include a series of possible approaches, ranging from those that address changes in national legislation and organisation of healthcare system to those that are focused on a local level and respect specific needs of a particular community. Namely, the project has shown that intercultural mediation cannot be regarded as an efficient tool for addressing linguistic and cultural obstacles without the extensive training of healthcare workers in cultural competency and without the active engagement of healthcare institutions on all levels in diminishing of health inequities among the population. On the basis of the positive results of the project "Together for Health" in all three pilot environments, a nation-wide project was planned, which is expected to include 25 environments from 2018 onwards. The future will show what kind of new challenges this larger and upgraded project will bring.

Lastly, as mentioned above one of the biggest drawbacks of our work was – as is the case with most projects – that it was short-lived and not aimed at systemic changes in the healthcare system. Thus we can rightly ask ourselves: what is the meaning of such projects? Who benefits from them? Do they have any lasting influence? Short-term, highly specialized projects without long-term effects have become part of daily life and their normalized inefficiency seems to be just another neoliberal strategy for maintaining the status quo in society through mediation of social tensions and potential conflicts. However, the question remains: do we, as researchers, have the possibility and motivation to change this trend?

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"Managing" the Polyphony
The Discourse of Fraud and Epistocracy in the Context of Migration

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This paper discusses the struggles of differently positioned social and political groups to establish authority over narrations in relation to contemporary migration processes toward the EU. Deriving from Malkki's determination of voice, as the "ability to establish narrative authority over one's own circumstances and future, and, also, the ability to claim an audience" (1996: 398) and act upon, the paper deals with the question of credibility and disqualification of certain voices. It focuses on two discursive mechanisms: the silencing of migrants' voices by the establishment of disqualifying discourse of fraud on the one side and epistocracy, the appraisal of credibility of voices of privileged groups, on the other.

Keywords: voice, migrants, discourse of fraud, epistocracy, credibility

Introduction[1]

The aftermath of the last "summer of migration" (see Kasparek 2016; Kallius 2016; Beznec at al. 2016; Bužinkić and Hameršak 2017) shows an increase of securitarian attempts of the EU as a political body to subject migration to the enhanced control of physical movement both externally, at the territories of third countries, as well as internally, within the borders of the EU member states. The media, but also international and local NGOs, all report on the appalling conditions in which migrants live[2] and relay the testimonies and observations of the

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[2] *Daily Mail* 10 January 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4107102/Belgrade-migrants-wait-food-pictures-similar-Second-World-War.html; *Independent* 22 April 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-chios-hilton-inside-the-refugee-camp-that-makes-prison-look-like-a-five-star-hotel-a6996161.html; *Telegraph* 15 March 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/15/dunkirk-migrant-camp-must-dismantled-soon-possible-like-calais/ (last access 19 October 2017).

effects of violence they are subjected to by formal and informal groups in "buffer" and member-states[3].

This awareness however, has not led to any change in practice. On the contrary, it seems that a securitarian tone of migration policy, with all its mechanisms of migration "deterrence", has gained increasing approval not only in the wider public, but is also gradually gaining support in national laws (Gunesh et al. 2016).[4] This text discusses some of the structural factors that are supporting the lack of reaction of the host society toward the everyday difficulties faced by migrants.

In particular, I will discuss discursive mechanisms that shape the discussion on migration from politically and/or economically devastated countries in Asia and Africa, to the wealthier, economically and politically privileged locations in Europe.[5] I will focus on *fraudulence*, as one of the dominant qualifications which speakers from the receiving countries ascribe to *migrants* and their *intentions*. The presumption of migrants' fraudulence can be found in informal accounts, such as in everyday narratives, in media reports, political debates, but also at the basis of some legal acts. The pervasiveness of the *discourse of fraud* bears important consequences on migration practice and lives of migrants: it diminishes their credibility and imprints dishonesty onto their activities. On the other side, the ability to make a judgment of someone's credibility corresponds to the notion of *epistocracy*, the privileged position to produce accounts which are likely to be accepted as truths. The authority, that is, juridical power of producing taken-to-be-truths, bears heavily on the socio-political position of the speaker and the role the speaker has in the concrete situation, which can even predetermine what can be said at all and how what is said can be understood in the final instance. The socio-political position profoundly affects ability to present and to be represented, to be trusted or derogated, and thus may increase or hinder possible perlocutionary outcomes of narrations (on perlocution, the effect that *saying something* has on non-linguistic world, see Austin 1962: 101).

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[3] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 2016, http://www.msf.org/en/article/eu-migration-crisis-update-june-2016; UNHCR interactive data, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean; UNHCR 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/3/58be80454/unhcr-deeply-concerned-hungary-plans-detain-asylum-seekers.html (last access 19 October 2017).

[4] Amnesty International 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/hungary-refugees-blocked-by-forces-criminalized-by-laws/; see, for example, recent changes of legislation in Slovenia: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/slovenia-amendments-to-aliens-act-denies-protection-to-refugees/ and Hungary: http://www.helsinki.hu/en/hungary-law-on-automatic-detention-of-all-asylum-seekers-in-border-transit-zones-enters-into-force-despite-breaching-human-rights-and-eu-law/ (last access19 October 2017).

[5] In the text, the term "migrants" is used irrespective of persons' administrative statuses. The other terms – "refugees", "economic migrants", "asylum seekers", etc. – are presented as found in the discussed narrations.

In more general terms, I will re-present discursive mechanisms of struggles of differently positioned social and political groups to make their interpretations of various aspects of contemporary migration processes toward the EU recognized and acted upon. In other words, I will deal with the problem of *voice*. Malkki identified voice as the "ability to establish narrative authority over one's own circumstances and future, and, also, the ability to claim an audience" (1996: 398). Voice is thus seen as an ultimate performative, which aims to make changes in the current state of affairs. As with any performative, in order to be realized, it needs to fulfil formal conditions: the subjects, those who speak, have to hold certain positions which give them ability not only to speak, but also to be *up-taken*, heard and acted upon (on performatives see Austin 1962). The notion of voice is embedded within the notion of power and social stratification. O'Donnell defined two dimensions of voice: the horizontal one, which induces solidarity within a social stratum, and the vertical one, related either to protesting against the powerful ones or imposing force from the above (O'Donnell 1986).

Long-lasting reflections of the role of the *interpretative authorities*, as those who represent others, have shaped anthropological inquiry (Clifford 1988). The questions which arose in the debates concerning notion of voice in anthropology and related disciplines, about "privileged informants", objectivity and bias, distinction between accounts given by amateurs or professionals, are highly relevant not only for contemporary migration research but also for migrants' lives. Therefore, this paper emphasizes the question of socio-political contingency of credibility and examination of the dominant factors which affect it in order to indicate structural asymmetry between various groups. It shows that, besides principal division to hosts and migrants, which is predominately based on citizenship, there exist numerous subdivisions based on micro-identifications, mostly related to professional occupation and the institution/organization a person works for. This asymmetry leverages their voices, the ability of being represented, listened to and acted upon, resulting not in polyphony, but in the overrepresentation of interpretations of some groups and the silencing of the others.

The paper is structured as follows: through an analysis of corresponding examples from Serbian and international media, reports of NGOs, scientific literature (all to be specified in the text) and informal narratives obtained during the multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork conducted on several occasions in Serbia from 2012 to 2017, I will first describe the prominent elements of the fraud discourse, one of the mechanisms of disqualification of contestants for authority over narrations; then I will describe how *fraud* transcends from depicting certain intrinsic characteristic of persons, to depiction of a whole set of their actions, which serves as self-justification of the initial disqualification; then I will say something about epistocracy, a systemic position of an *a priory* recognized interpretation authority. In the end, I will con-

clude about the fundamentally monologue-based structure of epistocracy, which systematically deprives certain groups of voice.

The credibility games: derogatory potential of the fraud discourse and uncontested interpretation authority of epistocracy

While researching narratives about migration, I discovered a set of similar notions pertaining to something that can be labelled as fraud discourse (on fraud discourse and migration see Haynes et al. 2010; Power at al. 2012). In Serbia, as well as elsewhere in Europe, it was very common to hear or read narrations that questioned the intentions of migrants: *fake asylum seekers*, for example, were perceived as those who used the asylum system as a means for achieving something other than international protection, either as a way to enter a country, legalize their stay, or take advantage of various benefits it could bring, including "pocket money", free accommodation, food, money for voluntary return, etc. Similarly, *bogus refugees* were perceived as those who pretended to be running from wars in their countries of origin, and who did not appear to be "really vulnerable" (Molnar Diop 2014; Neumayer 2005). The dis-vulnerability sometimes was ascribed to their gender, age and general appearance (they were "too male", too young, fit, strong, happy, determined), sometimes it was ascribed to their "true" nationality (they were seen as pretending to be from war torn countries, while they had "actually" been members of militant groups, government, terrorists, etc.).

The fraud assumption, which equals calculated dishonesty in order to get some advantage (Eggers 2009), transgresses from public discourse into the administrative and legal one and back, where the claims for asylum are examined on the basis whether they are or not *genuine* enough to be admitted into a country, to enter the asylum procedure or to be granted protection. In cases where the right to asylum had been denied, on any level, formal or informal, that is, in institutional or in general public narratives, migrants had been labelled as *unwanted economic migrants*, "those who chose to migrate, in order to improve their lives", "those who would steal our jobs", "those who would work for such small salaries, that even our salaries would be reduced". However, some of them had further been deemed *fake economic migrants*, "since they did not come to actually work, they came because of the welfare system in our state", "to live for free and receive benefits", "to take from the well without replenishing it" (the growing literature on these narratives includes Schierup et al. 2015; Anderson 2013; Costello and Freedland 2014; Kalm and Johansson 2015). We see that both in general public discourse, as well as in institutionalized asylum system, examination of migrants "real intentions" plays an important role.

The fraud discourse, which constructs migrants as a specific, unified group notably characterized as fraudulent, is not contained to simply labelling persons:

it transgresses personal characterizations and becomes attached to a set of activities that migrants *do*: so we read about "asylum shopping" (which implies that migrants are *calculating* in which state to file asylum claim log, thus disrespecting the rules and narrations of the Common European Asylum System which sees all EU states' asylum systems as equal; on asylum shopping see Moore 2013), strategic lying in order to get asylum or benefits; abusing the asylum system or hospitality of the receiving state, etc. Fraud is thus the fundamental paradigm which can be abstracted from particular qualifications of migrants and their activities. Therefore, it can be seen as a form of conceptual metaphor (on conceptual metaphor/metaphorical concept see Lakoff and Johnson 2003). Metaphorizing is a procedure of abstraction through which the expression used as metaphor loses its reference to an individual object and takes on a general value by giving prominence to one of its possible attributes and thus it hides its other possible aspects (Ricoeur 1994: 107). One of the significant features of metaphorizing is that the abstraction and paradigmatic relations result in systematization of experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 19). Similarly, through the process of abstraction, which accentuates fakeness, dishonesty and hidden intentions and mitigates other possible expressions, migrants are constructed as substantially fraudulent. Furthermore, within the course of developments of the discourse of fraud, characteristics that have initially been related to a part of migrants as a distinct group are now beginning to apply to the whole group.

The host society does the speaking, *re-presenting* migrants and their activities, while migrants are primarily objects of talk, and are deprived of their own voice. The transgressional derogatory potential of the discourse of fraud generates semantically related effects which result in the diminished credibility of migrants as a distinct group. They are not only silenced initially and turned into objects of talk, but also any future attempt to present their own voice, to become subjects of talk, will be covered with this additional layer of meaning – *even as subjects they cannot be trusted*. There are many examples that testimonies of migrants about abuse performed by institutions and individuals, from transit and destination countries as well as from their countries of origin, are not considered as trustworthy by the officials or are being disapproved as being a part of some "hidden agenda".

One of the better known examples happened near Farmakonisi island in Greece, in January 2014, when 11 persons died.[6] The survivors accused the coast guard, employed in Frontex mission Poseidon, for being responsible for not undertaking the rescue mission of the women and children that fell in the

[6] Group of lawyers for the rights of migrants and refugees offers detailed description here: http://omadadikigorwnenglish.blogspot.rs/2014/08/briefing-on-farmakonisi-boat-wreck.html (last access 19 October 2017).

water after the boat capsized due to the pushback actions of the coast guard. The authorities dropped the investigation in August 2014 stating that the testimonies from the survivors were – unfounded (Group of lawyers for the rights of migrants and refugees 2014). The nongovernmental organizations point to a series of cover ups, including the alternation of the chronological sequence of the incident and the lack of any technical recordings, such as phone or radio calls, photos, videos, GPS coordinates, as if the incident had never happened (ibid.). In the context of Serbia, in March 2015 Human Rights Watch issued a report about police abuse towards migrants, which was denied by the police and Commissariat, and even no investigation was opened.[7] Thus, not only had the testimonies of migrants been ignored and presented as fraudulent, but also the intentions of the international organization which published the report, were presented as having a "hidden agenda", or even as part of some wider conspiracy, directed against state institutions which were accused of misconduct. The latter development can only partially be related to the derogatory potential of the discourse of fraud. The representation of distrust ascribed to counterpartyed authorial voices (see Clifford 1988: 43) by groups from the host society indicates that identifications other than migrants/hosts can also serve as bases for derogations. However, it is concentrated on the fundamental relation whether counterparties do or do not trust migrants, or, rather, whether counterparties recognize (allow) or ignore (do not allow) manifestation and the up-take of migrants' voices. The fact that they are in position to allow or not allow manifestations and up-takes of migrants' voices undoubtedly indicates asymmetry in power relations.

The struggles of differently positioned social and political groups to establish authority over narrations which re-present migrants in this or that manner is ubiquitous. The "hidden agenda" narrative, applied to disqualify counterpartyed groups from this struggle, is pervasive: it is attached not only to migrants, but also to the organizations that help them. In the Serbian context, one of the most "denounced" actors is No borders Serbia.[8] No borders is an activist framework stating that all persons are equal and all should be able to travel on equal basis, and it is against divisions, injustices, racism, fascism, structural violence. Its main operational objective is to enable migrants' voices to be articulated, heard and acted upon. According to some of the state actors and civil society organizations, this network is often presented as an organized, almost militant group of people that is actively working against the asylum system and is thought to be directly responsible for several protests of

[7] A detailed account is available at: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/posle-izvestaja-hrw-da-li-su-migranti-na-udaru-srpske-policije/26957629.html (last access 19 October 2017).

[8] The site of No borders Serbia is available at: https://noborderserbia.wordpress.com/about/ (last access 19 October 2017).

migrants.[9] Similarly as Soros, Rothschild or "Islamic State" leaders are, according to some conspiracy theories that I encountered in media and interviews, paying each migrant ten thousand of euros to come into Europe,[10] "anarchists" from No borders are said to be orchestrated by undisclosed foreigners to manipulate migrants just to produce chaos and make problems to national institutions and nongovernmental organizations trying to manage migration according to the law.[11]

However, the pursuits of "hidden agenda" do not come only from outside Serbia: the official data, especially about the "number of migrants", "number of terrorists among the migrants" and "infectious diseases which the migrants carry", given by governmental institutions and international organizations are in some contexts considered as being misleading by the local population. For example, during the protests in Banja Koviljaca in 2011 (see Stojić Mitrović 2014), against the presence of migrants in the town, the protesters repeated that the governmental institutions were hiding the "true" scale of "threats" that migrants carried, in order to pacify the residents, and to pursue Serbia's EU obligations. In a series of protests across Serbia over the course of six years, local residents expressed distrust towards national institutions and their capability in "taming" migration and protecting its own citizens.

From the above examples, we can see some general features of the fraud discourse: it is related to deception conducted in order to obtain some personal gain and it is intentional. Effects of this kind of fraud, that is, threats that are seen to possibly arise from it, are potential, pending, i.e. have not become manifest yet. However, they are seen as targeting the existing order, public services and public servants working "in good faith", "our" welfare state, "real refugees", citizens, and finally, "our way of life". Fraud discourse does not concentrate on actual harm made to the "deceived" ones, but on dishonest intentions (Eggers 2009). Above all, it is the attack on the moral order; it serves to degrade moral standards of the group that is targeted as making a fraud. As credibility is ascribed not only to what a subject speaks, but also in accordance with her social position and concrete status, the fraud

[9] *Politika* 4 October 2016, http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/364951/Mars-migranata-ka-granici-Evropske-unije; *Blic* 4 October 2016, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/migranti-prave-haos-u-beogradu-pod-jakom-policijskom-pratnjom-zaustavljaju-saobracaj/q58tgsy (last access 19 October 2017).

[10] See, for example: http://www.kurir.rs/planeta/austrijski-mediji-rotsild-pokrenuo-seobu-migranata-sve-izbeglice-dobile-po-11000-evra-clanak-1909805; https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/analize/20151003110001530 6-soros-izbeglice-naseljavanje-evropa/; http://www.novi-svjetski-poredak.com/2017/03/08/otkriveno-islamska-drzava-placa-maloljetnim-migrantima-put-u-europu-ako-je-oni-prihvate-unistiti/ (last access 19 October 2017).

[11] In Serbia: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:628302-Anarhisti-pokrenuli-migrante-iz-Beograda-FOTO; in Greece: http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/anarhisti-prekinuli-misu-zbog-izbjeglica; in France: http://mondo.rs/a950320/Info/Svet/Neredi-u-Kaleu-Izbeglice-i-anarhisti-pale-kamp.html (last access 19 October 2017).

discourse is thus an instrument of epistemic discrimination conducted in favour of those with more political power (on epistemic discrimination and epistemic oppression see Fricker 2013). The operationalization of the fraud discourse by which the credibility of certain interpretations is eroded, serves as a weapon in the struggle for domination of the confronted groups. In other words, the position to which some individuals and groups are ascribed to within the socio-political system, determines the credibility which would be given to their interpretations.

While the derogatory potential of the transgressing fraud discourse serves to shrink space for manifestation, diminish credibility and buffer audibility of certain voices, epistocracy, on the other side, enables instalment of *truths*. Epistocracy is determined as the privilege of some groups to produce and distribute knowledge (Estlund 2003). Epistocracy privileges some people over others with the aim of generating outcomes of better epistemic quality (Prijić-Samaržija 2014: 1172–1173).

In the context of migration, where different actors, national, international, private, etc. compete for power, public sympathy and funds, we encounter two major principles of epistocracy: "expertialization" and "(eurocentric) nationalization of truth". To put it very concretely, it is more likely that the interpretations offered by experts or persons professionally involved within migration process, such as lawyers, administrators, police, etc., would be treated as more credible than interpretations of certain events or situations offered by activists, independent volunteers, individuals and other non-professional practitioners, while migrants are at the very bottom of the *trust spectrum*. Prijić-Samaržija emphasizes that knowledge needs to be considered as a socially situated phenomenon (2014: 1167). Besides testimonial injustice, which is conducted by ascription of credibility deficit to the speaker, credibility excess can also lead to testimonial injustices by causing epistocrat "to develop epistemic arrogance rendering him closed-minded, dogmatic and blithely impervious to criticism" (ibid.: 1171).

One example concerns a private company, to which two German states outsourced the management of several refugee shelters. Even though refugees complained that they were ill-treated, humiliated and intimidated by the staff, the abuse was acknowledged only when emails sent between staff members leaked. In these emails, the staff discussed what to do with a large financial donation. Instead of buying a children's sandbox, the director suggested getting a "child guillotine" and to get the "maximally pigmented" refugees do the cleaning up. Other employees discussed a crematorium for the decapitated. After the emails leaked, the company was fired.[12] Another example comes from Serbia: for years, migrants complained about the manner in which one administrator ran the asylum centre in Bogovadja.

[12] *Deutsche Welle* 15 August 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/berlin-cuts-ties-with-refugee-housing-firm-after-unspeakable-emails/a-19476506 (last access 19 October 2017).

There was a series of media articles, NGO reports, even protests by migrants, activists and local residents, but only when the partner organization, with a similar standing in the Serbian socio-political context, filed official complaint, he was quietly removed.[13] It appears that it is necessary that both the "accuser" and "the accused" hold the same or at least similar socio-political position to have the effect of "hearing" each other and acting correspondingly. On the other hand, when the socio-political position and power is very different, we witness silence. For example, police abuse reported by migrants and published in the report of Human Rights Watch,[14] which I mentioned before, or daily reports about violence in Bulgaria and Hungary, the political actors with juridical power simply seam to ignore.[15]

As there exists pervasive distrust among differently positioned host groups, matters of profession, affiliation and nationality of the speaker serve as the ultimate basis for the assessment of credibility. The official migration management in Serbia (and the EU) is largely shaped according two "credibility principles": "expertialisation" is related to the general technocratic trend when reports given by professional practitioners are recognized as value-neutral and purely factual (compare Holst 2012: 47). The credibility excess stems from the assumption that training and experience of expert reduces contingency of narration (Clifford 1988: 34). Experts are believed to be adequately trained for making reliable assessments, with the *a priori* accepted premise that the training had been completed and accomplished well, that norms had been fulfilled, that they had been well established and that the experts had managed to remain unbiased. On the contrary, expert accounts often serve to support policies by providing them with legitimacy – demonstrating that one has know-how, has the access to information that is considered reliable, has the material and human resources to gather information, and has the established protocols of utilizing, all serve to boost legitimacy (Boswell 2009: 70). In practice, experts are trained to pay attention to certain clues and ignore others: in ritualized texts, such as official reports, they are construing a reality, giving accounts filled with data suitable for the client (Clifford 1988). While these norms, routines and standards do help keep them focused and concise, they also reduce the range of possible actions, interpretations and recognition of unexpected factors and relations.

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[13] *Novosti* 16 August 2015, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:543727-CK-Sjekloca-ugrozava-rad-azila (last access 19 October 2017).

[14] Human Rights Watch report on Serbia 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/serbia-police-abusing-migrants-asylum-seekers (last access 19 October 2017).

[15] FRA report on Current Migration Situation in the EU: Hate Crime, November 2016, https://www.google.rs/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjG-On34-zSAhUMJ5oKHcpaBdgQFggkMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffra.europa.eu%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Ffra_uploads%2Ffra-2016-november-monthly-focus-hate-crime_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEtd6RR69JEXd5WQoxSF6rw-F5Pow&sig2=sBubIY5YdHZYLPoskm4ZTA&bvm=bv.150475504,d.bGs (last access 19 October 2017).

While reports given by professionals are likely to be given credibility excess, on the other side, reports offered by non-professional practitioners are treated as likely to be value-laden (Holst 2012: 47). However, reports made by both categories of practitioners are seen as more objective than those made by migrants. Migrants are often recognized as those in serious need of epistemic paternalism, "social practice of communication control or a regulation of information that aims towards optimal truth-production" (Prijić-Samaržija 2014: 1173). Epistemic paternalism involves speaking for persons that are to be represented, but not letting them speak for themselves. While this can be emancipatory in the way that it enables at least some kind of representation for otherwise underrepresented or even invisible groups, it can also be seen as further deprivation of agency and subjectivity and political subordination of these groups (compare Rivetti 2014).

The nationality of the speaker has a notable role in credibility accession. Besides the host/migrants division, in the Serbian official context, value neutral and purely factual are those assessments offered by national and official European institutions (for example, in order to induce credibility excess, a professor from Belgrade, during a public lecture on migration and security which was held in spring 2017, told the audience: "I will give you real data, provided by national institutions, the data that will be presented in Brussels, and not the data from some nongovernmental organizations or those you can find on the internet"), value-laden are those offered by nongovernmental organizations especially with foreign funding (such as, for example, Human Rights Watch or Doctors Without Borders), while reports made by international activists are mostly ignored.

Conclusions

In this text, I discussed some of the struggles of differently positioned social and political groups to establish authority over narrations in relation to contemporary migration processes toward the EU. In particular, I examined the question of credibility and disqualification of certain voices. Based on Malkki's determination of voice, as the "ability to establish narrative authority over one's own circumstances and future, and, also, the ability to claim an audience" (1996: 398) and act upon, I indicated some of the elements of the socio-political context which substantially influence audibility, that is, the potential of narrations of certain groups to be acknowledged and lead to possible perlocutionary effects. I focused my presentation on two discursive mechanisms: the first one is silencing of migrants' voices by the establishment of disqualifying discourse of fraud; the second one is epistocracy, the appraisal of credibility of voices of privileged groups. Therefore, this research did not deal only with the literal content of what is being said, but with the more pragmatic level where additional layers of meaning had been derived from contextual

circumstances of speaking, and especially from the role of the speaker, perceived as a subject occupying a specific socio-political position.

Migrants, as ultimately foreign and without any direct political influence, are inherently voiceless, until some other political actors speak for them. In the Bogovadja example, they often refused to testify or even give an interview to NGOs in order to "avoid problems", such as staying in Serbia longer than just transiting as fast as possible, or arriving on bad terms with those on whom they were dependant on everyday basis. Structurally deprived of voice, silenced, they cannot speak against fraud discourse in which they are inscribed by the more powerful actors and ruling system of inequalities. Epistocracy thus allows only monologue-based structure: those "on top" address their subjects and allow very little vertical voice, and the little of it they allow is strictly controlled; furthermore, they forbid the dialogical structure entailed by horizontal voice (O'Donnell 1986: 13). This results not only in the suppression of the specifically public dimension of the subjects, but also in the severe loss of their subjectivity – they are not to be trusted, their speech is not to be heard, their interpretations are *a priori* invalid (Clifford 1988). If their horizontal voice is obstructed, solidarity is prevented and their combined vertical potential is hindered/suppressed. In other words, denial of a credible voice is a political denial, and in extension, it is a denial of agency, denial of subjectivity. On the other hand, as a political instrument, epistocracy by reduction of polyphony fortifies the privileged positions of the ruling elites.

To conclude, fraud discourse, and its opposite, epistocracy, both have substantial political value. They are potent, both in political and in practical terms, since they can serve as means of justification for the implementation or rejection of certain practices. As a political instrument, fraud discourse is the manifestation of generalized systemic violence toward the dis-favoured social categories, foreigners and citizens alike. As a result, questioning migrants as a collective rather than individuals legitimizes the introduction of even stricter securitarian policies.

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Economic Activities and Agency of "Love-Driven" International Migrants in the City of Zagreb

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The chapter targets a specific population of foreign nationals in the capital city of Zagreb: well educated, highly skilled, young and middle aged immigrants of both sexes, from all over the world, who have been driven to the city by love/partnership. Based on encounters and interviews with such persons, as well as an analysis of foreign immigrants' Facebook pages, it analyses systemic constraints on migrants' agency and entrepreneurship.

Keywords: international skilled migration, love-driven migrants, agency, entrepreneurship, Zagreb

> "I feel Croatia is like a relationship: there is that one guy you really liked but you knew he had way too many issues. You knew, I can't carry that baggage. If I step into this, I'm on this upper trajectory, and that guy is going to bring me down." (M., February 2016, excerpt from an interview)

Croatia has traditionally been an emigration country. Though to this day it remains one – emigration being on the rise in the current decade (see Župarić-Iljić 2016 for an assessment) – this chapter is about foreign nationals who *im*migrate to Croatia. It targets a specific population of foreign nationals in the capital city of Zagreb: well-educated, highly skilled, young and middle aged immigrants of both sexes, from all over the world, for whom economic and financial considerations are not primary driving motivations for migration. Their most common reason of arrival is partnership with a Croatian person, hence the name proposed for this mobility: love-driven mobility. The chapter, which analyses migrants' agency and entrepreneurship in Zagreb, is based on encounters and interviews with such persons as well as an analysis of foreign immigrants' Facebook pages.

The research has been conducted within the framework of the project "City-making: space, culture and identity".[1] The project focuses on the transformations

[1] The project is funded by the Croatian Science Foundation, 2014–2018, project no. 2350. The presentation of the project draws from the project proposal, see www.citymaking.eu.

and restructuring currently taking place in the Croatian capital, Zagreb. A research hypothesis is that city-making in Zagreb is a result of a set of intertwined variables (political, economic, social and cultural) intersecting at different levels (from local and national to European and global). The project revolves around the issue of agency, in which it pays attention to three actors of city-making: urban dwellers, civil society and city managers (policy makers). One of its aspects deals specifically with mobility as a vector of diversification of city population and of transformations of the city itself. Though, at the moment, immigration of foreign nationals to Zagreb and Croatia is still negligible, we deem it important to study these processes even at this early stage. They indicate motives for migration, constraints on migrants' settlement and life in the city, as well as their role in transformations of the city. Anticipating changes that might be brought by immigration has proven timely since, mainly due to short-term tourist mobilities, Zagreb has become a changing city-scape in the last few years and, as such, is attracting more foreign national immigrants. In presenting a section of immigrants in the city – young, skilled, cosmopolitan – I discuss the constraints imposed by local and national economic structures on their agency and entrepreneurship.

The chapter begins with a presentation of statistics regarding immigration to Zagreb and Croatia. Then it situates the research in the context of contemporary international mobility and theories used to make sense of them. The third section presents the data, while the ensuing one deals with migrants' efforts at making a living and establishing themselves in Zagreb. The last one winds up with conclusions on the relationship of agency and structural constraints that determine migrants' lives in the city.

Incipient international migration to Zagreb and Croatia

Though immigration to Croatia is still small in numbers, it is estimated to have been on the rise since 2011. It is mostly generated by nationals of the European Economic Area and Bosnia and Herzegovina and by remigration flows from Croatian diaspora (Župarić-Iljić 2016). The census data for Zagreb in 2011 clearly show this: almost two thirds of immigrants come from former Yugoslav republics (half of which from Bosnia and Herzegovina) and about a third from other countries, among which Germany takes up almost half (because of Croatian remigrants from that country). Percentage-wise, about 6% (48,800) of the entire population of Zagreb (790,017) have immigrated from countries other than former Yugoslav republics, and of those almost half have come from Germany (22,984). The figures on the number of persons with Croatian and another citizenship (15,586) and with only foreign citizenship (4,871) living in Zagreb confirm that Croatians living abroad are providing the biggest contingent of international immigrants

(Grad Zagreb 2014, own calculations). The specifics of return and relocation of Croatians living abroad to Croatia have been studied, albeit not to a satisfying degree (Peračković 2006; Čapo et al. 2014).

Other-than-Croatian immigrants to the country have, with the exception of asylum seekers (Pozniak and Petrović 2014; Čapo 2015; Jurković and Rajković Iveta 2016), received even less attention. A study about the transnational activities of Chinese migrants in Croatia was carried out in 2009/2010 (Kuti and Božić 2011). An initial exploratory study, which analysed a class-specific group of immigrants – labourers with work permits – brought to light that of 1,518 foreigners registered as workers in mid-2011, about 90% were employed in construction and shipyard industries. A convenient sample of foreign workers further showed that more than 90% were from Bosnia and Herzegovina and exhibited characteristics typical for a workers' immigrant population: they were predominantly males, aged between 30 and 50 years, with low levels of qualifications and employed on annual contracts (Božić et al. 2013).

This chapter targets a different population of foreign nationals in Zagreb: well-educated and highly skilled immigrants from all over the world who do not come on labour permits to work in industrial sectors but who move either driven by love or, to a lesser extent, by business projects.

Pluralisation of migration studies

Migration studies are today more heterogeneous and complex than ever, in terms of topics researched as well as theoretical and methodological approaches.

Classical topics such as economic and labour migrations, which used to dominate research, have been broadened by studies of asylum seekers and refugee migrations (see e.g. a seminal study by Mallki 1995), and, in the context of the demise of socialist (communist) multinational states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, by related research into so called (co-)ethnic or ethnically privileged migrations of ethnic minorities toward their "mother countries" (see e.g. Münz and Ohliger 1997; in the Croatian context: Čapo Žmegač 2005; Čapo Žmegač et al. 2010). Return migrations of diasporans and refugees around the world has been another developing field (Cassarino 2004; Markowitz and Stefansson 2004; Tsuda 2009; Čapo Žmegač 2010; King et al. 2011; Čapo 2012). What all of these studies have in common is that they primarily deal with (re)migrants at the lower ends of social stratification.

More recent are studies of migrations at the other end of social stratification. Migrations of corporate managers, financial elites, employees of international organizations, travelling IT specialists, whether classified as "expatriates", "(highly)

skilled migrants", "transnational elites", "transnational capitalist class", "transnational/migrant professionals" and represented as the paradigmatic drivers of globalization, have become a well-established field of migration studies (among other, see Meier 2015; Fechter 2007; Nowicka 2006; Beaverstock 2005; Sklair 2001 in Favell et al. 2009).

To bridge the gap between the research in low-level (labour) and upper level (elite) migrations, researchers have advocated a focus on "middling" positions (Favell et al. 2009; Conradson and Latham 2005) or migrations by individuals from the middle classes of the society: "students, nurses, mid-level technical and clerical employees, ambitious or adventurous upwardly mobile middle-classes, migrants from a range of intermediate developing states, and many more it would be hard to describe as 'elites'" (Favell et al. 2009: 2). Vered Amit's collection of articles presenting "different types of voyaging" (Amit 2007: 2), all of which feature certain privileges (stemming from the resources of "money, time and credentials" and "relative affluence" or "modest prosperity", ibid.) is another example of this strand of research. It not only fills in the gap between studies of elite and lower-classes' migrations but also reflects broader developments in the global mobility of middle classes and expansion of varieties of travel (ibid.; Favell et al. 2009).

Lifestyle migrants, or "relatively affluent individuals of all ages, moving either part-time or full-time to places that, for various reasons, signify, for the migrants, a better quality of life" (Benson and O'Reilly 2009: 609) are a "middling" group that has captured the interest of researchers and become a flourishing sub-field of migration studies. Since, in this form of migration, migrants "do not move to pursue place-dependent opportunities for work" but to be "in a place somehow personally meaningful that they believe will fulfil a 'lifestyle commitment'", this strand of research is known as non-economic or amenity migrations in the US (Hoey 2014: 71–72).

New terrains of migration research have been matched by a wide range of new and ever increasing diversification of research questions. They put aside the hitherto dominant interest in (labour) migrants' integration and assimilation in the receiving societies. Migrations have been analysed with respect to theories of globalisation (Sassen 1998; Castells 2000) and transnationalisation (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Pries 2001; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). The first have evolved toward theories of unbound mobilities and motility (Sheller and Urry 2006; Hannam et al. 2006); the latter have, among other, grounded transnational processes in locality (Smith and Guarnizo 1998), focused on transnational social spaces and identities (Faist 2000; Levitt 2001), related migration to processes of urban rescaling (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009, 2011), etc. Within this pluralization of approaches, Boris Nieswand (2016) identified a trend towards the "decentering of migration studies", whereby researchers focus less exclusively on migrants and more on mainstream social actors

and institutions: nation-states, cities, social fields, diasporas etc. "Decentring" also means that migration studies are opening up to broader social and cultural issues and research. Moving away from migration per se to studying its consequences in a broader societal context is seen as an enrichment of migration topics on the one hand, and a mode of integrating migration research paradigms in general sociological approaches on the other.

The "case" of international migrants to the city of Zagreb analysed here is "symptomatic of the increasing diversity of contemporary patterns of international migration" (Conradson and Latham 2005: 288). These non-economic migrants landed in Zagreb due primarily to an intimate relationship with a Croatian partner. They fit squarely into contemporary patterns of international mobility in the sense that at the root of their arrival is middle classes' mobility: partners met on the occasion of longer sojourns or while traveling abroad, whether in the capacity of corporate executives, freelance industrial designers or other professionals, students or tourists. Some of the Croatian partners are so-called second generation Croatians (descendants of Croatian migrants abroad) who were born and raised outside of Croatia. Following a "fatal" encounter, possibly in the context of a life transition, specific family circumstances or readiness to move on to another country, couples made the decision to settle in the country from which one of the partners originates. What also makes them akin to middling forms of contemporary migrations is their qualifications, relative freedom to move and complex mobility trajectories.

Love-driven migration may be considered a form of family migration. However, I suggest it is very different from, for example, the well-known case of family migrations for the purpose of family reunification that followed the stop on recruitment of labour migrants in Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. The spatial, economic, and social context as well as time frame are very different in the case analysed here: these are migrations to a partner's/spouse's country of origin in the context of middle class and skilled mobility, previous multiple periods of travelling and sojourning in different countries by both partners. Moreover, the Croatian partner may also engage in migration, or, more precisely remigration, if s/he was living outside of the country and is now settling in Croatia with a foreign partner.

The chapter reconsiders the assumption that transnational migrants are actors of restructuring, reinventing and repositioning of the cities in which they settle (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009, 2011). It explores the extent to which these well-educated, highly-skilled, middle class, love-driven migrants are engaging with the city of Zagreb and changing its face. In what ways are they contributing to reimagining the city? What are the limits to their involvement and agency? In particular, can they fully utilise the human capital they bring with and rescale Zagreb with respect to other cities (ibid.)? The interpretation draws on theoretical discussions on the relationship between individual agency and structure proposed in socio-

logical literature on individualisation and late modernity (Giddens 1991; Bauman 2000; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001) and revisited in the discussions of life-style migrations (Korpela 2014; Benson and Osbaldiston 2016). I suggest that migrants' agency in the city of Zagreb is constrained and unable to fully develop because of systemic limits to entrepreneurship, in particular to foreign entrepreneurship. This is, however, not peculiar to Zagreb but applies to all of Croatia.

Mobile and middle class backgrounds of love-driven migrants in Zagreb

The data have been gathered using a variety of methods: extensive semi-structured interviews, informal conversations and meetings in public and private settings with twelve international migrants in Zagreb, as well as by attending foreigners' meet-ups and visiting their business establishments.[2] The ethnographic fieldwork has been backed by analyses of several of Facebook pages created by foreign nationals (*Expats in Zagreb*, *Internationals living in Croatia*)[3] and portals aiming at the population of foreign nationals in Zagreb like *Unique Zagreb*[4]. Continuous following of Facebook activities, linked with a detailed analysis of posts between May and September 2016 and in February 2017 yielded more general information about international migrants in Zagreb, in particular their reasons for settling, businesses and ways of socializing, while interview materials provided detailed and contextualised insights into their lives, aspirations, and constraints on their agency.

Facebook posts reveal that the dominant cause of foreign nationals' arrival to Zagreb and Croatia is partnership with a Croatian wo/man, usually a person with a migration history herself/himself.[5] This was confirmed by my interlocutors. Like the foreign national partner, the Croatian partner has usually had quite a mobile life trajectory and the couple have decided to live in Croatia either because of the spouse's wish to remigrate or related to a family matter (illness or death of a parent). Such relationships unite partners from distant countries. For example, one partner-

[2] In addition I have talked to three diplomats; their views are only partially referred to.

[3] *Internationals living in Croatia* is a rather small Facebook community of people spread over Croatia, with about 800 members. On the contrary, FB group *Expats in Zagreb*, has a growing membership: almost 1,900 persons in March 2017. One should note that not all group members are foreigners living in Zagreb and Croatia; some are planning to relocate, some are locals with international experience (some of whom are spouses of foreign immigrants), some are probably just locals who like to hang around international audiences.

[4] This web page is managed by the same person who administers the FB group *Expats in Zagreb*.

[5] Diplomats, whose arrival to Zagreb had different grounds, are not very actively engaged in these FB pages. They have their own networking channels, and diplomats' spouses manage an own association and FB group – *International Women's Club Zagreb*.

ship connected a French citizen with roots in Ivory Coast and Martinique with a Croatian; the couple met in San Francisco. Another was formed by a Venezuelan living in Germany and a Croatian, born and raised in Germany, one by a Sri Lankan and a Croatian who met at an international event abroad, a Jamaican who met their Croatian spouse during their career in an international organisation, etc. Of all interview partners, only a couple from Ukraine had no romantic reason for coming to Croatia; they chose to relocate to Zagreb with an intention to open a restaurant business. Croatia was chosen not because it offered any business advantages, but because previous tourist visits made them "fall in love" with it.

In three cases, the relationship which was the cause of migration fell apart, but in spite of such an outcome, the former international partner stayed in Zagreb. The reasons that these persons gave for remaining after separation from a local partner were the following: they either thought Zagreb was "a beautiful city", or liked its "way of life", saw a "potential" in living in Zagreb, or, for some personal reason found it alright to remain and see how life goes on. Three persons left Croatia since the interviews were conducted, either because of economic (inability to sustain oneself) or family reasons.

Out of two women and ten men, all but two were in their late twenties or thirties at the time of arrival. At the time of the interviews, held between February and March 2016 and January and March 2017, they were between 22 and 62 of age. The duration of their stay in Zagreb has been between eight months and six years. Three interview partners are of African descent, two are Asians.

The interviewees have multi-racial, multi-ethnic and/or multi-cultural backgrounds. Some hold double citizenship, of an EU and non-EU state (e.g. a South African and Grenadian also have British citizenship, one person has Ivory Coast and French citizenship, another one Egyptian and Bosnian etc.). Immigrants have obtained residence permits via family reunification provisions, work permits, or based on the citizenship of Croatia or another EU country. One person lived in Zagreb for two years "under the radar", without a residence permit.

Throughout their lives, these individuals have been exceptionally mobile, frequently changing residence or traveling as tourists. Due to their mobility before coming to Croatia, they have forged multi-focal transnational social spaces (cf. Kuti and Božić 2011) linking such diverse countries as Germany, Egypt, Bosnia and United States or Venezuela, Germany, Spain and Denmark, or Grenada, Jamaica, Canada, and United Kingdom. All interviewees are fluent in two or more languages, some also in Croatian.

Except for the youngest one, who has been involved in long-distance studying in England, all have tertiary education (college or university degree): in business administration, management, marketing, (computer) engineering, information

technology, graphic design, social media. They originate from middle or upper middle classes; prior to relocation some were corporate executives in transnational firms, some renowned public figures in their countries of origin (e.g. successful Formula 1 drivers, spouse of Miss of Sri Lanka), some had a flourishing business in their countries of origin or made a name for themselves in the documentary film industry.

To sum up, the interviewees are cosmopolitan individuals. Their lives and identities are the product of a complex series of "social structures and processes" involving race, ethnicity, gender and class, as argued by an intersectional approach to migration (Anthias 2012: 106). Their specific intersectionality is further defined by education (may not overlap with class), age (or stage of life-cycle), national citizenship (may not overlap with ethnicity), multi-cultural background and past migration experiences and aspirations, all of which position them in middle or upper middle class ranges of relatively young, well-educated, globally mobile but not necessarily affluent people. How is this positionality transferred to the concrete migration destination – the city of Zagreb – is discussed in the next section.

Immigrants' skills and agency in the city

These migrants bring substantial human (education, skills, creativity, languages), social (transnational networks) and some of them also economic (financial) capital that they invest in business ventures locally (restaurants, manufacturing) or internationally (design, programming, film production). With their skills, they cover quite a wide spectrum of economic possibilities, and aspire to use them well, not only for their own benefit, but also for the benefit of society: "I wanted to bring change as much as I could", said a talented application developer from Venezuela reflecting on his five-year long residence in Zagreb. Indeed, the intent to be agents of change in the modernising city is shared by a number of migrants and is not just paying lip service. One should not understand it (only) as a business-oriented goal in the service of own benefit, but (also) as a sincere striving for change in areas that they judge need transformation.[6]

Agency is expressed in various ways, depending on an individual's skills and areas of activity: some want to teach locals how to do business, some to contribute to social causes and the visibility of the city's minorities by inviting them to visit their catering establishment, some migrants promote (restaurant) management skills, professional work ethics and provide for the continuous education of restaurant personnel beyond the basics, some engage in marketing the city or other areas of the country via video production, some are into developing applications for various services in the city.

[6] That there is a genuine interest in the society and its issues is indicated by the following: some are able to comment on social conflicts over divisive historical interpretations, discuss gender relations, regionalism and identity issues at length, some are even aware of long-standing disputes over Croatian grammar (sic!).

Some migrants have become so engaged with the society that they share common concerns with Croatian citizens, debating high taxes and legal insecurity (ascribed to constantly changing laws), the inability of the state to encourage creativity and alike.

Those with catering establishments are engaged in changing the city in a visible way. The Sri Lankan and the Ukrainian entrepreneurs have filled in a genuine gap in the city's food market: with ethnic-type restaurants.[7] The former positioned themselves in the deficient street food sector, while the latter opted for an international (cosmopolitan)-style place for (upper) middle class clientele. "Be different" encapsulates their beliefs:

> "I fell in love with the city. It is very vibrant, full of life. The second thing is, we noticed that some of the other cities we visited in Europe did have food options, but here there is pizza, ćevapi, kebab... How about something different? We thought that if we offered something different, people would be interested, excited."

"Being different" equals opening a "pioneering" type of enterprise, one that does not yet have an established niche. That this would be the best way to go about doing business in Croatia was suggested by a post on FB *Internationals living in Croatia*, in a discussion that I will comment on extensively below, where one group member recommended to newcomers that "the best business is pioneer business".[8]

Both restaurants are run as a family business, with the owners constantly innovating, studying the market and getting inspiration from the top food cities in the world. Both were opened in quite a short time: the Sri Lankan migrants managed to do it in a week, the reason being that they bought the licence from a successful and well-established restaurant. In the second case, the opening was facilitated by them being incorporated into an existing multifarious domestic enterprise. This is how the migrants escaped the tedious and complicated procedures imposed on foreigners opening a restaurant in Croatia.[9] Even with this advantage, one of them has stated:

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7 Except for lots of Italian and several Chinese restaurants and one or two Japanese ones, until recently Zagreb had a lack of other world/ethnic food restaurants.

8 Facebook group *Internationals living in Croatia*, May 21, 2016 (last access 10 October 2016).

9 E.g. one of the more difficult requirements for a foreigner opening a business is that the Foreigners Act (Zakon o strancima) stipulates that for every foreign national, one must employ a certain number of locals, the number increasing with the number of foreigners employed. That particular provision was critically commented by migrants, e.g. "They said that we need to have ten people employed. I said we can't have that many, we don't have that many tables. That will hurt my growth, profits. If I grow, in one year I can give you 20 jobs. But I had no one to explain that to. So we had to employ ten people, otherwise we could not do business and stay in the country" (B., February 2016, excerpt from an interview).

> "It is very difficult to open your own business in Croatia. This is the only thing that I do not like in Croatia. All European countries are very good for business investments. If somebody arrives with money, all of them open the door, except Croatia. Croatia has done everything to make it too difficult."

A migrant, who, together with his brother and partner, has an extensive background in transnational corporate business, added:

> "The system does not encourage people like us who are trying to start something. We try so hard to find information: one day at one place you hear one thing, and the next day you hear something different. For a person who doesn't know anybody in this country, trying to find their way around is very hard. There is nobody to talk to, the system does not try to encourage this sort of investment into the country."

This is precisely why two migrants gave up. After encountering too many administrative hurdles to open an itinerant catering business, one person settled for the online sale of men's accessories, while his latest idea to develop an event organization business stopped short of realisation because the person left Zagreb. Rather than opening a tea bar for students, a South African was surviving on family rent and summer jobs. He also left Zagreb, mainly because he was unable to sustain himself on a long-term basis. His reflection about his two-year stay in Zagreb is succinctly expressed in the metaphor opening this chapter. It aptly points out how he felt brought down by a problem-ridden economic system.

My interlocutors with skills in computer engineering, software development and creative industries (graphic design, website building, film making, photography and video) also experience difficulties, in spite of the fact that some are at the forefront of developments in their fields. Unable to break through local monopolies and nepotism in web designing and marketing, a person with an excellent record in this field and the field of documentary production, is struggling and about to look for projects internationally. Another person in the creative industries is not looking for jobs but currently engages in a hobby (creative writing). Those who have international clients have been relatively free from local structural constraints on doing business and are doing well. A migrant from Venezuela complained about the difficulty to force his way with a good idea and the lack of an exciting and inspirational environment and investors:

> "Since I am a designer and into technology, while I was living in Copenhagen, I was inspired every day. Culturally speaking, every day I had something new, I had new expositions I could go to. The Danes are first in human-computer interactions, their design is top! From that point of view, which is very personal, I really loved being in Copenhagen. And not only that, but I would come up with a crazy idea that would somehow help the

> life in the city, and then I had to choose who would give me the money. To put that project to run. They would go like – please Mr. Foreigner [...] take our money, take our name, let us go to TV together with this idea. That was for me a bit of a shock here in Croatia! You could have the best idea – and nothing!"

Facebook groups, where advice on available jobs and recommendation about business opportunities are sought for and exchanged, tell a similar, rather bleak story of investment opportunities and success in Croatia, as my interlocutors. On inquiries on how to start an own business as a foreigner, advice given by internationals who have had the experience is discouraging. Opening up with a generalised opinion that it is "a whole other world for doing business" than being a tourist in Croatia because this is "not a very encouraging business environment", a person nailed down a whole set of drawbacks to be encountered by anybody wanting to open a catering outlet: "a boat load of red tape", "inspectors in Croatia are sort of mafia types...", "between the local government and the tax office things are a centuries old, and the old mentality of yesteryear is still very strong", "corruption is rife".[10]

Another person, who had to close down a tea house, had this to say:

> "My husband and I tried and failed... Lots of red tape, rules and regulations, very little information, every step you take will require five more – we thought setting up a cafe would be the easiest thing to do, turned out we were wrong."[11]

She further commented:

> "In our experience, you need to be prepared to knock on many doors, be delayed at every step, get conflicting information from various bureaucrats and also keep paying for everything before you even start, public notaries, accountants, taxes, work permits and various other permits, licences, attests, sanitary books, the list is never ending. If you do everything 'by the book' you won't make any money. [...] [W]e came from the UK feeling very enthusiastic about our new venture and after all the experience we had, we are quite deflated. A lot of time, money, energy wasted. [...] Croatia is a lovely country, people are wonderful and very helpful and we are extremely happy here – just not going to be running a business again – for sure."[12]

The situation in creative industries, another niche occupied by immigrant foreign nationals, is also depicted discouragingly:

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[10] Facebook group *Internationals living in Croatia*, May 17, 2016 (last access 10 October 2016).

[11] Facebook group *Internationals living in Croatia*, May 18, 2016 (last access 10 October 2016).

[12] See footnote 11.

> "Well I'm graphic designer with social media degree and branding and visual communication degree and situation for work in creative industry and find a job in general is hard in Croatia! Having lots of degrees is not really a plus here more works contacts and having friends of friends that can help you get a job... Bring a lot of money because take long time get job learn the language know how to work with Croatian people because is hard and confusing to manage them..."[13]

Advice about starting a project, given by another FB comment, is to make an informed decision based on investigation and have "total determination". This is exactly what the migrants I interviewed have: determination, and it should be added, loads of enthusiasm which transpired through their statements.[14] In addition, those who wanted to invest in a business locally studied the location and the market since the stakes were high. The Ukrainian couple had made inquiries about the country and where to live before actually moving to Croatia. They contacted ten immigrant families from Russia and Ukraine already living in Croatia for several years and visited them to talk to them about negative and positive aspects of life in Croatia. This lead to the decision to settle and open a restaurant business:

> "Everyone has said something like this: the country is ideal for living, eco-friendly, clean, peaceful, safe, air, water, beautiful, wonderful. A bit difficult for business, of course... Everybody told us that they were satisfied. It is not easy, nowhere is it easy, everywhere is difficult... By talking to these people we have seen that it is possible."

Conclusions: locational structural constraints on the transfer of human capital

This chapter has sought to contribute to a relatively new field of research in "middling" forms of migration (Conradson and Latham 2005) by documenting a group of international highly skilled and well-educated migrants in Zagreb and analysing their agency in the city. The case is doubly interesting: on the one hand, Zagreb and Croatia are not positioned highly on the international immigration and investment map; to put it in Glick Schiller and Çağlar's terminology (2009, 2011), Zagreb is not a city whose scale would attract migration. The country and the city offer limited pull factors for transnational and global business. That is why they are only modestly appearing as international migrant destinations, tourist mobilities

[13] Facebook group *Expats in Zagreb*, September 2, 2016 (last access 10 October 2016).

[14] Enthusiasm was mainly with respect to what they called "the quality of life" or "the way of life" in Zagreb. This has been analysed in another article (Čapo and Kelemen 2017).

excluded. On the other hand, and this is linked to the previous point, the specificity of the researched migrants is that most of them had an intimate relationship at the root of migration. Except in two cases, these highly mobile and skilled migrants, with extremely diverse cultural, ethnic and racial characteristics, primarily migrated for family and not for professional reasons and had therefore to find or create their own economic niche in society.

Some have been quite successful in doing so, some less. The successful formula seems to lie in creating opportunities for oneself and opening one's own, not yet carved out niche in the city economy, or, as migrants put it, starting a "pioneer business". The two restaurant ventures described are reaping the benefits of this position, very much like other similar foreign enterprises in the city: the craft beer production pioneered by a Belgian, a Canadian burger place, Argentinian, Korean, Ukrainian, African and French catering outlets or shops, etc. Zagreb, unlike other, much smaller towns in Croatia, has a large and cosmopolitan enough clientele, local and foreign, for these places to do well. With their innovative concepts and ideas, international migrants are acting as agents of change and are participating in restructuring the city, mostly in the domain of catering and services, but also in matters related to management and work ethics.[15] The extent to which they will also be able to impact the rescaling of the city in global terms – together with local actors and returnees from the diaspora – remains to be seen.

However, there are significant impediments to international migrants' entrepreneurship in the city and the country, no matter how much determination, enthusiasm, skills or good will they have. Locational socioeconomic opportunities, administrative and tax structures, business climate, as well as ways of doing business impact international migrants' efforts at establishing themselves economically. Red tape, nepotism instead of favouring knowledge and competence, lack of competitiveness and support of innovation, administrative hurdles, high taxes and similar are not just anecdotal complaints by international migrants; they are systemic structural problems pinpointed (identified) in World Bank reports and recommendations.[16] All of them set constraints and limits to the agency of skilled migrants, curtailing the full use of their skills, innovative ideas, entrepreneurship, transnational connections and financial capital.

[15] Other international migrants as well as returnees from Croatian diaspora settled on the Adriatic coast are innovating in other domains, mostly in the tourist sector (own unpublished research).

[16] The World Bank issues regular reports on the economy in Croatia, the latest was published February 1, 2017: *Croatia Policy Notes 2016. Restoring Macroeconomic Stability, Competitiveness and Inclusion*, downloaded from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/croatia/publication/restoring-macroeconomic-stability-competitiveness-and-inclusion (last access 18 March 2017).

The chapter has contributed to theoretical discussions on the ability of migrants (individuals) to act outside of and beyond existing structural contexts and conditions in a locality of settlement. While the issue of individual agency in migration settings has been evaluated in contradictory ways (Korpela 2014), this study unequivocally shows how the agency of transnationally mobile, educated and, prior to their migration to Zagreb, quite successful professionals or entrepreneurs in middle class positions, may be constrained and their complex global positionality (arising from education, skills, global mobility, transnationality, multi-cultural backgrounds, etc.) may become a questionable asset at their new destination, a destination that does not live up to the "scale" of these immigrants. The transfer of their positionality to a new destination – whereby it becomes "translocational positionality" (Anthias 2012) – to a destination which cannot take full advantage of it, may result in leaving the destination for another one.

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Local Religiosity in the Context of Migration
The Cases of the Greek Catholics from Žumberak in Croatia and the Orthodox Christian Serbs in Eastern Serbia

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Considering two case studies, this article presents the functioning and attitude toward local religiosity in the context of migration. The first case study examines permanent internal migration of the Greek Catholics from the region of Žumberak in Croatia and the second one temporary labour migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, particularly from Eastern Serbia and Western Macedonia. Searching for answers to the questions of the migrants' attitudes toward local religiosity, its role in the construction of identity and the impact of migration on it, we cannot but consider the "laws" to which these processes submit in social life.

Keywords: internal migration, external migration, labour mobility, local religiosity, identity

Introduction

The paper will present two case studies related to the functioning and the attitude toward local religiosity in the context of migration. The first case study examines permanent internal and external migration of the Greek Catholics from the region of Žumberak in Croatia. The second one refers to temporary labour migrants (*Gastarbeiters*) from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly those from the eastern part of the Republic of Serbia and the western part of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We decided to compare regions with different confessional characteristics in the countries created after the break-up of the former Yugoslav federation in which a long-standing tradition

of labour mobility presents one of its important features. In the second half of the 20th century, these regions detached steady waves of labour migrants into big cities in Yugoslavia, as well as to Western European countries.

The study will search for answers to the following questions:

- What is the migrants' attitude toward local religiosity?
- What is the impact of migration on the local religious life in the place of origin?
- What role does local religiosity play in the construction of identity under the conditions of migration?

One of the current research problems related to migration is the changing identity of migrants. According to Fredrik Barth (1969), collective identity is a dynamic cultural construct. The mechanism of self-identification, i.e. the formation of an idea about one's own community, is not based on invariable features of that community. At the basis of the creation of this idea is the relation to other community/communities. Hence, the definition of one's own community is interactive and reflexive. The idea of one's own community is a reflection of the idea of other communities with which it enters into contact and to which it compares itself. Following Barth's concept, we could assume that cultural differences between communities are not a result of their spatial or social isolation but of their interaction; hence, we could not speak of identity in the absence of interaction. And, since the interaction is a process, identification is a process, as well – identity is not an innate and invariable feature, but a subject of construction. Life in migration, under the conditions of pan-European mobility, creates a new social context on the European continent; the opportunities of interaction increase significantly compared to the settled life in the home place which results in the construction of new multidimensional identity by the individuals and the social groups. It is precisely this fact that makes the problem of migrants' identity so relevant.

Self-identification is the sense of sharing with others a particular set of symbols which enable the members of the group to "speak the same language". And since borders (symbolic and/or political) are not impermeable but rather places of contact (Gagnon 1997: 60), the members of the communities they discriminate could also share particular symbols. This presupposes different levels of self-identification, i.e. the co-existence of many overlapping and shifting identities (ibid.: 56). These identities are part of a hierarchical system which is subject to change just like its components.

Here we would like to explain the reason why we chose to examine migratory processes in the light of religion and more precisely of *local religiosity*. Proceeding from Durkheim's concept of religion as a social phenomenon (Дюркем 1998) and Geertz's understanding of religion as a system of symbols which teach us to see and comprehend the world in a certain way (i.e. not only as a reflection of the social

structure but also as a tool for its changing) (Geertz 1973: 87–125), we could argue that religion reflects society and social interests while at the same time also representing an instrument for the construction of community and meeting social interests. However, everyone attaches different meaning to the symbols and interprets them differently. Therefore, it is not the sharing of common message encoded in the symbols that constructs an idea of the society common for the members of the community, but the sharing of the symbols themselves (Cohen 1985: 16–18).

Religion provides precisely those symbols whose sharing leads to different levels of self-identification. The local perspective to religion refers to the interaction between the universal religious doctrine and its local variants typical of particular local communities. *Local religiosity* is here understood as what Bourdieu (1971) defines as a field of doctrines and ideas, behavioural complexes and stereotypes, specific practices and institutions that regulate them which, at different historical stages, combine in a different way. Or, according to Galya Valchinova, local religiosity includes religion in its institutional form and organization as well as various and unregulated reflections of the religious in everyday life (Вълчинова 1999: 15). *Religiosity* unlike *religion* allows us to cover activities, processes, institutions as well as the religious mentality, all of which remain latent or hidden for a long period of time (Вълчинова 2006: 19). Thus, local religiosity is understood here not so much as a belief but as a set of various religious elements (mainly but not only rituality) to which people resort and from which they choose in the process of identity construction. In this respect, local religiosity is an appropriate perspective to the problem of identity under the conditions of migration.

The basis of this study is the ethnographic fieldwork of the two authors. The empirical data on the Greek Catholic community of Žumberak were collected in 2001 and 2012. In 2001, Petko Hristov visited the villages of Sošice, Visoće, Plavci and Kašt and interviewed local people as well as the local priest Željko Pajić and Bishop Nikola Kekić. In 2012, Violeta Periklieva conducted fieldwork in several villages in the region of Žumberak (Sošice, Stojdraga, Budinjak, Kravljak and Kalje) as well as in some of the cities with Greek Catholics from Žumberak (Zagreb and Samobor), interviewing local people as well as church representatives (Mile Vranešić, Danijel Vranešić, Robert Rapljenović and Bishop Nikola Kekić). Field research in Eastern Serbia (Trgovište near Knjaževac, and Halovo near Zaječar) and Western Macedonia (Vevčani) was conducted by Petko Hristov in 2001 and 2012. It was part of a bigger ethnographical and historical research conducted in the regions of Tran in Bulgaria, Pirot and Knjaževac in Serbia, and Kriva Palanka and Kratovo in the Republic of Macedonia. This region is known in the literature as *Shopluk* – a denotation with unclearly defined borders and cultural specifics (Христов 2004: 67–82). As a basis for comparison, the authors use materials from fieldwork conducted in 2005 by Petko Hristov (see Hristov 2010: 141–150) in another border region in the heart

of the Balkans, famous in the past for its ethnic and religious diversity and for the mass labour mobility (seasonal and temporary) of its male population – the *Miyak* region in Northwestern Macedonia, where the state borders of Albania, the Republic of Macedonia and the newly-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo converge nowadays.

In view of the specifics of the theme, the authors adopted the model of so-called *multi-sited ethnography* to a great extent in organizing and conducting the ethnographic fieldwork. It was first presented by George Marcus (1995) and oriented towards the study of global processes and the increasing interrelations between people. Multi-sited ethnography gives an opportunity for analytical study of transnational processes, of the movements of people and ideas whose dissemination includes multiple locations. In contrast to the classical ethnographic fieldwork when the researcher usually spends a longer period of time in one specific location, in the case of multi-sited ethnography the researcher moves in many different spaces following the subject of the study. The spaces could be geographical, social or virtual and depend on the specific thing which the researcher chose to trace.

Although, in its classic form, it is applied to the study of migration processes, the adoption of multi-sited ethnography in studying processes of identity construction on various levels also has its advantages. During our fieldwork, we tried to adapt the model to our study using two main techniques: tracing the movement of the subjects (the people), and tracing the dissemination of particular symbols and devices of communal consolidation and self-identification.

In the case of the border studies, tracing the movement of people across the border proved to be very useful. It allows the researcher to better understand the reasons for the crossing of the border and its frequency, to observe the contacts of the subject on the other side of the border, his/her attitude in the context of being abroad, etc. In case there is no opportunity to follow the people themselves, the researcher could trace their social networks across the border: to visit their relatives, friends, business partners, etc. Tracing the movement of people, members of the researched communities, especially during religious holidays, allows registering their religious practices and selecting those which eventually function as mechanisms for self-identification of the respective community. At the same time, the specific spatial characteristics of the movement of people (the places they visit) when observing the religious practices as well as the type of other participants (their affiliation to particular community) give information about various social networks in which these people take part, as well as about the levels of their self-identification (local, regional, national, confessional, etc.). Tracing (or rather accompanying) one or more particular persons, members of the researched community, allows observing different ways of self-identification according to the context, too.

On the other hand, the model of multi-sited ethnography allows tracing the dissemination of symbols and mechanisms which were already selected by the researcher and which function as identification markers. Determining their presence or

absence in various geographical or social spaces provides information about the type and scope of their functions and about different forms of their usage. In addition, the spatial movement and the shifting of different locations allow the researcher to ask different groups of people within the community the same set of guiding questions, and to compare or analyse the different answers and points of view. All this creates preconditions for an overall picture of the processes of communication and identification in the case of migration.

Permanent migration of the Greek Catholics from Žumberak in Croatia

The region of Žumberak is located in the hilly northwest part of Croatia, on the border with Slovenia. From the 12th century, the fiefs in Žumberak gradually fell into the hands of Austrian counts and princes. In the 16th century, with the Ottoman Empire gradually conquering the Balkans, the Ottoman raids in Žumberak multiplied and the local population began to migrate leaving the region pretty deserted. In the 16–17th century, the so-called Military Frontier (*Vojna krajina*) was established in the border regions of the Habsburg Empire. The population with variegated ethnical structure that had run away from the devastations of the Ottoman invaders was settled in the regions forming the Military Frontier. The region of Žumberak was also part of the Military Frontier. The district of Žumberak was one of the first regions of the Military Frontier settled in the 1530s and 1540s with mainly Orthodox population leading the nomadic-military way of life. In the Austrian sources, they were called "Valachi Turcorum", "Valachi", "Rasciani Voskoky", "Valachi Uzkoky", "Pribegi" and "Vsskhokhen" (Kaser 1997a: 55), and in some other sources "Serbs" or "Rascians" (cf. Mal 1924). In the late 16th and the early 17th century, there were several attempts of forcing Catholicism upon the Orthodox population settled in the Military Frontier. However, the imposing of Catholicism in the second half of the 18th century significantly influenced today's confessional situation in Žumberak. In the remaining regions of the "frontier", Catholicism did not succeed to take deep root. Yet, after the 1770s, a union with the Pope was forced upon the Orthodox population in Žumberak. Thus, there were 3,879 Greek Catholics registered in five parishes in 1820 (Kaser 1997b: 185–186).

The natural growth of population which followed the demilitarization of the region in 1871, as well as the partition of the land related to the disintegration of the joint family households, led to the lack of agricultural land and pasture-grounds. This resulted in disturbance of the economic stability of the region. Consequently, in the 1880s, the population gradually began to migrate, first to bigger cities in the country and later even abroad (mainly to the USA).[1]

[1] For the migration of the Greek Catholics from Žumberak to Cleveland, Ohio, USA see: Čizmić and Hranilović 1990.

Migration processes that had started among the Greek Catholic community in Žumberak as early as the late 19th century, continued throughout the 20th century. The first migration flow was oriented mainly toward the countries in North and South America and continued until World War I. In this period, migration of 40% of the population only in the vicinity of the village of Radatovići was registered (Muraj 1989: 65). The second flow took place in the interwar period and was oriented mainly toward European countries. After World War II, most migratory movements were directed towards larger Croatian cities – Zagreb, Jastrebarsko, Samobor and Karlovac (Čapo Žmegač 2007: 90), but also to Slovenia and other Yugoslav republics. If in 1820 there were 3,879 Greek Catholics registered in Žumberak, the census of 2001[2] showed that the total number of the Greek and the Roman Catholics in the region was already only 1,185. The depopulation of the region went hand in hand with another process – the ageing of the remaining local population. The lack of subsistence forced the young active population to look for opportunities in big cities in the country. Thus, at the beginning of the 21st century, because of the internal migratory processes, the Greek Catholic community from Žumberak has been concentrated in three main Croatian cities – Zagreb, Samobor and Jastrebarsko, but also in Metlika in Slovenia. At the same time, external migration dispersed many Greek Catholics from Žumberak all over the world but mainly in Western Europe and Northern America. As a result of migration processes that lasted for over a century, the number of the total population (Greek and Roman Catholics) in Žumberak amounts to 872 (according to the census of 2011[3]). At the same time, life in migration, the aspiration for integration in the new environment, marriages with Roman Catholics and the feeling of discomfort or even fear caused by the different confessional affiliation[4] is the reason why, in large Croatian cities, some of the Greek Catholic migrants neglect their specific religious rituality and the others refrain from making it public. However, the dispersion and depersonalization of the Greek Catholic community in Žumberak has caused some reverse processes – consolidation and self-identification at the regional and national level.[5]

Today, there is a tendency toward the "virtualization" of the Greek Catholic community of Žumberak. The Greek Catholics live dispersed, but they are beginning to construct local community consciousness without actually having a common locality. As a whole, the construction of identity at a confessional level pretty much

[2] https://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/Census2001/census.htm (last access 16 November 2017).

[3] https://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/census2011/censuslogo.htm (last access 16 November 2017).

[4] For more information on the problems of the Greek Catholics in Croatia caused by their different (compared to the rest of the Croats) confessional affiliation see: Periklieva and Hristov 2013.

[5] On the process of self-identification of the Greek Catholic community from Žumberak on the national level see: Periklieva and Hristov 2013.

overlaps with this at a local level, i.e. there is a certain level of equality between Greek Catholic, *Žumberčanin* and *uskok*. In the last several years, the community scattered in Croatia and the world has created its own spaces on Internet. At the moment, there is a website[6] and two groups on Facebook (*I Love Žumberak*[7] and *Moj Žumberak/My Žumberak*[8]) which are the main forms of everyday communication of the community on Internet. Although their names do not refer to religious affiliation and their administrators define them as open to anyone related to the region of Žumberak in one way or another, the main active members of these groups and sites are Greek Catholics. Moreover, these spaces on Internet are the main channel for "advertising" Greek Catholic religious, cultural and social initiatives and for sharing everything that is important for the community. Through them, the migrated Greek Catholics (especially those abroad) search and establish contact with relatives, study their genealogy, get to know their origin and the culture of their ancestors, and restore their connections with the community and their place of birth. In this way, the virtual space becomes a new form of common locality for the "virtual" community of Žumberak.

However, a pronounced process among this "virtual" community is "returning". The migrated Greek Catholics from Žumberak return to their places of birth periodically or permanently. The latter usually happens when people retire. Many of those who have already returned, as well as those who plan to do so, share the feeling of aspiration and need since the very beginning of their migration (this applies to the first generation of migrants) or long ago. Periodical returning, however, is more important in terms of the topic of local religiosity. Many people come back to their birth places for religious feasts, patron saint's days of the churches and chapels in the region (*proštenje*), for pilgrimages, Saturday feasts for the dead, weddings, christenings, etc. which gather the otherwise "virtual" community in one place. The observation of many of these religious feasts and rituals by a community consisting mainly of periodically returning migrants results in their transformation. Gradually, the integrative function of the patron saint's day of the churches began to expand, constructing a community based on the regional and confessional principle rather than on the village principle. The family character (their worshiping on a family basis) of the chapels (*kapelica*) also receded into the background and since there are no remaining heirs to run them, owing to migration processes, today some chapels are desolate and the others are being cared for and worshipped by the whole community.

The process of depopulation that is still happening in Žumberak, on the one hand, and the process of periodical returning to the places of origin, on the other,

6 http://mojzumberak.com/ (last access 16 November 2017).

7 https://www.facebook.com/groups/17240392943 (last access 16 November 2017).

8 https://www.facebook.com/groups/204828039645938 (last access 16 November 2017).

give rise to an "extreme" form of celebration of patron saint's days in deserted villages.[9] This is the case of the village of Kravljak. Until June 2012, there were four old people living in the village. After a criminal incident in the village, Kravljak was deserted within only several days. Nevertheless, next year, those who had left the village, their heirs as well as people originating from other villages in Žumberak celebrated the patron saint's day of the village chapel.

Another reason for the return of Greek Catholics to Žumberak are the Saturday feasts for the dead.[10] From 1945 until the early 1980s, the feasts were not observed due to the pressure of the communist regime.[11] Although the closest relatives of the Greek Catholics who migrated in the cities are buried in the city graveyards, after the revival of the Saturday feasts for the dead, on these days many Greek Catholics also began to visit the graveyards in Žumberak where their distant relatives rest.[12] A tour of any of the graveyards in the region shows that the Greek Catholic migrants bestow great care upon them.

The periodical returning is mainly institutionally organized and initiated by the Greek Catholic Church and cultural societies.[13] In order to ensure the participa-

[9] Similar examples are registered among the Orthodox Christian population in Bulgaria and Macedonia; see: Боцев 2001; Периклиева 2015; Hristov 2007: 247–260.

[10] The Greek Catholics honour the dead five times per year – following the Eastern and the Western rite.

[11] Their revival in the 1980s is related to an alleged miracle which occurred in the Greek Catholic cathedral in Križevci: "Another miracle happened thirty years ago in the cathedral in Križevci. The nuns were attending a liturgy when they heard a bang coming from the roof. They ran outside and saw flames on the roof. They called the fire-brigade but when the firemen came they saw no fire. The bishop took that as a sign that the Saturday feasts for the dead should be revived. Until then they weren't observed, as they had been discontinued. Now we have four Saturday feast for the dead. [...] When we didn't celebrate the Saturday feasts for the dead, we honoured the dead only on All Saints' Day. They were discontinued after 1945 when the partisans came" (T. R., male, 51 y/o, lives in Zagreb).

[12] In 2012, Violeta Periklieva observed one of the Saturday feasts for the dead in Žumberak.

[13] The two types of institutions play a leading part in the process of construction and maintaining of local (respectively religious) identity of the Greek Catholics from Žumberak. This is not a surprise having in mind that the main figures of the initiative in the Church (the Bishop of Križevci Nikola Kekić, the vicars Father Danijel Vranešić in Samobor and Father Mile Vranešić in Stojdraga) were born and raised in Žumberak, in a family of priests. The efforts of the Church along these lines have increased during the last fifteen years, but were especially tangible in 2012 when it celebrated the 400th anniversary of the establishment of the Bishopric of Križevci: "During the last ten years, there is a strong process of revitalization of the Greek Catholic Church" (T. R., male, 51 y/o, lives in Zagreb); "The attempts at reviving the identity have already been going on for twenty years, since the democratization and the independence of Croatia. [...] In my opinion, during the war and afterwards, none of the attempts succeeded. [...] People continued to dissociate themselves from the Bishopric of Križevci because of the Eastern rite, and to renounce their Žumberak and Greek Catholic identity. [...] There are people from the Church – part of the priests from Žumberak – whose main aim is to revive the Uskok identity. [...] We'll see what the future will bring. I have the

tion of as many members of the community as possible, the Church even shifts the patron saint's days and other religious events to the closest Sunday after the exact day.

Besides calling the Greek Catholics to return, special efforts are invested on the part of the Church for the revival of extinct or dying religious customs, i.e. for the reconstruction/invention of tradition (following Hobsbawm 1983) based exclusively on the Byzantine rite. A typical example of such a process is the attempt to revive the family custom of *krsna slava*, i.e. the family feast of the patron saint of the family group. The Church is circulating special leaflets among the internal and external migrants describing how to perform the rite of *krsna slava* and what its meaning for the communal identity is. The vicar in Samobor keeps a special book with a file for each family, including also the day of the saint in which *krsna slava* is celebrated by each family. The head of the family which does not celebrate its *krsna slava* is summoned by the priest for a personal conversation, aiming to revive the neglected custom. In 2014, a list of the family names of the Greek Catholics from Žumberak and of the patron saints of their *krsna slava* appeared on the website of the Vicariate of Žumberak[14] so that every member of the scattered community has access to it. As a result, there are already families of internal as well as of some external migrants who have resumed the celebration of the custom.[15]

Whenever the Church is not successful in reviving old customs, it recourses to other strategies that once again lead to changes in the custom. It introduces religious family customs within the temple of the church, for example *krsna slava* and *Napijanje u Slavu Božju*. On the day of the festival of a saint known to be the patron of some Žumberak families, the Bishop performs for the representatives of the respective families in the church the toast *Napijanje u Slavu Božju*, typical of the ritual. In this case, the pattern of the *krsna slava* is taken out of its family context and introduced in the church service where, in the form of an institutionalized collective ritual meant for the whole community, it changes its function: from a ritual aiming at sustaining unity at a family level into a ritual establishing local consciousness.

Another characteristic process, which is also an initiative on the part of the Church, is the acquisition of visual symbols of local identity. One of these symbols is the so-called icon of *Žumberačka Bogorodica* or the Virgin Mary of Žumberak (Figure 1) by means of which the Greek Catholic community from Žumberak

feeling that more and more young people are becoming interested in their Žumberak origin..." (J. Š., male, 40 y/o, lives in Stojdraga, Žumberak).

[14] https://www.zumberacki-vikarijat.com/krsne-slave-zumberackih-uskoka/ (last access 16 November 2017).

[15] "Today, this custom is rarely observed. Thanks to Danijel [Father Danijel Vranešić] some families began to celebrate it again" (T. R., male, 51 y/o, lives in Zagreb).

symbolizes its connection with their migrant ancestors. The story goes that the icon was brought by the *uskoci* in their migration. The icon's symbolism draws parallels between the Virgin Mary's pain for the Crucified Christ and the pain of the Žumberak mothers during the Military Frontier who mourned over their dead husbands and sons.[16] According to some sources, the original is nowadays kept "under lock and key" in the Greek Catholic Seminary in Zagreb and its replicas are placed in the majority of churches in Žumberak and the cities with migrant communities. One can also find reproductions of the icon in many homes in Žumberak, and there are cases in which migrant members of the community abroad carry the Virgin Mary of Žumberak with themselves. The icon is also almost constantly present at religious processions in the country and abroad where there are members of the Greek Catholic community.

Figure 1: The icon of the Virgin Mary of Žumberak, Marija Bistrica, Croatia (April 2012). Photographer: Violeta Periklieva.

[16] "They [the Uskoks] had brought the icon with them in order to remind them of their homeland. [...] According to the symbolic of the icon, in the same way after the wars the Uskok mothers mourned over their dead sons and husbands" (J. Š., male, 40 y/o, lives in Stojdraga, Žumberak).

Temporary labour migration of the Orthodox Christians from Eastern Serbia and Western Macedonia

Traditional patterns of trans-border seasonal labour mobility involving the majority of the male population of entire regions have existed in the Balkans for centuries. The main principle was that men earned "there" (in the city or abroad) but fed their families "here", in the home villages. This century-long traditional model of "migration culture" (or "*gurbet*[17] *culture*") was transformed several times during the 20th century. The new political borders set in the Balkans after the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the policy of mobility restrictions implemented by the different nation states, the political ideology of nationalism and the social environment in most of the Balkan countries, as well as the increasing national propaganda against ethnically and religiously "foreign" people led to the intensive decrease in the cross-border labour mobility of men (cf. Baldwin-Edwards et al. 2015: 5–11). In the interwar period, the labour market for seasonal cross-border migrants in the Balkans was in collapse. This led to a change in the pattern of male labour mobility – its destinations were re-directed towards the big cities within the respective country. However, this mobility pattern still had the traditional characteristics of temporary labour – men were earning in the city but their families stayed in their home villages, where the men returned to spend the inactive winter months.

The nature of labour migrations, their destinations and intensiveness changed once more during the 1960s, when countries in Western Europe began hiring legal guest workers (*Gastarbeiters*) from Yugoslavia. The need for labour force in countries like Switzerland and Germany led to a series of agreements and engagement of workers from Yugoslavia in many countries of Western Europe. This type of migratory movements toward Western European countries reached its climax in the early 1970s when, owing to the laws for bringing families together, a significant part of male *Gastarbeiters* settled in the host countries, thus transforming them into countries of immigration. These migratory processes became more frequent during the 1990s (the "decade of transition"), when countries like Albania, Bulgaria and Romania joined these processes. In this way, the above-mentioned traditional *gurbet* model of seasonal migrations and labour outside the region (see Hristov 2015: 30–46) was transformed from the beginning of the 1970s into the *pechalbar's* model of the *Gastarbeiter* culture (cf. in details Ivanović 2012).

[17] The labour mobility is known in different Balkan languages as *gurbet / kurbet / kurbéti*, or through the South-Slavic term *pečalbarstvo*. The word "gurbet" in most Balkan languages comes from the Turkish-Arabic "gurbet", meaning "abroad" (see *Турско-български речник* 1952: 193), and the South-Slavic word "pečalbarstvo", from the Slavic "pečalba" ("gain"), i.e. to "gain for a living" (see Hristov 2015: 31).

Today, many of these *pechalbar's* villages have already been deserted. Nevertheless, nostalgia for home still remains – near the end of their lives, some of these *Gastarbeiters* return from all over the world to their villages in order to die "at home". Once they return to their native villages after retirement, these people at first renovate their own houses and buy homes in the city nearby. Later, though, the former *Gastarbeiters* take it as a duty to renovate and continuously preserve the religious (in this case Orthodox Christian) and ritual sacred places of the family and the local community; we observed this in numerous villages in Bulgaria, Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia (Hristov 2012: 287–294). Some *Gastarbeiters* rebuild old churches and chapels, invest in their interior, resume customs and rituals, etc. There are many examples, but here we will give only two.

In the village of Trgovište, near Knjaževac in Eastern Serbia, which Petko Hristov visited in 2001, a former worker in the Mercedes concern who returned from Germany renovated the family chapel (*zavetina*) during the 1990s, considering this as an important "obligation" (Figure 2 and 3). According to him, the renovation of the chapel was "his sacred duty to the family tradition and his ancestors". The chapel was built in 1866 and every year the family used to celebrate their *slava* by the cross. The retired *Gastarbeiter* not only renovated the chapel but also kept the tradition of holding the family *slava* near the cross. For comparison – a neglected stone cross and family chapel in the same village (Figure 4).

Figure 2: Family chapel restored by a former *Gasterbeiter*, Trgovište, Serbia (2001). Photographer: Petko Hristov.

Figure 3: A stone cross in a family chapel restored by a former *Gasterbeiter*, Trgovište, Serbia (2001). Photographer: Petko Hristov.

Figure 4: A neglected stone cross and family chapel, Trgovište, Serbia (2001). Photographer: Petko Hristov.

The second example is from the village of Halovo, near Zaječar (Serbia), which has a *Wallachian* population; it was visited by Petko Hristov in 2001 and 2012. A *Gastarbeiter* from the village gold-plated the entire iconostasis in the village church upon returning from Frankfurt (Figure 5). According to his fellow villagers, he did this as an act of gratitude to God that he had managed to earn enough money in Germany and to return to his home village in good health.

Figure 5: An iconostasis gold-plated by a former *Gasterbeiter*, Halovo, Serbia (2001). Photographer: Petko Hristov.

Migration also leads to changes in local religiosity. For example, the traditional feast calendar in Vevčani, Western Macedonia, has been transformed in the second half of the 20th century in such a way as to concentrate all important family holidays during the winter months, when men who had a century-long tradition in temporary and seasonal labour migrations to both neighbour Balkan countries and to Germany, Austria and Switzerland were at home. In 2001, a *Gastarbeiter* who had returned from Germany began renovating a special "pechalbar" chapel high in the mountains. The chapel was dedicated to the Feast of the Ascension (*Spasovden*, on Thursday, the fortieth day after Easter), but the celebrations were held in January (on the Thursday before St. Athanasius's Day) when the *Gastarbeiters* returned home for Christmas. According to the local respondents, the celebrations had to ensure good health and success to the men who were working abroad. In this case, the chapel is a typical *lieux de mémoire* (in the terminology of Pierre Nora; Hopa

2004, 2005), an important part of the migrants' collective memory and identity (see Hristov 2009).

In other cases, unable to participate in important religious rituals in their home villages, some *Gastarbeiters* relocate elements of their local religiosity to the receiving country. Thus, for example, some *Gastarbeiters* from Macedonia who are unable to attend the village *kurban*[18] in their home villages sacrifice an animal and give it to neighbouring families in the receiving country in order to take part in the village celebration.

Conclusion

The cases presented here show that, despite the type of migration (internal or external, permanent or temporary), migrants maintain a strong bond with their local religiosity. At the same time, the context of migration makes a number of changes in local religiosity, adapting it to the new realities either in the place of origin or in the receiving environment. In fact, this adaptation is one of the key processes that Hobsbawm (1983) identifies in the "invention" of tradition – the use of familiar models and traditional ritual patterns for new purposes. The main purpose in this case is the aspiration for self-identification under the conditions of migration. Seeing themselves in "the mirror of otherness" or, as Barth (1969) puts it, entering in interactions with "others", migrants rediscover the strong bond with their birthplaces. For the internal Greek Catholic migrants from Žumberak, this mirror is the Roman Catholic majority in Croatia. For the external permanent or temporary labour migrants from Serbia and Macedonia, this is the multicultural environment in the receiving countries. In both cases, however, one of the instruments that take part in the process of self-identification, local identity construction, and belonging to the local community is local religiosity.

The cases show the importance of local religiosity (as defined in the beginning) and local identity. This suggests that, despite the theories of secularization and globalization, at the same time there are counter-processes running which maintain the role of religiosity and local community in social life. The contradiction of the phenomena in the religious life is presented by Peter Berger as counter-secularization. According to him, secularization on the level of society does not necessarily mean secularization on the level of individual consciousness. Some religious institutions

[18] Among the Orthodox Christian population of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, as well as in some places in Southeastern Serbia and Northern Greece, the custom of making a collective blood sacrifice in honour of the patron saint of the local church is still observed. The term *kurban* for the sacrificial animal derives from Arabian through the Turkish language, but the prototype is Abraham's sacrifice in the Old Testament; the ritual practice has its roots in the pagan sacrifices in antiquity (cf. in details Hristov and Manova 2007: 211–231; Hristov 2007: 247–260).

lose their power and influence, but religious beliefs and practices continue to exist in the life of the individuals. At the same time, other religious institutions continue to be socially and politically significant although few people practice the religion related to them (Berger 1999). Similarly, while globalization and intensified mobility lead to gradual loss of significance of the established state borders in Europe and frequent mentions of "European identity", at the same time, perhaps as a counter-process, new borders appear (after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union) or struggle to appear (the latest example of Ukraine) and in many countries nationalist movements make their way, gain new adherents and in some cases even put in the agenda the problem of exiting the EU (the French National Front, the Dutch Party of Freedom, the Independence Party in the UK, etc.).

All this brings transformations in national identity. These transformations result in stronger attachment to the local and an increase in the intensification of communal consolidation and self-identification at the local level. In fact, contrary to the traditional idea that national communities represent a "continuation" of ethnic communities, in the pre-national era local identity plays a more important role in the hierarchy of identities than the ethnic (see for example Detrez 2015). Since man seeks identification with less abstract communities, and the local contains the ethnic or national as well as the specific local (Генчев 1984), self-identification at the local level could be an expression and a result of the two opposed processes – globalisation and intensifying nationalism.

Thus, the case studies presented here not only shed light on the problems of the migrants' attitude toward local religiosity and its role in the processes of self-identification in the context of migration, but also reinforce the need to consider the "laws" to which these processes submit in social life. Do social processes, similarly to Newton's laws, cause counter-processes which, in spite of the contextual changes, seek to maintain certain "balance" in society, such as the preservation of the social role of religiosity and the hierarchal order of identities in which the lowest and respectively most familiar level of self-identification is of paramount importance?

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Interaction as a Key Connective Tissue of Refugee Integration in Croatian Society

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The paper focuses on studying the experiences of integration of persons that have received international protection in the Republic of Croatia. It places emphasis on the interactive dimension of integration: the significance of social connections and relationships that these persons establish with the members of the receiving country and local community. The field research lasted for two and a half years (from 2015 to 2017) and was based on qualitative ethnological and cultural anthropological methodology. By examining the life experiences of refugees, meeting with them frequently and conducting interviews with them, the importance of the passing of time in integration was observed, as well as the importance of the moment in the research of integration processes.

Keywords: refugees, Croatia, dimensions of integration, interactive integration

Introduction[1]

The Republic of Croatia approved its first international protection to a refugee in 2006. Between then and the end of 2017, 485 persons were granted international protection[2] – 337 men and 148 women.[3] The integration of persons that have received international protection, i.e. refugees in Croatian society is conditioned on the rights that they have in the Republic of Croatia,[4] the effec-

[1] The work is founded on the doctoral research and dissertation of Rahela Jurković (2018), created under the mentorship of Marijeta Rajković Iveta.

[2] Persons under international protection are refugees who have been granted asylum or subsidiary protection (see: Zakon o međunarodnoj i privremenoj zaštiti [Act on International and Temporary Protection]).

[3] See more: https://www.mup.hr/ministarstvo/dokumenti/statistika (last access 5 March 2018).

[4] See: Zakon o međunarodnoj i privremenoj zaštiti.

tiveness of the implementation of such rights and the support and assistance that governmental institutions, civil society organisations, the local community and citizens provide them in order to make them feel welcome and accepted members of society (cf. Penninx 2007; Jurković 2018).

In modern society, integration is above all a complex process, one that demands an interdisciplinary scientific approach, while the concept of integration itself "continues to be controversial and hotly debated" (Castles et al. 2002: 21). As the starting point of this cultural anthropological research, as well as of the analysis of the obtained results that was subsequently performed, we used the theoretical approaches of scholars who primarily focused on dimensions related to the integration of immigrants. Esser (2001, according to Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016: 13) refers to four dimensions of integration: "culturation (similar to socialisation), placement (position in society), interaction (social relations and networks) and identification (belonging)". Heckmann and Schnapper (2003, according to Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016: 13) make a distinction between structural, cultural, interactive and identificational integration. Penninx, who defined integration as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society" (2007: 10), refers to three dimensions of integration: the legal-political, the socio-economic and the cultural-religious (Penninx 2007; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016), and three levels where the processes of integration take place: individuals, organisations and institutions (Penninx 2007: 11–12). The theory that has proven to be relevant, and which has been referred to by many researchers in the past few years (cf. Pittaway et al. 2009; Valenta and Bunar 2010; Kirkwood et al. 2014; Smith 2015), is the so-called framework that has, pursuant to literature and the implementation of qualitative research on the example of refugees in Great Britain, been derived by Ager and Strang (2004). Their theoretical framework comprises ten areas that have been identified as crucial for the integration of refugees. The authors divided these ten areas into four groups: means and markers, social connections, facilitators and foundation. Means and markers comprise four areas: employment, housing, education and health. In terms of social connections, the authors distinguish between three elements: social bondages, i.e. connections within the refugee community itself, defined through ethnic, national or religious identity; social bonds, i.e. the relationships between refugees and members of other communities; and social links, i.e. connections with institutions, including local and central government services. The term facilitators refers to language and cultural knowledge and safety and stability, while the foundation of integration consists of the area of rights and citizenship (Ager and Strang 2004). Starting from that theoretical framework, the authors have derived the following definition of integration:

> "An individual or group is integrated within a society when they: achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc. […]; are socially connected with members of a […] community with which they

> identify, with members of other communities and with relevant services and functions of the state; and have sufficient linguistic competence and cultural knowledge, and a sufficient sense of security and stability, to confidently engage in that society in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship." (ibid.: 5)

European empirical research on the integration of refugees encompasses works on integration policies (Valenta and Bunar 2010), particular segments of integration (Mestheneos and Ioannidi 2002; Stewart and Mulvey 2014; Pajnik 2012; De Vroome and Van Tubergen 2010), the entrepreneurship of refugees (Wauters and Lambrecht 2008) or on certain national contexts: Belgium (ibid.), Norway and Sweden (Valenta and Bunar 2010), the Netherlands and other countries of the European Union (Mestheneos and Ioannidi 2002). The global refugee problem, which also has an impact on the situation in Croatia, has increasingly started drawing the interest of Croatian authors in the last ten or so years (Benčić et al. 2006), whether in the context of the protection of the rights of refugees at the level of the European Union (Baričević 2014, 2015), the tenth anniversary of the development of the asylum system in Croatia (Župarić-Iljić 2013), media depictions of asylum seekers and refugees and Croatian citizens' attitudes towards them (Župarić-Iljić and Gregurović 2013; Gregurović et al. 2016), the security systems of facilities that accommodate them and the surveillance of asylum seekers (Pozniak and Petrović 2014), foreign unaccompanied minors (Župarić-Iljić and Mlinarić 2015), biopolitics and refugees (Petrović 2016), or integration of asylees (Jurković and Rajković Iveta 2016). The previously listed studies of the European and Croatian context of international protection system offered us insights into the researched segments of the condition of refugees and into the various research approaches that are necessary in order to obtain a comprehensive view of this research area, insights into what society offers to people under international protection, as well as reflections on integration itself as expressed through the narrations, opinions and thoughts of the refugees. An overview of empirical research also points towards the importance of multidisciplinarity in studying the integration of refugees and immigrants in general. However, very few cultural anthropological studies have been conducted that would examine integration from the perspective of the refugees themselves, i.e. persons who have been granted international protection in the countries that have signed the Geneva Convention, on which this protection is based. Therefore, the specific goals of this work pertain to studying the integration experiences of persons who are supposed to integrate into Croatian society because they have received international protection in Croatia, with an emphasis on the interactive dimension of integration: the importance of the connections that they establish with the members of the receiving society.

Methodology and research sources

The research was conducted with the use of the strategy of grounded theory, i.e. the method of conducting qualitative research that constructs inductive analyses from the data obtained through research and creates conceptual frameworks and theories in this manner (Charmaz 2011: 187). What this method has in common with ethnographic research is "field strategies, techniques for conducting observation, conversations, interviews and keeping records" (Škrbić Alempijević et al. 2016: 62). The starting point of the research was the collection of "rich data" (Charmaz 2011: 13) through interviews, participant observation and ethnographic case studies. In addition to semi-structured interviews, the data was also obtained through a combination of two qualitative research strategies: participant and non-participant (cf. Potkonjak 2014: 71). With the participant research strategy, the aim was to obtain knowledge by taking part in life of informants and their integration into Croatian society (for example, providing assistance to them in relation to the access to the rights they have), while the non-participant strategy was used when the aim was to create a distance from the situation being observed by refraining from interaction (for example, by observing activities that the Association of Africans in Croatia conducted in schools). During the research, media publications about the informants were also monitored and partly included in this paper.

According to Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995: 1), ethnographic field research presupposes that the ethnographer enters into a social setting, gets to know the people involved in it and develops ongoing relations with them, participates in the daily routines of the setting and observes everything around it. The research that is the basis of this paper was conducted between February 2015 and the end of 2017. Such a long time period allowed us to obtain insight into the integration of refugees as a dynamic process, a process that changes with time, and in which the interaction between refugees and the local community plays an important role. The two and a half years of research and many encounters, i.e. regular meetings with the informants, as well as multiple semi-structured interviews with the same persons (conducted at intervals of several months, one year or several days), provided insight into the transformation of their experiences, depending on the moment they were interviewed or the period of their lives they were referring to: arrival in Croatia, time spent waiting for asylum in reception centres, everyday life and experiences in exercising the rights they were lawfully entitled to, and their understandings of the concept of integration itself. The aim of conducting semi-structured interviews was to gain insight into the experiences of the informants as refugees in terms of the main aspects of their integration (Spradley 1979 according to Roulston 2010: 19). In this paper, we present one part of these experiences through summaries of the stories of several of the informants, selected according to the importance of the connections that they established (or did not establish) with the members of the receiving country.

The interviewed informants arrived in Croatia after 2011. The interviews were conducted in English, French or Croatian (according to the choice of the informants). The interlocutors were selected with the aim of presenting an ethnography of the particular (Abu-Lughod 1991), in the manner of representing various countries of origin (Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Syria), different professions (athlete, cook, chef, musician, lawyer), as well as different family situations (singles, families). The age of our interlocutors ranged between 19 and 35.[5] Although our initial aim was to examine the experiences of both sexes, this proved to be difficult to accomplish. Men constituted the greater majority of our interviewees, as they were participants in various events (e.g. Refugee Day, Migrants Day, cooking workshops, African Days in Zagreb) that were related to refugees in Croatia. It turned out that men were more active and "visible" than women. In addition, some women refused to talk due to a lack of language proficiency, or due to other unnamed reasons (an interview could not be arranged with them, or they ignored the request for an interview). The interviews were arranged after a brief period of acquaintance with the informants that were included in participant observation. Some of the interlocutors were involved in two local initiatives, the culinary collective the Taste of Home[6] and the Football Club Zagreb 041,[7] which aimed at supporting the integration of refugees into Croatian society. Parts of this paper refer to data obtained in case studies of these two local initiatives (cf. Jurković 2018).

Integration experiences of refugees in Croatia: interactions with members of the local community

The work focuses on the interactive dimension of the integration of refugees in Croatia, from the time of their arrival in Croatia and the period while they were waiting to be granted international protection (asylum) up to the period of one, two or three years after they were granted asylee status in Croatia. Our aim was to examine the informants' experiences in interacting with the members of the local community, whether with persons employed in governmental institutions that are part of the system for providing care and assistance to asylum seekers and asylees, persons who work or volunteer for organisations that help refugees, or individuals and Croatian citizens that are not related to any of the stated groups. The informants shall be listed in the order that they are mentioned in the work, as Informant A, Informant B, Informant C, etc. We shall first present their experiences from the

[5] Of all 485 persons that were granted international protection until the end of 2017, 243 were aged between 18 and 34. See more: https://www.mup.hr/ministarstvo/dokumenti/statistika (last access 5 March 2018).

[6] See more about the Taste of Home in: Jurković and Rajković Iveta 2016 and Jurković 2018.

[7] See more about the Football Club Zagreb 041 in: Jurković 2018.

period while they were waiting for asylum, followed by their experiences after they had been granted asylum.

Life experiences of asylum seekers in Croatia

Upon their arrival in Croatia, the informants were accommodated in a reception centre for asylum seekers.[8] In the reception centre, not all people "were the same", reported Informant A, as some of the asylum seekers engaged in theft and caused trouble. What bothered him was that all of the asylum seekers were treated equally, as if they were "all bad". Even when he would venture beyond the centre, to places frequented by young people, he would encounter the following:

> "If you're an asylum seeker, if you say you're an asylum seeker […] people don't want to communicate with you […] People from Croatia. If you tell them that you're a refugee, they don't even want to shake your hand."

When he would tell them where he was from and what he was doing in Croatia, they would respond: "OK, you're a refugee, an asylum seeker. We don't want to talk to you". We can conclude that this Informant's first contact with Croatian society was marked with interactions where the individuals from the receiving society decided not to continue communication with him, because they would stereotypically conclude that he, as an asylum seeker, was the Other, different, and should be excluded as such because he did not fit in, because he was different (cf. Hall 1997). Such were the perceptions of asylum seekers among the local population, but our other informants also had such perceptions of themselves. As Informant B reported to journalists about the life of an asylum seeker:

> "You don't have a mother, a father, a nation. Nobody speaks your language. You feel like a total nobody, worthless. The life of an asylee is such that you feel that you don't belong anywhere. You're apart. On buses, people turn away from you. In café bars, nobody wants to sit next to you. When you want to go to a club, you need documents […] Who are you, actually? Nobody." (Žaja 2014)

Informant C spent two years in a reception centre. His thoughts on being labelled as an asylum seeker (cf. Zetter 1991) are also marked with an unwillingness to identify with such an identity. Here, we encounter a certain paradox: persons seeking and being granted international protection are often embarrassed to have found themselves in the situation of someone who needs protection, in which this

[8] During the period of the research, there were two reception centres in Croatia: one in Zagreb and the other in Kutina.

embarrassment primarily stems from conceptions that the members of the receiving society have about them, or from their opinion that such, primarily negative, conceptions dominate. Refusal to accept the identity of a refugee is best reflected in the interview conducted with a married couple from Syria, as reported by the husband (Informant D):

> "Wherever I go, I'm a refugee […] Whenever you think about yourself, you feel like a foreigner, and you'll never be like a citizen […] When you look at me, you don't tell me that I'm a refugee, but I am a refugee, I am a foreigner […]",

adding that he "hated being a refugee". For example, when going to a town park with their children, they would feel that they were not "like the other people there, like they were at home". He explained that, though other people might not view them as foreigners, that this was how they felt. Informant D, his wife and three children waited briefly for asylum at the reception centre in Zagreb, as they were included in the European programme for relocation of refugees from Greece to other European countries. In response to the question on how they spent time at the reception centre, the Informant stated: "You can imagine how we spent the time, in one room". However, he added that the situation in Croatia was better than it had been in Greece, where they had spent several months previously. They arrived in the reception centre for asylum seekers in Zagreb in August, and at that time there were no activities that they could have involved themselves in (such as Croatian language classes or creative workshops) because it was the period of summer holidays. Only the children spent two to three hours a day in playgroups organised by UNICEF. To this, Informant D added: "I hate Croatia [Zagreb, authors' note], in summer, there's nobody here, it's really empty, I feel that it's empty. I feel isolated". The lack of employees of public and other institutions due to the annual leave, i.e. a lack of interaction with them, was what this Informant highlighted as a negative phenomenon.

Informant C, who was a professional football player in his country of origin, started to encourage other asylum seekers to play football after he arrived at the reception centre for asylum seekers, as: "when we started playing, it didn't matter where someone was from, or what religion he belonged to", adding that they all played together. Furthermore, this was something that they did at their own initiative. In one of the interviews, he described how it once happened that policemen and other employees of the reception centre, together with people from the Red Cross who had provided them with a field for playing, watched the asylum seekers play football with great interest, which he found to be "very nice" as it was the only thing that attracted them, something they wanted to watch. He added: "the asylum seekers played with joy, the police watched them, and everybody was happy", which demonstrates the importance of interaction between asylum seekers, the local Croatian population and

the police when it comes to leisure activities. With this, the ethnography of the particular showed that the reception centre for asylum seekers did not always have to be an "area of uncertainty" in which it is difficult to build trust between asylum seekers and the employed staff (cf. Pozniak and Petrović 2014). On the basis of interactions established in the reception centre and his work in it as a football coach, Informant C met the president of the local football club for which younger players (children) of Croatian origin played. He offered the Informant the position of the coach of the club, and the Informant's first reaction was to say that his Croatian was not really good, and that because of this he would not be able to communicate with the children. The president of the club retorted that this did not even matter, as "football speaks only one language". The Informant continued: "This is something I'll never forget […] and that is how I started coaching the kids". He would coach the asylum seekers in the morning, and the children in the evening. Often he would miss dinner at the reception centre as it clashed with his training sessions with the children but, nevertheless, he was "very, very happy" as it was time well spent, and because he felt needed and had the opportunity to continue playing football, like he did in his country of origin. This football club forever "remained in his heart", as:

> "These were people who accepted me […] out of love […] they loved me. They respected me as a human being, not as an asylum seeker, not as a coach that they wanted to use […] This was something I saw in the eyes of these parents […] When someone behaves towards me in a loving way, I can sense it […] This is why I was so happy when they gave me this chance."

Therefore, he was happy at the club where he coached children because nobody perceived him as an asylum seeker, and he stressed: "Why should a human being be viewed as an asylum seeker?", adding:

> "I want to be viewed just like any other Croatian citizen who lives here, as someone who goes through the same things as other people […] If you live somewhere, try to spend time with this community, do what they do, feel both their pain and their joy; this is what it means to be integrated […]."

From this experience, it can be observed that this Informant needed to not feel treated like a mere asylum seeker by the local community, but to be accepted for his knowledge and skills. As Pittaway et al. concluded: "People feel the need to be able to contribute to their new country, to retake control of their own lives and to regain their dignity and freedom" (2009: 144). Likewise, his desire to spend time with the members of the society into which he migrated and to understand them can also be observed.

Reception centres offered organised activities for asylum seekers with the primary aim of filling their leisure time, and not with the aim of discovering their

knowledge, skills, talents, and finding places where they could be employed to the benefit of both asylum seekers and their new community. The case of Informant C represents an example of his individual strength and the need not to succumb to waiting and idleness, which was then recognised by the members of the receiving society. Only when he stepped out onto the football field did others notice him and acknowledge his abilities. Such situations do not happen often, and neither do they happen to the majority of asylum seekers. We would like to stress that Informant C was over 30 when he arrived in Croatia, in contrast to, for example, Informant A, who was in his early twenties, and thus attention should also be given to the maturity of the informants and their previous life experiences. Therefore, Informant C, though indirectly, through his desire to continue playing his beloved sport of football, effected the establishment of interaction with members of the receiving society, which then caused the creation of new dimensions of interaction, such as social and economic.

Experiences of integrating into Croatian society after being granted asylum

The previously mentioned practices of exclusion, i.e. non-acceptance by the receiving society, for Informant A continued even after he was granted asylum and started living in Zagreb. He encountered rejection: "Even my neighbours don't want to talk to me because they know who I am, all they do is just say 'hi' from time to time". Furthermore, he held that it was difficult for him to find a job because people did not like "other skin colours". Therefore, here the question is not only of social status (asylum seekers and asylees as non-citizens or *denizens*, cf. Agamben 1995), but also of colour of skin, which *a priori* stereotypes people into the category of those you should not socialise with, or those you should be careful with. With time, the Informant A met new people, mostly volunteers of non-governmental organisations that worked with refugees, who showed him a different side to Croatian society, and whom he befriended. Therefore, his conclusion was as follows: "If you don't have friends, you can die here!"

During the research, Informant A's thoughts about his life in Croatia changed. During the first interview, he stated that it was more difficult to be an asylee than an asylum seeker, explaining this with the insufficient financial assistance that unemployed asylees received. In the second interview (after four months), he still held that good people existed in Croatia, but he also had new understandings about the citizens of Croatia: he stated that they suffered too, as they were without money and employment. He was also unemployed at that moment, although he had established contact with the culinary cooperative the Taste of Home, which gathers migrants and refugees, and cooked with them occasionally. However, he did not have the best opinion of this cooperative, as he held it to be a closed group of people that was difficult to approach. Nevertheless, he managed to find a summer job on the Adriatic

coast through them, and later found employment in the cooperative as a cook. Informant A was also a cricket player, and he played cricket for a club from Zagreb and won awards at competitions outside of Croatia with this club. He stressed that his fellow cricket players had helped him a lot, and that he was able to count on them much more than on those who were very vocal and public about their support for the integration of asylees. In his last interview (a year and a half after the first interview), he stated that he was finally happy with his life in Croatia. However, he was not certain whether he wanted to stay in Croatia permanently. As one of the problems, he reported having searched for a place to rent for three months, commenting that people were racist and did not wish to rent him an apartment.

The example of Informant A illustrates the importance of interaction with the domicile population, which was mediated through activities conducted in the culinary cooperative and through playing cricket. Through our encounters with him during two years, we observed that the intensity of interaction with Croatian citizens was what conditioned his stance as to whether he wanted to leave Croatia or stay. The better the interaction with the local community, the more satisfied he was with his life in Croatia, and vice versa. With time, the interactive dimension proved to be strengthened and expanded, as he had found employment in the culinary cooperative, thus achieving both the social and the economic dimensions of integration. He travelled with them, which allowed him to encounter new people and regions of Croatia, which contributed to his feeling of being happy in Croatia.

Informant C continued coaching children after he was granted asylum, but he also received an invitation from another club, Football Club Zagreb 041, to coach the adults that were playing for this club, among whom some were asylum seekers and asylees. The Club was established in late 2014, and one of its aims was to integrate refugees. Informant C coached the players of this Club for more than a year, on a voluntary basis. In the interview, he stated that some of the members would tell him that he was the identity of the Club, which was something that he could not accept because that would have meant that not all members of the football club were equal, whereas his stance was as follows:

> "All are equal in this Club, and no matter whether you're black or white – you're a player of this team and a member of this Club, and if you don't play football well, you won't play."

In addition to coaching for Football Club Zagreb 041, Informant C also found employment and married a Croatian woman after he was granted asylum. After some time he stepped down from the role of coach of Football Club Zagreb 041, as he did not have enough time for all his private and business obligations. In the meantime, he also completed the coaching school of the Croatian Football Federation and continued coaching the children of Croatian citizens in the men-

tioned local football club in Zagreb. We can conclude that, in his case as well, interaction with the local community not based on relationships related to his status as a refugee, i.e. asylee were of crucial importance for his integration.

Informant D and his wife were not satisfied with their lives as persons who were granted asylum in Croatia, adding that money did not play any part in it. Although they held themselves to be already integrated into Croatian society (the children attended kindergarten, and the husband was employed), they were not satisfied. They found this difficult to explain. The Informant explained that you always remembered and missed what you had at home: childhood, cousins, family. He stated: "It's like dying and being born again, but as adults with memories". In his country of origin, they were a rich family that led a full life and had many friends. Now, as they explained, they "could not do anything": they could not "buy a car, or go for summer holidays". They appreciated that Croatia received them, and people were kind towards them, but they wished to return to their own country. However, Informant D added that they might change their opinion in five years: "I'll probably say then that we need Croatian citizenship", because their children: "will have, by then, become Croats instead of Syrians, as their culture, friends, childhood […] would all be in Croatia". Already at the reception centre for asylum seekers, they established contact with a volunteer from a non-governmental organisation that offered them an apartment to rent.[9] The person in whose apartment they live still helps them a lot, and always asks them: "Do you need anything? Can I help you in any way?" Informant D, apart from possessing work experience as a lawyer in his country of origin, had also worked with international refugee organisations in Greece. These experiences, as well as the need to care for his three children together with his wife, had an influence on the speed with which he established connections with the domicile population. Soon after being granted asylum, the Informant found employment through a volunteer that published a post on her Facebook wall stating that a person who has been granted international protection was looking for a job. This post was shared further, an employer reacted to it and offered the Informant a job. However, due to a lack of proficiency in Croatian and due to a complicated procedure for recognising previously acquired qualifications, the job he received was only on a part-time basis and the salary was low. In order for the law studies that he completed in Syria to be recognised, Informant D would have to study law full-time in Croatia for two years which was, under the circumstances that his family of five had found himself in, i.e. the necessity to provide for their basic needs with his labour, unfeasible. This experience shows that the interactive dimension of integration is exceptionally important (for example, with the help of friends and acquaint-

[9] Persons who are granted international protection in Croatia are entitled to have their apartment rent covered by the government for two years, starting from the day that they received the decision on international protection (see: Zakon o međunarodnoj i privremenoj zaštiti).

ances who were Croatian citizens, they were able to find a place to rent more quickly, and the Informant was able to find a job), though there still exists the pronounced subjective feeling of not belonging, as well as the memory of losing everything they had in their country of origin. Furthermore, interaction also highlights the prejudices that the members of the receiving society have about Others, regardless of their education, to which the following words of the Informant are witness:

> "You know, once when I was having a friendly conversation with my boss, he told me: 'You know, I thought you were 55 or 60 years old because you were a lawyer with three kids.' He also thought that I didn't know how to use the Internet, or send an e-mail […] He told me that he thought that I didn't have any experience […] Often, people from European countries don't know anything about Syria, or about Arab countries in general."

Such realisations also show that his employer observed the world in a somewhat ethnocentric way. Therefore, we hold that conducting cultural anthropological research is of essential importance for integration that involves persons from different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Informant D and his wife stated the following about their lives in Croatia:

> "We started a new life here, and starting a new life is very difficult […] We have started moving forward, and we hope we can continue in this direction […]. The culture is different here, and we had to accept many new ideas that we might have not been open to previously, or which we hadn't even thought about […] Now, we have to accept them and face them."

Upon his arrival in Croatia, Informant D opened a Facebook page in Arabic titled Asylum in Croatia. His decision was motivated by the fact that, prior to their arrival in Croatia, they tried to find out information about asylees in Croatia, but were unable to find anything in Arabic. This is why they decided to provide people with information about the situation in Croatia and life there, thus creating manifold interactive networks and transnational fields (cf. Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004) that no longer only focus on life in Croatia and life in the country of origin, but also on the lives of all of those who, as asylum seekers, happen to find themselves in Croatia. According to official documents, their number will continue to increase.[10]

After being granted asylum in 2012, Informant B started cooking in the cooperative the Taste of Home which, from the aspect of interaction, brought changes into

[10] According to the *Action Plan for Integration of Persons Who Have Been Granted International Protection for the Period from 2017 to 2019*, it is expected that 625 unemployed persons that have been granted international protection will be registered with the Croatian Employment Service in 2018, and that 618 such persons will be registered in 2019 (*Action Plan…* 2017: 19).

his life. He cooked for Croatian citizens at various events. According to his own words: "People would eat everything I cooked and then come back for seconds". This realisation can be interpreted as a moment in which the interactive dimension of integration was achieved, i.e. a turning point in his views of the members of the receiving society – who previously, as he clarified, had the habit of showing even overt signs of dislike just because he was black. Thus the Informant became convinced that food could change opinions and help him meet friends, and food also helped change his conceptions of Croatia as a closed-off country that was not particularly inclined towards those who were "different". Five years after these initial contacts mediated by food, he opened an African restaurant in the city centre of Zagreb together with a friend from the same country of origin. In addition to cooking, Informant B also provided assistance to asylum seekers in reception centres and, together with several Africans and the help of one non-governmental organisation, founded the Association of Africans in Croatia (*Društvo Afrikanaca u Hrvatskoj* – DAH) in 2014.

> "[DAH] will promote social cohesion among African groups and individuals in the Republic of Croatia in order to prevent feeling the effects of isolation, social exclusion and racism […] Promoting and presenting a positive image of Africa and its cultural values […] Informing Africans in the Republic of Croatia on the possibility of exercising the rights and enabling the participation of its members and other Africans in the Republic of Croatia at various meetings and events pertaining to African culture and traditions as well as those that are suitable for integration into Croatian society."[11]

Informant B was the first president of the Association. Together with other members of DAH, he implemented many activities that had an impact on the locals in the sense of informing them about Africa. Their most frequent activity was visiting primary schools, where they would tell the children about Africa, tell them African fairy tales, dance and play the traditional African instrument *djembe*. During one such activity, held in 2017 as part of the festival "African Fairy Tales", we witnessed Informant B telling the children of a Zagreb primary school about his positive and negative experiences in Croatia. He told them how, while he was sitting on a bench near the Central Train Station in Zagreb, a child approached him and started rubbing the skin of his arm. The child's mother ran up to them, apologised and explained that her daughter was a huge fan of Africa, that her sister liked to dress up as an African woman and paint her skin in a dark colour, and that therefore, in this way – by rubbing the Informant's skin – the little girl was only trying to find out whether the colour could come off, i.e. if he was really black. The Informant told the pupils that this was the happiest day for him after his arrival in Croatia, because

[11] http://dah.hr/ (last access 23 October 2017).

he saw that "a child loved Africa and black people". This story brought joy to the pupils. By telling them about his positive experiences with the local population, he created new positive interactions with the pupils that he was telling the story to. He also told them about his bad experiences during his stay at the reception centre for asylum seekers: "In Kutina, when they asked me: 'Who are you?' I told them: 'Nobody – people don't want to sell me a drink!'", explaining that, in one café bar in Kutina, they didn't want to serve him because he was black. The school in which the members of DAH were presenting Africa on that day was the 56th school in which they had organised such activities. The end of such meetings with children was always full of song, dance and laughter.

Informant E also cooked at the culinary collective the Taste of Home, which began as an occasional activity that later developed into a permanent and paid job. His experiences with the Taste of Home were very positive, and this meant:

> "[…] a new family for me […], a new collective, great people who I meet there and a great idea. The idea is great because it's full of messages, a new revolution for me […] We share food, different food and food we eat at one plate, and it's unity, the unification of everyone, from everywhere. We can share, to show that we can do something […] It's one of my reasons (why I am taking part in), because I see it as a big idea, good things that are for me very important, you know […] Unity, peace, love. New family and do what you want." (Jurković and Rajković Iveta 2016: 196)

For him, the collective the Taste of Home also signifies the realisation of the identificational dimension of integration, as demonstrated by the feeling of belonging to, i.e. creating a "new family" which is also the result of the interactive aspect of his integration process. As he also found employment with this collective in the end, in addition to the interactive and identificational dimensions of integration, the collective also provided him with economic integration. With time, he finished a training programme for chef, which was funded by the Red Cross, and became chief cook in the Taste of Home. He stressed that integration, above all, depended on the persons themselves, after which other people and Croatian society played an important role in the sense of openness towards asylees. "They're welcoming, they're nice, but they need to do more […]" explaining that this related more to culture, sports, music and shows that would involve asylees and the local population:

> "If the country sees me, if it trusts me and gives me a *paper* [grants international protection, authors' note], gives me a chance to start a new life, then I can pay them back, I can thank them […]."

For some time, Informant E played football for the Football Club Zagreb 041, whose members, i.e. people gathered around the Club, he had met even before the

Club was founded, as the association of football fans White Angels (*Bijeli Anđeli*), predecessor of the Club (cf. Hodges 2015), had initiated meetings and football games with refugees and asylees a few years before the foundation of the Club. For Informant E, these activities were of crucial importance, as through this kind of socialisation he managed to establish social connections with the *local guys*, which then proved to be important for his feeling of connection with what was to become the Club that he would play at. This connection, as he described it, is as strong as family, i.e. occurs on the interactive and identificational level of his integration. On the other hand, Informant C, who was the coach of the same Club, achieved such a level in another football club, as there he felt that he was loved and respected as a human being, not as an asylum seeker. Apart from the interactive dimension, playing football for the Football Club Zagreb 041 also provided Informant E with the identificational dimension of integration as, when he met some of the people connected with the Club for the first time, the feeling between them was as if they had known each other for five years:

> "We talked, we laughed, it was cool. There was human warmth there […] this is what I respect […] and so if you say organisation, I'll tell you – no, it's a family, not an organisation."

These experiences confirm the importance of interaction for integration, as well as its influence on other dimensions of integration.

Informant F, who is from Africa, and was granted asylum in 2015, often participated in meetings and events organised by the Association of Africans in Croatia. Sometimes he would sing at the concerts of the Croatian-African band or play drums at African evenings held in clubs throughout Zagreb. At the festival "African Fairy Tales", he told the children stories from Africa and proved to be an interesting and animated narrator who aimed to bring the atmosphere of the place he was talking about to life through words and gestures. He often came to the matches of the Football Club Zagreb 041, especially in 2016, when he would drum together with the other drummers on the stands while surrounded by singing fans. During our meetings, he was always happy to have the opportunity to talk to someone in French, and he was always in the mood for joking around. He viewed DAH as the initiator of cultural exchange between Africa and Europe, and as an educator and promotor of Africa in Croatian schools. When, during a meeting of DAH that the co-author of the paper participated in, the question of how much the image of the Association should be connected with refugees arose among the members of DAH, Informant F stated: "Being a refugee is not bad. It's just a label, the important thing is knowing who you are". Therefore, in contrast to the other informants, he did not have any problems in identifying as an asylee. He viewed being granted asylum in Croatia as follows: "This is the country that accepted me, and I'm proud to be

in Croatia and to be living in Croatia. Whether the economy goes up or down, I'll be here". He was also a musician, but it didn't take him long to come to the conclusion that he could not make a living from music in Croatia. Thus he completed a training programme for forklift operator (funded by the Red Cross), and two months after the completion of the training he found a job at a company that already employed several asylees. He stressed that he worked as a forklift operator out of self-respect, to earn a living and survive, while adding "but music – music is my life". On the first day of his new job, a woman working there told him: "I know you! You play *djembe* with DAH at schools […] We saw you on TV, we know you". This is why he held that DAH played a large role in his integration. In his example, the interactive dimension was established through an association that gathers Africans in Croatia, which influenced the establishment of interaction between the Association members and employers, thus also influencing the realisation of the Informant's economic dimension of integration.

Concluding thoughts

The integration of asylees into Croatian society is a dynamic process that, on one hand, depends on the quality of the institutional infrastructure that the receiving society has provided for persons under international protection, and, on the other hand, on the persons themselves. This paper, which focused on the lives of refugees as asylum seekers and their lives after being granted asylum, showed that success at establishing interactive connections with the members of the receiving society greatly depends on the persons themselves, and that the interactive dimension of integration also plays the role of connective tissue in other dimensions of integration. The interactive dimension of integration proved to be of crucial importance for the creation of "social bridges" (Ager and Strang 2004) with the local population, i.e. with individuals that became the informants' friends, or with acquaintances and individuals that were willing to help them. Interaction with the local community also proved to be of foremost importance in changing our interlocutors' attitude towards the local population: from the attitude that they didn't like Others, asylees, and black people, to the attitude that there were also good people among them. In the cases of certain refugees, it was precisely such individuals, who did not necessarily have to be connected with any governmental or non-governmental institution providing assistance in integration, that played a key role in making their lives in Croatia easier. The interactive dimension of integration was crucial in making the informants arrive at the opinion that there were people in Croatia who were willing to help. Likewise, this dimension also revealed to them the prejudices that even such good people have in relation to the countries and regions that refugees arrive from. Interaction with new friends, Croatian citizens, also proved to be of importance in finding adequate accommodation more easily, and in finding employment.

When it comes to the other dimensions of integration (cf. Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016), the identificational dimension was also prominent in the research. In this paper, it encompassed the matter of identification with the status of refugee as a person under international protection, which mostly comprised of rejection and dislike towards the position of a foreigner in society and the identity of a refugee, asylum seeker or asylee. On the other hand, identification that was acceptable to refugees occurred at the level of the collective that accepted them and which felt like family. Such collectives were football-related, i.e. sports clubs and a culinary collective that gathers refugees. Through these collectives, they entered into interactions with persons who also had refugee experience, as well as with Croatian citizens who accepted their food, played football with them or engaged in other forms of interaction with them.

Conducting research of ethnography of the particular (Abu-Lughod 1991) through a period of two and a half years proved to be of importance for observing the dynamic nature of the integration process: the changes that happen in a person's life with the passing of time, as well as the changes in their views about life in Croatia. Some of the informants participated in activities aimed at raising awareness about refugees and members of other cultures in Croatia and themselves initiated new associations and activities, such as the Association of Africans in Croatia and activities related to the presentation of Africa to schoolchildren. Interaction with children through educational stories on Africa, laughter, music and dance proved to be one of the most effective ways to eliminate stereotypes and preconceptions about Others, thus influencing the understanding that the integration of refugees is not only the international obligation of Croatia, but also a mutually beneficial interaction process in which all who are involved have something to gain.

Although the interactive and identificational dimensions of integration are subjective categories, and are not among the foremost priorities of theorists of integration, interaction with Croatian citizens proved to be of exceptional importance for integration of refugees in Croatian society, as it represented an important link with other dimensions of integration, including the socioeconomic dimension (cf. Penninx 2007). Also, interaction showed to be essential for the refugees to feel as accepted members of Croatian society. By conducting field research for a longer period of time (two and a half years), i.e. through a systematic approach that included many interactions and multiple interviews with persons who were granted international protection in Croatia (interviews that were held from a few months to one year apart), it was also possible to observe the importance of the time and moment when the research was conducted for perceptions of satisfaction and integration into the receiving society.

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